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Abstract 
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) production sharing contracts 
(PSCs) with international oil companies (IOCs) have dominated the relationship 
crises between the KRG and the Iraqi Federal Government (IFG) for the last 15 
years. During this period, the KRG has managed to sign 50 PSCs with IOCs 
without any participation of, or prior approval from, the IFG. The authority of 
the KRG to manage oil and gas operations and the legality of the KRG’s PSC has 
been contested constantly by the IFG. The federal Constitution (the 
Constitution) is the primary battlefield between the KRG and the IFG over the 
management of oil and gas operations. The KRG argues that its act of managing 
oil and gas operations within its territories is consistent with the constitutional 
provisions.1 Articles 111 and 112 of the Constitution are the main sources for 
oil and gas management. Article 111 concerns the ownership of oil and gas in 
Iraq, while Article 112 provides how oil and gas should be managed.  
This legal dispute is also associated with long-standing ethnic conflict between 
the Kurds and the IFG for over 80 years. The political dimension has adverse 
implications for this legally complicated dispute. This research critically analyses 
the legal arguments forwarded by the disputed parties over the management of 
oil and gas under the Constitution. It also provides an in-depth investigation 
into the legality of the KRG’s PSC and whether they are consistent with the 
Constitution. The constitutional issues have complicated the dispute to the 
extent that settlement would be impossible unless substantial amendments are 
made to the Constitution or to the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law. The research 
considered all relevant national and international laws, examined the legal 
positions of both parties, scrutined the views of key players, and provides 
practical recommendations to achieve an objective outcome.  
 
Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 
Kurdistan Production Sharing Contract (KRG PSC) 
                                                          
1 The full text of the Iraqi Constitution is available at www.iraqinationality.gov.iq  
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Legality of the KRG Production Sharing Contract 
Constitutional Dispute over the KRG’s PSC 
Dispute between the Iraq Federal Government and Kurdistan Regional 
Government over Oil and Gas Operations 
History of Oil and Gas in Kurdistan Region 
History of Oil and Gas in Iraq  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter will give an overview of the oil and gas dispute in Iraq, research 
question, aims and objectives, and structure the of thesis  
1.2  Overview of the Conflict over the oil and gas resources in Iraq  
Iraq is the second-largest OPEC oil producer, producing 4.5 million bpd. Its 
proven oil reserves are estimated at 150 billion barrels, including the Kurdistan 
regional proven oil.2 OPEC estimated the Kurdistan regional proven oil is 43.7 
billion barrels and its proven gas is between 3 and 6 trillion cubic meters3. 
Kurdistan oil makes up 30% of all Iraq proven oil and its gas accounts for 89% 
of all proven gas in Iraq. Based on the current figures regarding the Kurdistan 
regional reserves of proven oil and gas, Kurdistan is expected to be one of the 
world’s top petroleum producing regions in the future. Therefore, petroleum 
production will play an effective role in the region’s political future. Accordingly, 
the current dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi IFG was expected to be 
legally and politically complex. Any future settlement over oil and gas 
management between these two governments would not be easy. Compromise 
over the country’s primary economic resource is the most difficult task for both 
disputing parties, as the oil and gas disputes are associated with complex 
constitutional issues and long-standing political conflict. Therefore, any 
attempts to understand the current dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi IFG 
over oil and gas management requires thorough knowledge and understanding 
of the historical background of oil and gas operations in Iraq and the political 
conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. 
 
                                                          
2 Stasa Salacanin. The battle for Kurdish oil. Qantara.de 2018. The text available at 
https://en.qantara.de/content/iraq%CA%B9s-wrangle-over-natural-resources-the-
battle-for-kurdish-oil  
3 PUK MEDIA. Oil Companies in Kurdistan Region. https://www.pukmedia.com 
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1.2.1 De facto Kurdistan Regional Government in 1991 
As a result of the First Gulf War against the Allied Forces in 1991, the Iraqi 
government lost control over a large area of Kurdistan, Iraq. In 1991, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 by which a no-fly zone was 
imposed on Iraq. The no-fly zone restricted Iraqi aircraft to fly over large areas 
of Kurdish populated territory.4 As a result of the no-fly zone restriction, Kurdish 
political parties, mainly the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) and the Patriot 
United of Kurdistan (PUK), gained control over the large area of Kurdistan for 
the first time in the history of Iraq. In 1992, the general elections were held in 
Kurdistan and subsequently, the Kurdistan Regional Government was formed 
(KRG).5 Between 1991 and 2003, the KRG had no formal and legal relationship 
with the former Saddam Hussein regime; the KRG was a semi-autonomous 
regional government independent of the central government. However, the KRG 
received de facto international recognition. The United Nations (UN) and 
western countries dealt with them directly without central government approval. 
The UN directly dealt with the KRG in respect of its share in the Oil-for-Food 
Programme.6  
After the U.S-led coalition force invasion in 2003, a new Iraqi government was 
formed in 2004. The KRG re-joined the central government. The relationship 
between the KRG and IFG is now regulated by the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 
(“the Constitution”). Article 1 of the Constitution provides that Iraq is a federal 
state.7 The Constitution recognises the KRG as a federal region8 and the KRG’s 
authority and its relationship with the IFG is regulated by constitutional 
provisions.9 The Constitution came into effect in 2006. Between 1991 and 2005 
the KRG was a semi-autonomous de facto regional government and was 
                                                          
4 Global Policy Forum (GPF) No-fly zone. https://www.globalpolicy.org/previous-
issues-and-debate-on-iraq/no-fly-zones.html  
5 About the Kurdistan Regional Government, available at www.cabinet.gov.krd  
6 Johannes Jüde, “Contesting borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan's de facto 
state”, International Affairs, Volume 93, Issue 4, July 2017, Pages 847–863, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix125.  
7 Article 1: The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign 
state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, 
and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.  
8 Article 117: First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the 
region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
9 The relevant articles of the Constitution will be referred to in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
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independent of the central government and its authorities in managing internal 
affairs, including the management of oil and gas.  
In 1994, domestic war erupted between the two main political parties of the 
KRG, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP), which resulted in having two separate administrations within the KRG’ 
controlled area. In 1995, the PUK developed the field and started oil production 
from the Taq Taq oilfield situated near the town of Taq Taq.10 The Taq Taq oilfield 
was discovered in 1978 but had been left undeveloped by the former Iraqi 
regime.11 The KRG signed a PSC with Genel Energy in 2002, and the initial 
contract was amended in 2004 and in 2006.12 The KRG concluded a PSC with 
DNO in 2004.13 The initial production from the Taq Taq oilfield was not 
significantly high. High production required funds, technical expertise, and 
technology, which the KRG was unable to provide at the time considering the 
UN economic sanctions on Iraq, including the KRG. Under the UN economic 
sanctions Iraq was not allowed to export its oil to the international market, and 
IOCs were not allowed to purchase Iraqi oil. Although Kurdistan was not under 
the direct control of the Iraqi government, it was subject to the UN economic 
sanctions. However, the PUK was able to produce tens of thousands of bpd of 
oil. The production was for local use and transported by tankers to the 
neighbouring countries. In competition with the PUK, the KDP started searching 
for oil within the area under its control. Due to the lack of technology and funds, 
searching for oil by the KDP was not an easy task. Although oil was discovered 
in different areas within the KDP territories, significant development was not 
made until after 2003 because of lack financial resources. 
                                                          
10 Competent Person’s Report Taq Taq Field ss of December 2015. Prepared for: Genel 
Energy International Ltd. MAICO Building, The Valley Anguilla, British West Indies TV1 
11P. Prepared by McDaniel & Associates Consultants Ltd. 2200, 255 – 5th Avenue SW 
Calgary, Alberta T2P 3G6. 2016. The report is available at 
https://www.genelenergy.com/media/1957/genel-energy-cpr-report-taq-taq-field-
311215.pdf  
11 Garland, C. R., I. Abalioglu, L. Akca, A. Cassidy, Y.Chiffoleau, L.Godail, M.A.S.Grace, 
H.J.Kader, F.Khalek, H. Legarre, H. B. Nazhat, and B. Sallier, 2010, Appraisal and 
development of the Taq Taq field, Kurdistan region, Iraq: Geological Society, London, 
Petroleum Geology Conference series 7, p. 801–810, doi:10.1144 /0070801. The text 
is available at https://pgc.lyellcollection.org/content/7/1/801  
12 The full text of all the contracts are available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=1 
13 Al Arabia TV. Iraqi: Oil and Gas Part 1. available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DruYvQxDXAU&feature=em-share_video_user  
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After the collapse of the former Iraqi regime, the KRG enjoyed greater autonomy 
in governing the Kurdistan region. In 2005, a new Iraqi government was formed 
and the KRG found even greater autonomy and began acting more 
independently. After the invasion, a new investment law was introduced in Iraq 
by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA), Order 39,14 and the KRG introduced 
its own investment law. Both investment laws were favourable to international 
companies to encourage international investment to participate in rebuilding the 
country, including IOCs. The KRG began to invite IOCs to invest in Kurdistan’s 
oil. The KRG announced that it would provide the PSC to IOCs to persuade them 
to invest in the KRG oil and gas sector. The terms and clauses of the KRG’s PSC 
were generous to IOCs. Because of the favourable terms of the KRG’s PSC, IOCs 
were racing to engage in KRG oil and gas operations to the extent that it affected 
their participation in the federal government bids for oil and gas licence.15 The 
large participation of the IOCs in the KRG’s oil and gas operations pushed the 
IFG to confront the KRG’s on the basis that the KRG does not have right to 
manage oil and gas without co-operation with the federal government and that 
the KRG’s PSC is not constitutional as its terms are contrary to the provisions of 
the Iraqi constitution. The KRG completely disagreed with the Iraqi 
government’s stance over the legality of its PSCs and insisted that its oil and 
gas contracts with IOCs are constitutional and were concluded in accordance 
with the provisions of the Iraqi constitution. 
The dispute over the KRG’s oil and gas contracts with the IOCs has become the 
most controversial and legally complicated issue in the relationship between the 
federal government and the KRG in the last 15 years. The IFG made it clear that 
the KRG does not have the exclusive right to manage the natural resources, 
including oil and gas, within its territories without prior approval from the central 
government. In addition, the terms of its PSC are so favourable to the IOCs that 
they breach the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The KRG has repeatedly 
confirmed that the Constitution grants the KRG a right to manage the natural 
resources, including oil and gas, within its territories, and that its PSCs are in 
conformity with the Constitution.  
                                                          
14 The full text is available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/  
15 Chris Edwards. Iraq oil and gas regime – Part 2. Reed Smith 2013. The full text is 
available at https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2013/07/iraq-oil-and-gas-
regime--part-2  
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1.2.2 Efforts to resolve the problem 
There have been on-going meetings and negotiations between the KRG and the 
Iraqi federal government to settle this matter. The matter is so legally 
complicated that settlement would be almost impossible. It should be noted that 
the oil and gas dispute is associated with other disputes between the IFG and 
the KRG, such as the KRG’s share from the annual petroleum revenue or annual 
general budget, and the territorial dispute.16 Therefore, in the presence of the 
other disputes, the oil and gas dispute would be more difficult to settle. The IFG 
relies on the constitutional provisions in denying the KRG’s right to manage oil 
and gas without co-operation of the federal government and claims that the PSC 
model is not consistent with the Constitution. In response to the IFG’s claim 
over the legality of its right to manage oil and gas and its PSC, the KRG argues 
that its oil and gas contracts with IOCs are conducted in accordance with the 
KRG Oil and Gas Law No 22 of 2007 and the Constitution. It further confirmed 
that all oil and gas contracts concluded before the enactment of the KRG Oil and 
Gas Law No 22 and the Constitution, have been modified or amended in a way 
to be consistent with the Constitution. 
 
1.2.3 The legality of the KRG’s PSC 
The disagreement between the Iraqi IFG and KRG over the legality of the KRG’s 
PSCs began around the same time as the KRG concluded a PSC with the 
Norwegian Oil company DNO ASA on 25 June 2004.17 Prior to its PSC with the 
DNO ASA, the KRG concluded a PSC with a Turkish oil company GENEL Enerji 
as on 17 July 2002.18 However, the Iraqi government formally declared its denial 
to the KRG’s right to sign oil and gas contracts with IOCs without co-operation 
of the IFG from 2004 and onward, after the KRG concluded the PSC with DNO.   
                                                          
16 Anjli Raval. Oil and Gas Correspondent, Financial Time. Interview with Richard 
Mallinson, Geopolitical Analyst, Energy Aspect. The video is available at  
https://youtu.be/tBmLPK0mx34.  
17 Tawke- Production Sharing Contracts (PSC)- Iraq-KRG. A copy of the signed 
contract is available at the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources website at 
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/ku/the-ministry-ku/contracts/pscs-signed  
18 Taq Taq - Production Sharing Contracts. A signed copy of the contract is available at 
the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources website at 
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/ku/the-ministry-ku/contracts/pscs-signed  
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The IFG argued that under Article 112 of the Constitution the KRG does not have 
exclusive constitutional rights to manage oil and gas within its territories and it 
cannot sign oil and gas contracts with IOCs without prior approval from the IFG. 
The KRG does not agree with the IFG’s interpretation of Article 112. The KRG 
argues that both Articles 112 and 111 of the Constitution confirm the KRG’s 
right to manage oil and gas operations within its territories, including signing oil 
and gas contracts with IOCs. 
 
1.2.4 Oil and gas dispute under the Constitution 
Before the enforcement of the Constitution, the IFG had no legal authority to 
stop KRG from managing petroleum operations. This was because Iraq had no 
national law or legislation regulating oil and gas operations and the KRG action 
of managing petroleum operations was unprecedented in Iraq’s legal system. 
Therefore, any attempts by the IFG to deny the KRG the right to manage oil and 
gas or to sign PSC lacked a legal basis. It may be argued that the same problem 
applies to the KRG that there was not any national law or legislation granting 
the KRG a right to manage oil and gas within its territories, or to sign oil and 
gas contracts with IOCs.  
Following the enactment of the Constitution in 2006, the dispute entered a new 
era, in which the constitutional provisions play a primary role in the legal 
arguments relied upon in the dispute. The dispute was mainly on the 
interpretation of Article 111, 112 and 115 of the Constitution. Each side of the 
dispute interprets Article 111 and 112 in a way that protects their interest. The 
IFG and the KRG’s interpretation of these two articles is critically examined in 
the later chapters of this study. In addition to the constitutional provisions, the 
relevant federal and regional law and legislation is considered. Before the 
enactment of the Constitution, the KRG was managing oil and gas operations in 
accordance with the oil and gas contracts it signed with the IOCs until 2007 
when the Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq, No. (22)-2007 was 
passed.19 
                                                          
19 The full text of the law is available at  
mnr.krg.org/images/pdfs/Kurdistan_Oil_and_Gas_Law_English_2007.pdf.  
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Article 141 of the Law No 22-2007 grants the KRG authority to amend or modify 
any terms or clauses of oil and gas contracts concluded by the KRG with IOCs 
before the enforcement of the Constitution that were inconsistent therewith, to 
bring them in line with the relevant provisions of the Constitution.  
The Iraqi government argues that the issues with the KRG’s PSCs could not be 
resolved through amendment or modification of the existing oil and gas 
contracts. The issue is that the KRG did not have the exclusive right to sign oil 
and gas contracts with IOCs without prior approval from the Iraqi government; 
therefore, the PSCs are not constitutional. The dispute over the legality of the 
KRG’s PSC remains unresolved.  
The tensions between both governments escalated further when the KRG 
concluded a PSC with the giant American oil company Exxon-Mobil in 2011.20 
The IFG used different methods to stop the deal, including threatening Exxon-
Mobil with the termination of its oil and gas contracts with the central 
government if they do not withdraw from the oil contract with the KRG. At the 
same time, it threatened the KRG with cutting its share of the annual budget if 
it continues signing PSCs with IOCs. The IFG repeatedly confirmed that the 
KRG’s oil and gas contracts must be approved by the central government in 
advance, otherwise they are not constitutional. The threat did not persuade 
Exxon-Mobil to withdraw from the contract with the KRG and did not stop the 
KRG from granting further PSCs to IOCs.  
 
1.3  Aims and Objectives   
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide an in-depth investigation into the 
legal dispute between the KRG and Iraqi IFG over the KRG’s exclusive right to 
manage oil and gas operations within its territories. It explores the dispute over 
relevant oil and gas law and relevant provisions of the Iraqi constitution in 
examining and analysing the legal arguments relied upon by the disputed 
parties in this long-standing dispute. In this investigation, the terms and clauses 
                                                          
20 KRG confirms ExxonMobil contract at Erbil oil and gas conference. Available at 
www.mnr.krg.org.  
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of the PSC and TSC are fully evaluated considering the relevant law and 
Constitution.  
The objectives are as follows:  
To provide a legal framework for regulating the relationship between the KRG 
and IFG over the management of oil and gas.  
To provide a legal jurisprudence for legal professions and academics on oil and 
gas law. Therefore, there is little legal knowledge among Iraqi practitioners and 
academics in this area of law. 
To provide a legal solution to this long-standing dispute supported by national 
and international legal authorities.  
To provide recommendations to the disputing parties on how an acceptable 
settlement to protect mutual interests can be reached.   
 
1.4  Research question 
 
The research attempts to answer the research question, which is: To what 
extent does the Iraqi Federal Constitution grant the KRG an exclusive 
right to manage oil and gas operations within the KRG’s territories? In 
other words, can the KRG manage oil and gas operation under the Constitution, 
including signing oil and gas contracts with IOCs without prior approval from 
the IFG.  
Secondary Question: Are the KRG’s PSCs consistent with the Iraqi 
Federal Constitution? The IFG argues that terms and clauses of the 
KRG’s PSC are so generous to IOCs that it does not achieve the highest 
benefit for the people of Iraq as is stipulated by Article 112 of the 
Constitution. In addition, the IFG claims that the immunity KRG’s PSC 
grants to IOCs undermines the sovereignty of Iraq. The research 
examines the terms of the KRG’s PSC to answer the above questions.   
 
1.5  Research Methodology  
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The research methodology is qualitative and desk based supported with 
empirical data collected from the interviews of the individuals who are directly 
involved in the Iraqi oil and gas sector.21 The research methodology is designed 
to explore the main points of the legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG 
over the KRG’s oil and gas contracts with IOCs. It is designed to fully investigate 
the core issue of the dispute and to evaluate the legal arguments of both sides 
to achieve the objectives of this study. Therefore, it is important that an 
appropriate method should be selected to ensure the validity and accuracy of 
data collected and the findings the research makes. Chapter five provides the 
details of the data collection method, the instruments used to collect the data, 
and the data analysis strategy. For data collection, the research relies on 
primary and secondary sources. Sources include the Constitution, Oil and Gas 
Law of Kurdistan Law. No (22)-2007, Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) the 
KRG has concluded with IOCs, other domestic legislation and international law, 
data from the literature reviewed, and data collected from the interviews 
conducted with the individuals who are directly involved in oil and gas disputes 
from both the IFG and the KRG. It also provides the reasons for the selected 
method and approach in conducting the research, including why the specific 
approach was taken in the research and why the analysis techniques were 
applied. 
 
1.6  Structure of the research thesis 
 
This thesis comprises of six chapters as follows: 
Chapter one provides a general outline of the research question and the nature 
of the legal dispute between the KRG and the central government and the main 
points of the dispute. This chapter provides a brief discussion of both side’s 
arguments concerning the research question. It also discusses the main 
                                                          
21 Paul Chynoweth. Advanced research methods in the built environment. Chapter 
Three, Legal Research. P29. Available online at 
http://www.csas.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/66542/Legal_Research_Chyno
weth_-_Salford_Uni..pdf  
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objectives and aims of the research and finally provides brief outlines of each 
chapter of the research thesis. 
Chapter two explains the methodology of the research and what method and 
strategy were adopted to conduct the research. It explores the sources of the 
data (primary and secondary sources and interviews). It discusses the 
difficulties the researcher experienced during the data collection and conducting 
the interviews. It also justifies the methods used. 
Chapter three explains the historical background of oil and gas concessions 
and contracts in Iraq from the 1920s to 2003 and how the terms of the 
concession agreements changed and were finally terminated. The chapter 
discusses the nationalisation of Iraqi oil and the introduction of the service 
contract. It discusses the changes in the oil contract and legal developments 
concerning oil and gas between the 1920s and 2003.  
Chapter four examines the ownership of oil and gas generally, and particularly 
the ownership of oil and gas in Iraq, including the KRG. The chapter discusses 
how the Constitution deals with oil and gas ownership, particularly Article 111. 
The chapter discusses different doctrines of ownership in general and in respect 
of natural resources. It also discusses the ownership of oil and gas in Sharia 
Law as the Iraqi civil law is mostly based on the Sharia law. 
Chapter five analyses the dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the 
management of oil and gas operations within the KRG’s territories and the 
disputed territories. This chapter critically examines the KRG’s right to manage 
oil and gas under the relevant articles of the Constitution. The chapter further 
explores the dispute between the IFG and the KRG’s interpretation of Articles 
111 and 112 of the Constitution and how it affects the relationship between the 
disputed parties. The chapter evaluates the terms of the KRG’s PSC in the light 
of the domestic law and the relevant provisions of the Constitution, and how the 
KRG’s PSCs are different from the IFG’s Technical Service Contracts (TSC). 
Chapter six comprises of three parts. Part one explains the findings of the 
research. It provides a critical evaluation of the disputed parties’ constitutional 
arguments over the management of oil and gas operations in Iraq and why the 
dispute is legally complicated. Part two provides recommendations to the 
disputing parties on how to remove the legal barriers and defects to reach an 
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acceptable solution to this long-standing crisis over the management of oil and 
gas in Iraq. Part three concludes the research and provides the outcome of the 
thesis. It also highlights the contribution of the thesis to this area of law.   
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CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides a detailed discussion of 
the data collection methods, the reasons for the selected methods and approach 
in conducting the research, including why the specific approach was taken in 
the research and why the analysis techniques were applied. Part 2 provides the 
findings of the research.  
2.2  Research Methods  
 
2.2.1  Overview of data collection  
The purpose of this research is to examine and explore the KRG’s PSCs and the 
KRG’s right to manage oil and gas operations unliterally without prior approval 
from, or co-operation with, the IFG, and whether the KRG’s claim to have the 
exclusive right to manage oil and gas operation is supported by the Constitution 
and to what extent the KRG oil and gas contract with IOCs are consistent with 
the Constitution. To answer the above questions the research critically analyses 
the provisions of the Constitution, other federal legislation (if any), the KRG’s 
oil and gas laws, regulations, and legal arguments forwarded by both sides of 
the dispute.  
The research is primarily library-based, and it also involves conducting 
interviews with key individuals from both sides of the dispute and from 
academics, details of the interviews are provided in the later parts of this 
chapter. In addition to the current constitutional provisions and federal and 
regional legislation regarding oil and gas management in the country, the 
research also provides an historical background of oil and gas contracts and 
management of oil and gas operations for the period from 1927 when oil first 
discovered in Iraq until 2004 when the new Iraqi government was formed. It 
discusses how oil and gas laws and contracts have been developed over the last 
century and their implications on the current oil and gas contracts used in Iraq. 
To this end, a review was conducted of most literature relating to oil and gas 
contracts used by the IFG and the KRG, legislation, and the relevant provisions 
of the Iraqi constitution. Therefore, most of the data was collected from primary 
sources. 
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2.2.2.  Data collection methods  
The research primarily deals with the legal disputes between the IFG and the 
KRG over the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas operations within the KRG’s 
territories and the KRG’s PSCs in light of the Constitution, Oil and Gas Law of 
Kurdistan Law No. (22)-2007, national legislation, and literature on a national 
and international level. It analyses the terms and clauses of the KRG’s existing 
oil and gas contract with IOCs considering the relevant articles of the 
Constitution concerning oil and gas management in Iraq. Therefore, doctrinal 
legal research is the most appropriate method to be used in this research. Paul 
Chynoweth describes doctrinal legal research as being “concerned with the 
formulation of ‘legal doctrines’ through the analysis of legal rules. Within the 
common law jurisdictions, legal rules are to be found within statutes and cases 
(the sources of law) but it is important to appreciate that they cannot, in 
themselves, provide a complete statement of the law in any given situation. This 
can only be ascertained by applying the relevant legal rules to the particular 
facts of the situation under consideration.”22 He also states that “The methods 
of doctrinal research are characterised by the study of legal texts and, for this 
reason, it is often described colloquially as “black-letter law”.23 The black letter 
is the most traditional approach to methodology. “This method of dissertation 
research aims to reduce the study of law to an essentially descriptive analysis 
of a large number of technical and co-ordinated legal rules to be found in 
primary sources”.24 Through this approach, the research critically analyses the 
legal disputes between the IFG and KRG and exploring the legal authorities 
referred to by both the IFG and the KRG in support of their legal arguments over 
the KRG’s exclusive rights to manage oil and gas operations within its territories 
without prior approval from the central government.  
Multiple qualitative research methods assisted the researcher in collecting 
comprehensive and accurate data in relation to the research topics. More 
importantly, the use of the multiple qualitative methods assisted in neutralising 
any partiality in data obtained from the interviewees when compared with the 
                                                          
22 Paul Chynoweth. Advanced research methods in the built environment. Chapter 
Three, Legal Research. P29. Available online at 
http://www.csas.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/66542/Legal_Research_Chyno
weth_-_Salford_Uni..pdf  
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
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information from the secondary sources. Accordingly, more accurate findings 
can be made. This is discussed in detail in the latter parts of this chapter.  
This thesis conducts a thorough investigation into oil and gas legislation in Iraq 
and KRG and the KRG’s PSCs and will also provide a historical background of oil 
and gas contracts, oil concessions from the time when oil was first discovered 
in Iraq in 1927 until now. It discusses how oil and gas law and contract 
developed over the last century and their implications on the current oil and gas 
contracts. To this end, a review was conducted of national and foreign literature 
relating to current and old Iraqi and KRG’s oil and gas contract, legislation and 
relevant provisions of the Iraqi constitution. Further insight into the current legal 
dispute between the Iraqi government and the KRG will be provided via a series 
of semi-structured interviews with the key individual involved in this matter.  
Details of the qualitative methods, research strategies and approaches used in 
this research are discussed below. 
2.2.3.  Approach to the research development  
The approach to developing the research is an important part of every research 
which the researcher relies on to explore the research topic, and to answer the 
research question in an academic way. Every social research, including legal 
research, must have an approach in conducting the research, which is either 
deductive or inductive. Some researchers use a combination of deduction and 
induction, called abduction.25  
The deduction approach involves developing or testing a theory by analysing 
the collected data. The research starts with the theory and then moving to the 
data collection. This approach mostly applies to natural sciences research and 
to quantitative methodology. In contrast, the inductive starts with data 
collection to critically analyse a phenomenon and then build a theory based on 
the outcome of the research. This strategy starts with data collection and then 
moves to build a theory.26 As indicated above, there are other researchers who 
apply an abduction approach, which is a combination of deduction and induction. 
It starts either way, from theory to data or from data to theory. The most 
                                                          
25 Kenneth F. Hyde, Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research, Qualitative 
Market Research, 1 June 2000 
26 M. Saunders, P. Lewis, A. Thornhill. Research methods for business students (7th ed. 
2016) Pp 145-148   
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appropriate strategy for this research is the induction approach as this research 
will start with collecting data in respect of the research topic and then critically 
analysing and evaluating them in order to answer the research question.27.  
Selecting an appropriate approach will assist the researcher to collect the 
relevant information to the research topic and analysing them in a systematic 
way in order to reach a clear conclusion. Therefore, the research will primarily 
adopt the documentary analysis, historical analysis, and comparative analysis 
to achieve its aims in collecting the relevant data on the research topic.  
2.2.4.  Research strategy 
The research strategy will assist the researcher to make a good plan on how to 
go about the data collection sources, and then direct the researcher to achieve 
an accurate answer to the research question. This will ultimately assist the 
researcher to choose the right sources data and to select the right textbook, 
journals and articles to use in the research to reach the right conclusion.28  
Choosing the right strategy for the research requires careful consideration of 
important issues in respect of the research question, the nature of the 
relationship the researcher has with the research topic, whether the researcher 
has any direct or indirect control over the events that the researcher is 
investigating, and when the investigated events took place, whether they took 
place recently or are historical events.29  
To understand the nature of the legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG 
over the KRG’s rights to deal with the natural resources and the right to grant 
oil and gas contracts to IOCs, a brief historical background of oil and gas 
concession and contract are required. An historical background of oil and gas 
concession and contracts is crucial to show how the terms and clauses of oil and 
gas contracts have been developed. The effect of this development on oil and 
gas law and legislation during the same time. it will also assist the researcher 
to show the full picture of the current crises between the IFG and the KRG and 
why the ongoing dispute between these two governments are complicated and 
                                                          
27 Ibid 
28 M. Saunders, P. Lewis, A. Thornhill. Research methods for business students (3rd ed. 
2003)   
29 Robert K. Yin, “Case study research, design and method”. Applied Social Research 
Series Vol 5. (3rd ed, 2003)  
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extremely difficult to settle with the current legal framework regulating oil and 
gas operation in Iraq.  
2.2.5.  Historical events 
The historical background of oil and gas operations in Iraq is profoundly 
important to understand the current dispute between the IFG and the KRG over 
the management of oil and gas in the country. The historical events are relevant 
to the current dispute, therefore a history of oil and gas contracts and the 
national laws and legislation regulating oil and gas operations is inevitable when 
the researcher does not have control over the events pertaining to the research 
topic nor has direct contact with the individuals involved in the research 
subject.30 The primary and secondary data will become the main source of 
evidence when the research matter concerns a problem from the past. 
Therefore, this strategy is required to explore how the KRG’s PSCs have 
developed over the last 13 years. It would be difficult for the researcher to 
conduct a full investigation into this legally complicated matter without referring 
to the Turkish Petroleum Company’s (TPC) searching for oil in Iraq in the 1920s 
under the oil concession agreement and oil and gas contracts granted to IOCs 
by the Iraqi government from 1950s until now, and how these contacts have 
been developed through history. Through this strategy, the research identifies 
the legal issues of the on-going dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the 
KRG’s PSCs during the last 15 years. Therefore, the historical strategy is a better 
option to explore historical events. This is an important element to critically 
analyse how the legal dispute over the management of oil and gas started and 
how the dispute has developed to the current situation. The research explores 
the legal arguments the KRG relies on to defend its rights to manage natural 
resources, specifically oil and gas, within its territories. Accordingly, without the 
history strategy it would not be easy to understand the current relationship 
crises between the KRG and the Iraqi government, and how this relationship 
has been shaped by the on-going legal dispute over the management of oil and 
gas during the last 15 years. Analysing the early development of Iraq’s oil and 
gas contracts and the KRGs PSCs is crucial to understanding all aspects of this 
long-standing legal dispute between the KRG and IFG. 
                                                          
30 Robert K. Yin, “Case study research, design and method”. Applied Social Research 
Series Vol 5. (3rd ed, 2003). 
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2.2.6 Data sources 
The historical analysis covers all past and present information and evidence in 
relation to the oil concession agreements granted to the TPC and to the IPC in 
the 1920s and 1930s, and different types of the production service contract 
granted to IOCs by the Iraqi government from the 1950s to the present and in 
respect of the KRG’s PSCs. Local and foreign authors who are a good source of 
the data. Some of these authors were directly involved in the KRG’s oil and gas 
contract. Information from these authors is detailed and reliable similarly, some 
of the authors were directly involved in drafting KRG’s PSCs. Therefore, 
information and evidence from these authors are sources of first-hand data in 
respect of the legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the KRG’s PSCs. 
 2.2.7   Archival analysis 
Archival analysis was the main strategy for exploring the terms and clauses of 
the oil contracts in Iraq from the time when oil first discovered and how they 
have developed from oil concession to the PSC. The archival approach is a 
favoured option to obtain sufficient information and evidence on different types 
of the oil contracts between the IFG and the ICOs during the last 100 years and 
is a primary source of first-hand data in respect of the KRD’s PSCs. 
Chapter three of this research discusses the historical background of oil 
contracts in Iraq. The research constantly refers to historical events and 
documents in the other chapters in exploring and analysing historical data 
pertaining to the research questions. 
Using archival analysis does not necessarily mean the research does not refer 
to recent events and documents regarding oil and gas contracts in Iraq and 
KRG. The research refers to both recent and historical documents.31 The 
research explores, discusses, and analyses all recent and historical events and 
data to establish whether the KRG has the exclusive rights to manage oil and 
gas within its territories and their revenues, issues surrounding oil and gas 
ownership, different interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Constitution 
concerning oil and gas ownership, the characteristics of the KRG’s oil and law, 
                                                          
31 A. Bryman. “Research methods and organization studies”, Contemporary social 
research series. Vol 20. (e1989). 
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the Iraqi petroleum regime, the relevant international regulations, and similar 
situations elsewhere in the world.  
The research critically analyses all recent and historical sources the IFG and the 
KRG have referred to in their legal arguments over the legality of the KRG’s 
PSCs, including the KRG’s oil and gas law, Iraqi petroleum regulation, 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, textbooks, journals 
and online articles. Three main legal issues are analysed in detail: the legal 
reasons the KRG believes its PSCs with IOCs are constitutional; the legal 
provisions the IFG relies on to dispute the KRG’s rights to manage oil and gas 
within its territories and that the KRG’s PSCs are unconstitutional; and most 
importantly, how IOCs are satisfied that their oil and gas contract with KRG are 
legal and to what extent they are certain that the KRGs PSCs are not legally 
disputable.   
To investigate the above questions and explore and analyse the main points of 
the legal dispute between the parties, the research refers to historical and recent 
events, legislation, documents, and local and foreign literature as follows: 
1- The oil concession granted to the TPC in the 1920s and the oil concessions 
granted to IPC between the 1930s and 1950s; 
2- Technical service contract between the Iraqi oil state company and IOCs 
between the 1960s and 2003; 
3- Production service contract between the Iraqi oil state company and IOCs 
from 2003 until now; 
4- Production sharing contracts between the KRG and IOCs from 2005 until 
now; 
5- Other studies, textbooks, journal articles, and academic research on the 
legality of the KRG’s PSCs with IOCs and the on-going legal dispute 
between and KRG and Iraqi government over the legality of those 
contracts;  
6- Law No 80 of 1961 (Iraq); 
7- Oil and gas regulations and legal documents such as the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution of 2005, Kurdistan Regional Government’s 
Oil and Gas Law No 22 of 2007, Federal Oil and Gas Law of 2007 and as 
amended in 2011; 
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8- The official websites of the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and 
official website of the Iraqi Oil Ministry. These official sources provide 
current information about Iraq’s oil and gas contract, including statistical 
data about the number of oil and gas contracts. Most of this data is in 
Kurdish, Arabic, and English; 
9- The press and mass media. These sources are in Kurdish, Arabic and 
English. They offer current information about the ongoing dispute 
between the KRG and Iraqi government in respect of the legality or 
constitutionality of the KRG’s PSCs the KRG’s oil revenue and how these 
issues have affected the relationship between them. 
10- Semi-structured interviews, as discussed below.  
 2.2.8 Interviews  
The purpose of the interview was to obtain first-hand data from individuals who 
are directly or indirectly involved in oil and gas dispute between the IFG and 
KRG over oil and gas management within the KRG’s territories. There have been 
difficulties in contacting the interviewees and meeting them because meeting 
and interviewing individuals who are involved in the dispute from both the KRG 
and IFG was extremely difficult due to the security problems, the availability of 
the interviewees, and the distance between the interviewer and the 
interviewees. The interviewees are all based in Iraq while the research was 
conducted in Scotland. However, the author visited Iraq to meet and interview 
the interviewees. Contact was made with many individuals, but the researcher 
was not able to interview all of them due to the unavailability of those people. 
Several interviews were conducted face-to-face in Iraq and others were 
conducted through Skype. The interviews were conducted in Kurdish and Arabic. 
The interviews were translated into English. The Kurdish and Arabic and the 
English translated version of the interviews were sent to the interviewees to 
confirm that they were happy with the translation and confirm that no 
information was removed or added to the interview. A list of prepared questions 
was asked during the interview to discover more about the legality of the KRG’s 
PSCs and the legal arguments forwarded by both parties in their dispute. The 
list of the questions is in Annex 2.  
Three key individuals, who have been involved in oil and gas management from 
the Iraqi parliament and the Kurdistan parliament, were interviewed. The 
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researcher attempted on different occasions to contact the former Iraqi 
Ministers of Oil, Mr Hussein Al-Shahristani and Mr Abdul Karim Luaybi, the KRG 
Minister of Natural Resources, Dr Ashti Hawrami, and Mr Tariq Shafiq, who is 
one of the drafters of the Federal Oil and Gas Law. Unfortunately, the researcher 
was not able to interview them due to the difficulties in contacting them. 
Happily, the above individuals were interviewed by Ruba Husari in 2009, 2010 
and 2011 on the same subject matter. The transcripts of the interviews were 
published on the Iraq Oil Forum’s official website at www.iraqoilforum.com. The 
information the researcher was looking to obtain from the above individuals is 
available in the interviews published by Iraq Oil Forum. The above individuals 
expressed their views on oil and gas dispute in other websites and TV interviews.  
In terms of interview preparation, permission for the interviews was sought in 
advance via email. A list of the questions for the interview was sent to the 
interviewee a day before the interview took place to ensure that the 
interviewees had sufficient time to read and understand the questions and make 
prepare ahead of the interview. Each interview lasted between 15 and 30 
minutes and was recorded (with the consent of the interviewee). General 
guidance was sent to the interviewees with respect of the researcher and the 
purpose of the interview. The list of the questions for the interview was 
discussed with the supervisors and they were approved by the supervisors 
before sending them to the interviewees. 
The questions are divided into four parts; questions for individuals in the IFG, 
questions for individuals in the KRG, questions for individuals in political parties, 
and questions for academics. The interviews were designed to suit the 
participant’s backgrounds and the nature of their involvement in the research 
matter to ensure the research adheres to ethical academics and non-bias. The 
questions for the individuals from the KRG are different from the questions for 
the participants from the Iraqi government, in other words questions for Kurdish 
participants are different from the question for the Arab participants, and there 
were different questions for academics. The questions for the individuals in 
government were different from the question for the oppositions. This is to 
ensure the research keeps its neutrality and to strike the balance between 
different ethnicities and political backgrounds of the interviewees.  
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The researcher contacted many individuals to arrange a face-to-face interview 
or through Skype, but only managed to interview a small number of individuals 
who were personally involved in drafting oil and gas law and contracts, and who 
were closely aware of the ongoing dispute between the KRG and Iraqi 
government over the KRG’s oil and gas contract with IOCs. The purpose of the 
interviews was to collect the first-hand information from those who are directly 
or indirectly involved in the research topics. For individuals who the researcher 
was not able to interview, their views and opinions have been expressed through 
TV, newspapers, journals, social media and websites. The researcher has 
referred to these as a data collection source. 
Since the methodology used in this research is qualitative, conducting interviews 
with a small number of individuals did not undermine the methodology of the 
research. The information intended to be obtained from the individuals who 
supposed to be interviewed, was obtained from that small number of the people 
interviewed. This has been supported by Hussey and Hussey,32 who states that: 
“The aim of a phenomenological paradigm is to get depth, and it is possible to 
conduct such research with a sample of one”. As discussed above, the primary 
purpose of the interviews was to obtain first-hand information from those 
directly involved in the legal dispute over the KRG’s oil contracts with the ICOs, 
which was achieved through the interviews and the other sources as discussed 
above.   
22.9 Problems with primary and secondary data 
The researcher has experience various difficulties in collecting the relevant 
data concerning the research question.  
(a)  Primary data 
The starting point in analysing this dispute is the relevant articles of the 
Constitution. The interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 of the Constitution is 
the core of the dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the management of 
oil and gas in Iraq, and the only institution competent to rule over the 
interpretation, the Federal Constitutional Court, has not done so. Secondly, the 
individuals who have been selected to be interviewed in respect of this research 
                                                          
32 Hussey, J. and Hussey, R. (1997) Business Research: A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students. Macmillan, London  
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were all politically affiliated to the IFG in Baghdad and to the KRG. With the 
current sectarian conflict in Iraq, there is a possibility that the interviewees were 
likely to be partial in their answers. Therefore, the same key questions in respect 
of the main issues such as the legality of the KRG’s oil and gas contract, the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Iraqi constitution, and the 
ownership of oil and gas were equally put to all the interviewees, and 
information disclosed by other individuals in press conferences, TV interviews, 
online publications, and government publications were considered. This was to 
collect accurate data about the research question and to neutralise the data 
from any bias. Consideration was given to the other secondary sources such as 
papers by academics, articles and analysis by lawyers, and studies by 
practitioners in oil and gas law.  
(b) Secondary data  
Collecting data about oil and gas contracts in Iraq was not an easy task, 
especially data about the oil concession agreements granted to IOCs between 
the 1920s and 1950s, and the different types of the service contract from the 
1950s until the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This research explores the oil contracts 
from the time oil was first discovered in Iraq until the present, which covers a 
wide range of oil contracts, laws, and regulations over the period of a century. 
This would not be an easy task especially for a country like Iraq, which has been 
affected by many international wars and domestic conflict and instability and 
many military coups. Therefore, the saved data about oil and gas agreements 
and contracts may have been destroyed or has disappeared. Iraq has not been 
able to computerise and save all data regarding oil and gas contracts. At the 
time of writing this research, the website of the MoO has been referred to for 
information regarding the research question, but there was not much 
information which could be used in this research. The website was poorly 
designed and only contained information about the recent activities of the MoO, 
annual oil revenue, list of the MoO companies and state oil companies, some 
recent legislation regarding oil and gas management, and MoO news.  
The secondary data sources are mostly from 1990 and onward, or from non-
Iraqi sources, such as foreign textbooks and journals. Articles, online 
publications, conference news, and TV programmes all are in English. Some 
foreign sources refer to the historical events, notes, comments and personal 
32 
 
memories from individuals who were involved in the oil business in Iraq. Access 
to the original sources of these data is very difficult, if not impossible. This is 
because they may no longer exist.   
(c) Limitation in the available literature  
 
The literature of this area of law is limited to a certain extent. There are several 
articles written by Iraqis in Kurdish and Arabic. There are more articles in English 
than Kurdish and Arabic. 
The leading expert in this field is Dr Zedalis, Rex J at the University of Tulsa, 
who has provided more details on the KRG’ PSCs than anyone else. He has 
thoroughly discussed oil and gas issues between the KRG and Iraqi government. 
His book, The legal dimensions of oil and gas in Iraq, is a leading textbook in 
this area of law. Unlike Peter Cameron, Zedalis has concentrated on the legal 
aspect of the problem. He has explored the provisions of the Iraqi Oil and Gas 
Law and the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law 2007. 
Professor Peter D. Cameron, Director of CEPMLP,33 from the University of 
Dundee was often involved in the KRG’s PSCs as a consultant. He believes that 
the motive behind the KRG’s PSCs is a dream of independence. To achieve this, 
a sustainable economy is needed, and oil and gas revenue would guarantee 
that.  
Ben Holland, in a short article “Are Kurdistan’s oil contracts constitutional” 
examines the legality of the KRG’s PSCs. He concentrates on examining the 
KRG’s PSCs in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, in 
particular, Article 112. His findings are similar to those of Peter Cameron and 
Zedalis.  
There are many TV and newspapers interviews of the KRG and Iraqi 
government’s officials on the matter. Dr Ashti Hawrami, the KRG Minister of 
                                                          
33 Peter D. Cameron, “Managing the politics of oil reforms: Lessons from Iraq: keynote 
address at oil and gas in federal systems conference, March, 2010, Washington DC”. 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy.  
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Natural Resources, does not believe the current relationship crisis between KRG 
and Iraq is caused by the KRG’s PSCs.34 
Deniz Tas35 considered this matter from a different angle. He believes the KRG’s 
PSCs is a matter of ownership, and whoever has the right of ownership of oil 
and gas has the right to manage oil and gas.  
The differences in interpretation triggered Thomas. W. Donovan’s attention.36 
He states that due to the ambiguities in the Constitution’s provisions, each side 
of the dispute wants to exploit that ambiguity in its interest. He suggested that 
to overcome this problem, the relevant articles should be amended to prevent 
different interpretation. Alternatively, a formal interpretation of the relevant 
articles should be provided by parliament or a competent court, and that 
interpretation must be binding.   
The above literature dates back to five or six years ago. The current political 
situation in Iraq, the current war with ISIS, and the sharp drop of oil and gas 
prices may have changed many things, including the desire of the parties to 
resolve this problem and confront ISIS together. Although several meetings 
have taken place between the KRG and IFG on different occasions, the dispute 
remains unresolved.37 
2.2.10 Final remarks on the research methods  
This chapter reviews the main sources on which the researcher relies for data 
collection and the appropriate method to explore the research questions. The 
researcher prioritised the sources of data used in legal research like this, and 
the data must be accurate and reliable. The researcher is committed to the 
ethical principles of academic research and has followed procedural 
requirements to avoid any partiality and bias in writing this research and in 
selecting the data collection sources, in particular the data from the 
interviewees. Therefore, a qualitative method of a doctrinal and comparative 
                                                          
34 Togy talk to Dr. Ashti Hawrami, Minister for Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional 
Government. The Oil and Gas Year Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2009, By Wildcat 
Publishing 
35 Petroleum development in the Kurdistan region of Iraq: A struggle over 
competency. 2012  
36 Thomas. W. Donovan, The Iraqi upstream oil and gas industry following the 2010 
general elections. 2010. 
37 Baghdad’s oil deal with the KRG. Petroleum Economist, 01/05/2015, P12-12. 
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nature was selected to achieve the aims and objectives of the research. The 
primary questions this research seeks to answer are whether the KRG has the 
exclusive right to manage oil and gas within its territories, whether the KRG’s 
oil and gas contracts with IOCs are constitutional, and how this affects the 
relationship between the IFG and the KRG. In doing so, should all oil and gas 
contracts be treated the same in terms of legality, or should a differentiation 
should be made between oil and gas contracts concluded by the KRG with IOCs 
before the new constitution came into effect in 2006, and those contracts 
concluded after that. Should oil and gas contracts concluded by the KRG for oil 
and gas within the disputed territories with the IFG be treated differently from 
those concluded for oil and gas within the KRG’s undisputed area?    
The research follows an inductive approach as this is most appropriate. The 
literature assists the researcher to consider other studies and research in this 
area of law, such as the legality of the KRG’s PSCs and the question of oil and 
gas ownership in Iraq. The opinion of experts and writers on this subject have 
been considered. A historical strategy was employed as understanding the 
current legal dispute and relationship crises between the IFG and the KRG would 
be difficult without the knowledge of the early history of the oil concession 
agreements and oil and gas contracts since the 1920s. This aids the researcher 
to demonstrate the significant barriers and obstacles preventing the parties from 
reaching a settlement on the disputed issues. An archival strategy was also 
selected to explore and investigate the terms and clauses of the KRG’s PSCs 
between 2003 and now, and how they are different from the IFG’s service 
contract. The selection of these two research methods is an effective method to 
cover a wide range of data sources. Qualitative sources included data collected 
from the interviews, different interpretations of the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution and legislation, and media reports. This method is best suited to 
the research to guarantee a better and fairer outcome.     
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CHAPTER 3       HISTORY OF PETROLEUM OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The dispute over the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s oil and gas 
contracts with international oil companies (IOCs) has been the most 
controversial issue between the KRG and IFG since the invasion of Iraq by the 
Coalition Force in 2003. Since 1992, the KRG has enjoyed a semi-autonomous 
self-administered rule over the Kurdish populated area, specifically the 
provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Duhok, which are shown in figure 1 below. 
Following the formation of the IFG in 2004, the KRG was formally recognised as 
a regional government within Iraq. This was confirmed by Article 117 of the 
Constitution of 2005. The purpose of the constitution in Iraq was to reflect the 
real structure of a new federal, democratic, and pluralistic system, which is 
confirmed in paragraph four of the preamble of the Constitution.38 The 
Constitution reflects the political, legal, economic, cultural, and social 
developments and changes in Iraq after the invasion and regulates the 
relationship between the KRG and the IFG. The exclusive power of the regional 
government and IFG are identified in the Constitution, and certain powers are 
shared between the KRG and the IFG. The management of oil and gas 
operations is regulated by Articles 111 and 112 of the Constitution. Article 111 
vests the ownership of oil and gas in the people of Iraq in all governorates and 
regions. However, the article does not explain who has exclusive authority to 
exercise ownership rights over oil and gas as a representative of the people of 
Iraq. Article 112 of the Constitution explains how oil and gas should be 
managed. The KRG argues that the Constitution grants certain rights and 
authorities to the KRG, including the right to manage oil and gas within the 
                                                          
38 Iraqi Constitution of 2005. Preamble “We, the people of Iraq, who have just risen 
from our stumble, and who are looking with confidence to the future through a 
republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with the 
determination of our men, women, elderly, and youth to respect the rule of law, to 
establish justice and equality, to cast aside the politics of aggression, to pay attention 
to women and their rights, the elderly and their concerns, and children and their 
affairs, to spread the culture of diversity, and to defuse terrorism”. 
36 
 
KRG’s territories.39 Accordingly, the KRG has concluded over 50 oil and gas 
contracts with IOCs during the last 15 years. Some of the contracts date back 
to 2004, prior to the enforcement of the Constitution.40 The KRG uses a 
production sharing contract (PSC) as a model contract for IOCs, which is 
different from the service contract, the model contract used by the IFG to 
manage oil and gas operations with IOCs. The dispute is legally complicated and 
politically motivated. This study focuses only on the legal aspect of the dispute.  
The management of oil and gas within the KRG’s territories independently, 
without any co-operation from the IFG, is extremely significant for the KRG. As 
a long-term objective, this will guarantee the KRG’s road towards independence 
in the future. The motivation behind the KRG’s ambition to manage oil and gas 
unilaterally is not unknown. It is clear for the IFG that managing oil and gas 
without co-operation of the IFG will help the KRG to build its own economy, 
separated from the IFG. Therefore, the KRG’s management of oil and gas has 
been firmly disputed by the IFG. The IFG argues that the KRG’s management pf oil and gas 
unliterally is contrary to Article 112 of the Constitution. The KRG confirms managing oil and gas 
within its territories without co-operation with the IFG is not departure from the oil and gas 
management framework stipulated by Article 112 of the Constitution. There is not an agreement 
between the KRG and IFG over the interpretation of the oil and gas management under Article 112 
of the Constitution. 
To understand the current conflict between the KRG and the IFG over the 
management of oil and gas, an historical background of oil and gas operations 
and model contracts in Iraq is required. This enables the researcher to assess 
                                                          
39 Article 12 of the Iraqi Constitution 2005. First: The federal government, with the 
producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management 
of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in 
a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, 
specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were 
unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged 
afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the 
country, and this shall be regulated by a law.  
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate 
governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the 
oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using 
the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment. 
40 KRG’s PSC with DNO. The full text of the contract can be accessed at the KRG 
Ministry of Natural Resources at http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/the-
ministry/contracts/pscs-signed  
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the depth of the dispute, and why it is so difficult for the disputed parties to 
reach an agreement.  
3.2 The search for oil in Mesopotamia 
 
The current Iraqi state did not exist before the First World War (WWI). Prior to 
WWI, Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire and was called Mesopotamia.41 
Mesopotamia comprised of three vilayets (vilayet is an Arabic word meaning 
‘province’): the Vilayet of Basra in South, the Vilayet of Baghdad in the middle 
and in the north, Vilayet Mosel.42 Kirkuk was part of Vilayet Mosel. The map in 
figure (2) below shows Mesopotamian territories before 1920. 
 
                           Figure (2) 
 
BBC - History - British Relations with Iraq 
Map showing the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.43 
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in WW1, Iraq was established in 
1920. The distinction between Mesopotamia and Iraq is important here because 
the search for oil and attempts for oil concessions began before the creation of 
Iraq in 1920. The search for oil in Mesopotamia is traced back to the beginning 
                                                          
41 Simon, Reeva Spector, and Eleanor H. Tejirian, editors. The creation of Iraq, 1914-
1921. Columbia University Press, 2004. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/simo13292. 
42 Dr. Ferruh Demirmen. “Part I: Quest for oil, oil in Iraq: The Byzantine beginnings”. 
Global Policy Forum. 25 April 2003 available online at www.globalpolicy.org.  
43 BBC available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/iraq/britain_iraq_01.shtml  
38 
 
of the 20th century, after the discovery of oil in 1908 at Masjid-i Suleiman in 
Persia44 by a British businessman, William K. D'Arcy. D’Arcy was the first person 
in the Middle East to obtain an oil concession from the Iranian government. In 
1901, D’Arcy obtained a concession agreement from the Persian Shah, for the 
exploration and development of oil in the Persian Empire (Kingdom of Iran).45 
The concession was for 60 years. It covered 500,000 square miles, equivalent 
to five-sixths of the Persian Empire.46  
In 1901, D’Arcy began negotiations with the Ottoman Empire for an oil 
concession in Mesopotamia.47 The negotiation continued until 1912 but D’Arcy 
was unsuccessful in obtaining the concession because there was strong 
competition from the German government to obtain an oil concession from the 
Ottoman Empire. The Germans started negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, 
the Turkish Sultan, before the British to obtain oil concession in Mesopotamia. 
The competition between the Germans and the British to obtain oil concession 
from the Ottoman Empire led to both preventing each other from obtaining it. 
In 1899, the Germans, through the Deutsche Bank, obtained a concession in 
Mesopotamia for a railway called Baghdad Railway.48 Prior thereto, Germany 
obtained a concession from the Othman Empire to build a railway from Berlin to 
Istanbul and a further concession was granted to the Germans to extend the 
railway to Baghdad. The later railway concession included mining rights 
extending 20 kilometres on both sides of the projected railway. The Germans 
made the first request to the Ottoman Empire to obtain a right for searching oil 
within the railway concession area,49 and a request to extend the concession 
                                                          
44 Dr. Ferruh Demirmen. “Oil in Iraq: The Byzantine beginnings”. Global Policy Forum. 
25 April 2003 available online at www.globalpolicy.org  
45 Sarah Kent. “A brief history of the Iranian oil industry”. The Wall Street Journal. 
2015. It can be accessed on line at https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-brief-history-of-
the-iranian-oil-industry-1428063016  
46 Dr. Mohammad Malek. “History of Iran. Oil in Iran between the two World Wars”. 
Iran Chamber Society, 08 October 2017. It can be accessed online at 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/oil_iran_between_world_wars.php   
47 The International Petroleum Cartel, staff report to the federal trade commission, 
released through subcommittee on monopoly of select committee on small business, 
U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2nd sess (Washington, DC, 1952), Chapter 4, "Joint control 
through common ownership--the Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd.," pp. 47-112. It can be 
accessed on line at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/Petroleum/ftc4.htm  
48 The Baghdad Railway, 1899-1914. It can be accessed at 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos139.htm  
49 History of the IPC and Mr. Gulbenkian's part in its foundation, also letter from H. 
Riedemann to W. C. Teagle, October 10. 1920. 
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area to include a larger area. The German negotiation with the Turkish Sultan 
was not easy as it opposed the British interest for an oil concession.  
Before the German and British competition for oil concession, in or around 1891 
an Armenian businessman, C. S. Gulbenkian, prepared a comprehensive report 
on the oil possibilities in Mesopotamia at the request of the Turkish Sultan.50 
The report contained important information about the possibility of oil in Iraq 
that attracted the attention of the Turkish Minister of the Liste Civile and the 
Minister of Mines. The Report persuaded Sultan Abdul Hamid to transfer the 
ownership of the large area of land in Mesopotamia from the Ministry of Mines 
to the Liste Civile. This transfer was the transfer of the ownership of the land 
from the government to his private account.51  
The discovery of oil in Persia and Gulbenkian’s report on the possibility of oil in 
Iraq were two major factors that persuaded the British and German to race for 
oil concession in the region. Before the Gulbenkian Report, there was historical 
evidence confirming the possibility of oil in Iraq, specifically in Kirkuk.52 In 1904, 
the Anatolian Railway Co represented Germany’s interests when it successfully 
obtained a concession for exploring oil within the 20 kilometres on both sides of 
the Baghdad railway.53 The map in figure 3 shows the Berlin – Baghdad railway. 
The Germans attempted to obtain a further concession for searching oil or even 
mining rights in Mesopotamia, but they were unsuccessful because the Anatolian 
Railway Co did not fulfil its contractual obligations under the 1904 concession 
by failing to complete the exploring and development stage within the 
timeframe. Therefore, Germany’s dreams for an oil concession never 
materialised and their negotiation with the Turkish Sultan finally ended with a 
promising letter granting the Anatolian Railway Co favourable terms if any future 
                                                          
50 Daniel Yergin. The prize, the epic quest for oil, money, and power. Edition 1991. 
p.186. 
51 From Memoirs of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian with particular reference to the origins 
and foundation of the Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., Lisbon, September 16. 1941. 
52 Yergin. 1991. p. 204. 
53 Marian Kent. Oil and empire: British policy and Mesopotamia oil, 1900-1920. Online 
version, Barnes & Noble, 1976.  
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mining concession were granted to them.54 Accordingly, the 1904 concession 
between the Anatolian Railway Co and the Ottoman Empire become void.55 
Figure (3) 
56 
In addition to the failure of the Anatolian Railway Co to meet its contractual 
obligations under the 1904 concession, the British competition for an oil 
concession around the same time was another reason to end the Germans’ 
dream for an oil concession in Mesopotamia. The British businessman D'Arcy 
represented the British interests in the race for an oil concession in 
Mesopotamia. His efforts produced no benefit for the British but managed to 
persuade the Turkish Sultan to invalidate the German concession.57   
In 1910, the Ottoman Empire had gone through some political changes, 
including the removal of Sultan Abdul Hamid from power by a pro-British group 
                                                          
54 From Memoirs of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian with particular reference to the origins 
and foundation of the Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., Lisbon, September 16. 1941. 
55 W. C. Teagle, Confidential memorandum of negotiations with the Turkish Petroleum 
Co. Ltd. 
56 https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=baghdad+railway+map   
57 Murat Ozyuksel. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: 
Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East (1st edit) 2016.  
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called the Young Turk Revolution.58 The political developments in the Ottoman 
Empire helped the British government to protect British interests in the Ottoman 
territories. The National Bank of Turkey was established and Gulbenkian was 
appointed as a director and a member of its executive committee. Gulbenkian’s 
business backgrounds and his intensive knowledge of oil in Mesopotamia made 
him the right person for both positions in the National Bank of Turkey and, more 
importantly, to lead the negotiation with the Ottoman Empire to obtain an oil 
concession in Mesopotamia.59  
With his business experience, skill, and knowledge of oil, Gulbenkian managed 
to remove the barriers to obtain the oil concession in Mesopotamia. He believed 
the competition between the British and German was the major obstacle 
preventing the British and Germans from obtaining oil concession between 1904 
and 1912. Therefore, the cooperation between the British and the Germans was 
essential for a successful negotiation with the Ottoman Empire, and co-
operation between the two rivals would produce a satisfactory solution to the 
oil concession. Gulbenkian finally managed to convince the British and Germans 
to work together in their efforts for oil concession and an agreement between 
the National Bank of Turkey, representing British interest, and the Deutsche 
Bank, representing the German interest, was reached.60 The two rivals agreed 
to form a British limited-liability company, 25% of which was given to the 
Deutsche Bank.61 In January 1911, the British limited-liability company was 
replaced with African and Eastern Concessions Limited, and again in October 
                                                          
58 D. Ergil. A REASSESSMENT: THE YOUNG TURK, THEIR POLITICS AND ANTI-
CONONIAL STRUGGLE. 1975. 
https://ojs.lib.uom.gr/index.php/BalkanStudies/article/viewFile/1518/1540 
59 The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, 
released through Subcommittee on Monopoly of Select Committee on Small Business, 
U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2nd sess (Washington, DC, 1952), Chapter 4, "Joint Control 
Through Common Ownership--The Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd.," pp. 47-112. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/Petroleum/ftc4.htm  
60 Deutsche Bank owned Anatolian Railway and Baghdad Railway.  
61 The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, 
released through Subcommittee on Monopoly of Select Committee on Small Business, 
U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2nd sess (Washington, DC, 1952), Chapter 4, "Joint Control 
Through Common Ownership--The Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd.," pp. 47-112. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/Petroleum/ftc4.htm  
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1912 the latter was changed to the Turkish Petroleum Co (TPC). In 1929, the 
TPC finally changed to the Iraqi Petroleum Co (IPC).62 
3.3 The Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) 
 
The search for oil in Mesopotamia became an imminent matter. For the British 
government, oil was the only thing that could protect its hegemony over India 
and the Middle East.63 Because of the competition between the Germans and 
the British, their earlier negotiations with the Ottoman Empire for oil concession 
in Mesopotamia were unsuccessful. Gulbenkian facilitated the cooperation 
between the British and the Germans to guarantee a successful oil concession 
agreement with the Turkish Sultan. Therefore, in October 1912 the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (TPC) was established to represent the interests of all 
parties in their negotiation with the Ottoman Empire for the oil concession in 
Mesopotamia. The National Bank of Turkey and the Deutsche Bank merged to 
make up the TPC.64 The Anglo-Persian Oil Co entered the race for the 
Mesopotamia oil. A new agreement was required to protect everyone’s interests. 
Therefore, in 1914 a conference was held at the British Foreign Office. The 
National Bank of Turkey, Deutsche Bank, D’Arcy group, Royal Dutch-Shell 
through the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co, and representatives of the British and 
German governments were all present. On 19 March 1914, an agreement was 
reached to re-structure the shares of TPC. Accordingly, the TPC was re-
structured as follows: 50% shares for Anglo-Persian Oil Co, 22,5% for the 
Deutsche Bank, 22,5% for Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co, and the other 5% for 
Gulbenkian.65 The Anglo-Persian Oil Co represented British interests. 
Following the TPC’s shareholders agreement, dramatic progress was made in 
the negotiations with the Ottoman Empire for oil concession. On 18 May 1914, 
                                                          
62 Michael Quentin Morton. History of oil in the Middle East. Once upon a red line-the 
Iraq Petroleum Company Story. https://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2013/06/once-
upon-a-red-line-the-iraq-petroleum-company-story  
63 David E. McNabb. Oil and the creation of Iraq. Policy Failure and the 1914-1918 War 
in Mesopotamia, (1st Edit 2016). https://books.google.co.uk/books  
64 Marian Kent. Oil and Empire, British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1990-1920, (1st 
Edit 1976). 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WA9aCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA222&lpg=PA222&dq=,
+in+October+1912+the+Turkey+Petroleum+Company+(TPC)   
65 Daniel Yergin. The prize, the epic quest for oil, money, and power. Edition 1991. 
Chapter 10, p.187. 
43 
 
with support from the British and German ambassadors, a draft concession 
agreement for the oil rights in Mosul and Baghdad was submitted to the Ottoman 
Empire. On 28 June 1914, the Ottoman Empire agreed to grant oil concessions 
to TPC. Below is the confirmation of the grant.66 
The Minister of Finance, which has taken over from the civil list matters 
concerning petroleum deposits already discovered or to be discovered in 
the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad (Provinces of Mosul and Baghdad), 
agrees to lease them to the Turkish Petroleum Co., and reserves the right 
later on to fix its own share as well as the general terms of the 
agreement.67 
The grant was not an oil concession, only a promise. The final agreement 
between the Ottoman Empire and the TPC over the Mesopotamia oil was not 
concluded. The parties were in negotiation to reach the final agreement, but it 
was disrupted by WWI. Therefore, the negotiation between the TPC and the 
Ottoman Empire was suspended during the period of the WWI.  
3.4 Post WWI negotiation for oil concession in Iraq 
 
WWI ended in 1918. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, and its territories were split 
between the British government and France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
in 1916.68 In the beginning, there was a dispute between Britain and France 
over the division of the Mesopotamia territories. For British government, oil was 
crucial to promote its control in the Middle East and India. Therefore, the British 
government could not compromise over the Mesopotamia land. After a long 
negotiation between the British government and French, the dispute was 
resolved through the San Remo agreement in April 1920. Thetwo governments 
agreed that the 25% shares of the Deutsche Bank in the TPC would be granted 
to France and in return, the Vilayet of Mosul would be given to the British 
government. The French also agreed to the construction of the pipelines through 
                                                          
66 Demirci, Sevtap. “Turco-British diplomatic manoeuvres on the Mosul question in the 
Lausanne Conference, 1922–1923.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 37, 
no. 1, 2010, pp. 57–71., www.jstor.org/stable/25702898. 
67 The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, 
released through Subcommittee on Monopoly of Select Committee on Small Business, 
U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2nd sess (Washington, DC, 1952), Chapter 4, "Joint Control 
Through Common Ownership--The Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd.," pp. 47-112. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/Petroleum/ftc4.htm 
68 J. Russell, R. Cohn. Sykes Picot Agreement (1st edit) 2012. 
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French-controlled territories to transport oil from Mesopotamia to the 
Mediterranean.69 Accordingly, after WWI, the British government was granted a 
class-A mandate over Mesopotamia territories. Following the settlement 
between France and the Britain, the Iraqi state was created in 1920 and a 
monarchy established as the political system in 1921.70  
The TPC resumed its negotiation for Mesopotamian oil with the newly 
established Iraqi government. The TPC relied on the promise from Grant Vizier, 
which was granted by the Ottoman Empire before WWI for its claims to 
Mesopotamian oil.71 The major controversial point in the new negotiation was 
the Iraqi government’s request for a 20% share of the oil company’s oil 
operation under the concession in Iraq. The TPC opposed this and did not want 
Iraq to be part of the TPC’s management. Therefore, Iraq’s request for 20% of 
TPC shares was rejected. The negotiation continued with the Iraqi government 
and finally the TPC was granted the oil concession in Mesopotamia in 1925. The 
most important terms of the first oil concession granted to the TPC by the Iraqi 
government are as follows:  
1. The oil concession was for 75 years.  
2. The concession was granted in respect of only 24 plots which were 
selected for the TPC.  
3. In return for the oil concession the Iraqi government was to receive 
royalties at a flat fee per ton to be paid in English pounds sterling. Royalty 
payments were linked to oil company profits. Royalties were to be paid 
from the profits. The Iraqi government would only receive the royalty 
payments twenty years from the date the concession was granted.  
4. The Iraqi government also had the right to tax the oil production at the 
same rate levied on other industrial concerns. 
                                                          
69 Marian Kent. Oil and empire, British policy and Mesopotamian oil 1990-1920, (1st 
Edit 1976). 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WA9aCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA222&lpg=PA222&dq=,
+in+October+1912+the+Turkey+Petroleum+Company+(TPC)   
70 David E. McNabb. Oil and the creation of Iraq. Policy failure and the 1914-1918 War 
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71 Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Parts 8-11. By United 
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5. The TPC must build an oil refinery in Iraq to meet the domestic needs, 
and TPC also had to build pipelines to export the production oil to the 
international market. 
6. The Iraqi government had a right to give the other plots, other than those 
selected by the TPC, to the other oil companies, and TPC was able to bid 
on those plots.72 
 
The grant of the oil concession to the TPC was rectified by the Iraqi parliament. 
Following the grant of the oil concession, the TPC began searching and drilling 
for oil. The Kirkuk province was known for its oil possibility before 1925 when 
the oil concession was granted. Therefore, the TPC started drilling for oil in the 
north of Kirkuk. Two years after the grant of the concession on 25 October 1927, 
oil was discovered for the first time in Iraq. The produced oil was spilt for the 
first three days, which was estimated at 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) before 
the gusher was brought under control.73 Exploration and development of oil 
continued by the TPC within the selected plots until 1929 when the TPC changed 
its name to the Iraqi Petroleum Company IPC. The picture in figure (4) shows 
the oil gusher when oil was first discovered in Kirkuk. 
                                                          
72 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Iraq: A country study. Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress, 1988. Available online at http://countrystudies.us/iraq/  
73 David E. McNabb. Oil and the creation of Iraq. Policy failure and the 1914-1918 war 
in Mesopotamia, (1st Edit 2016). https://books.google.co.uk/books.  
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The famous gusher at Baba Gurgur with a river of oil in the foreground. (Source: 
IPC).74 
Figure (4) 
 
                                                          
74 Michael Quentin Morton. “River of oil-early oil exploration in Iraq”, Geoexpro. 
Available online at https://www.geoexpro.com/category/history-of-oil.  
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3.5 Dispute between the United States of America and the TPC shareholders over 
Iraqi oil  
 
After WWI, the TPC faced a new rival in its claim for the oil in Iraq. The United 
States of America claimed that oil in the Middle East, including Iraq, should be 
shared between all WW1 allies who fought against the Ottoman Empire. The 
USA was one of the allied powers in WWI against the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, like the other TPC shareholders, the USA should have benefitted from 
the aftermath of WWI and US oil companies should have been given the right 
to participate in the oil operations in Iraq.  
The USA demanded that the “Open-Door” policy should be used for US oil 
companies to participate in the Middle East oil, including Iraqi oil. Under the 
Open-Door policy, all interested parties should be able to participate equally in 
oil operations. US oil companies should not be discriminated against in 
participating in the oil operations in Iraq. The British Government and France, 
as two major shareholders of the TPC, had been in negotiation with the USA for 
about six years. Finally, in 1928, the dispute between the USA and other TPC 
shareholders was settled. The TPC shareholders agreed that US oil companies 
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Standard Oil Co. (New York) benefit from 
Iraqi oil through the TPC.75   
The TPC shareholders were involved in oil operations across the Middle East 
directly and indirectly through their subsidiaries. Therefore, there was a kind of 
indirect competition among the TPC shareholders in the region. The competition 
undermined the TPC’s efforts to maximise profits from oil productions. 
Therefore, a new agreement was required between the TPC shareholders to 
eliminate all barriers, including any direct and indirect competition, in all oil 
operations within a defined area, which covered most of the former Ottoman 
Empire’s territories. The Red Line agreement was concluded between the TPC 
shareholders in July 1928. Figure (5) below shows the territories covered by the 
Red Line agreement. The primary purpose of the Red Line agreement was to 
prevent the TPC’s shareholders from competing with the TPC in oil operations, 
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refining, and oil concessions within the area defined by the agreement, which 
covered all the Middle East.76  
Article 10 was considered as an important provision of the Red Line Agreement, 
which provided that:  
All the parties hereto agree that the Turkish Company or a nominee of 
the Turkish Company shall, except as hereinafter mentioned, have the 
sole right to seek for or obtain oil concessions within the defined area, 
and each of the Groups hereby covenants and agrees with the Turkish 
Company and with the other Groups that excepting only as herein 
provided or authorized such Group will not nor will any of its Associated 
Companies either personally or through the intermediary of any person, 
firm, company, or corporation seek for or obtain or be interested, directly 
or indirectly, in any such oil concession or be interested, directly or 
indirectly, in the production of oil within the defined area or in the 
purchase of any such oil otherwise than through the Turkish Company or 
an Operating Company under the Turkish Company. 
Article 10 restricted all partners of the TPC from participating in any kind of oil 
operations within the defined area except through the TPC. It granted the TPC 
the sole right to deal with oil operations, drilling, development, production, and 
obtaining new oil concessions in the defined area. The Red Line agreement 
finally cleared the road for the TPC’s monopoly over Mesopotamian oil. 
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Figure (5) 
3.6 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 
 
The TPC was replaced by the IPC and accordingly all assets, including the oil 
concession granted to the TPC in 1925, were transferred to the IPC. Due to the 
conflicting interests of its shareholders, the IPC failed to meet its obligations 
under the concession. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (also known as Esso and subsequently changed to Exxon) were involved 
in oil operations outside Iraq. Due to market competition, they deliberately 
delayed the development of Iraqi oil to increase oil production and maximise 
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profits in other places. At the same time, other shareholders like the Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles (CFP) were working hard to adhere to the terms of the 
concession and complete the works on time to get the Iraqi oil to the 
international market as soon as possible, or at least within the timeframe 
stipulated in the oil concession. The IPC failed to complete the construction of 
pipelines and shipping terminals within the timeframe under the concession 
agreement. Therefore, in March 1931 the Iraqi government terminated the oil 
concession originally granted to the TPC in 1925 due to non-compliance with 
the terms of the oil concession.  
In 1931, the IPC started a new round of negotiations with the Iraqi government 
for a new oil concession with new clauses and terms. The IPC successfully 
negotiated new terms and accordingly managed to obtain a new oil concession 
for 70 years which covered a larger area than the 1925 concession. The new oil 
concession covered 83,200-square-kilometers, all east of the Tigris River. In 
return, the IPC was required to build two oil pipelines to the Mediterranean by 
1935. In addition, the IPC promised to pay an additional payment and advanced 
a loan to the Iraqi government.  
The two pipelines that the IPC was required to build were a pipeline from Al 
Hadithah going through Syria to Tripoli (this pipeline was closed by the Syrian 
government in 1982) and a pipeline from Al Hadithah to Haifa in Palestine, which 
was closed in 1948 due to the Arab-Israeli war in 1947. These pipelines were 
crucial for exporting Iraqi oil to the international market. The map in Figure 6 
below shows the two pipelines. In 1938, the IPC began exporting Iraqi oil to the 
international market. By 1936, the oil production in Iraq reached an average of 
4 million tons per year and continued to produce the same level of oil until World 
War II, when oil production suffered sharp reduction due to the shipping 
restrictions in the Mediterranean. 
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Figure (6) 
3.7 British Oil Development Company (BODC) 
 
The IPC’s oil production level was not satisfactory for the Iraqi government. The 
IPC had the capacity to produce more than real production or the production 
that was stipulated in the concession agreement. The IPC performance in 
exporting crude oil to the international market was suspicious. The Iraqi 
government believed the poor performance was to protect the interests of the 
IPC parent company at the international level. The Iraqi government wanted 
maximum production of its oil. The low level of oil production pushed the Iraqi 
government to invite other oil companies to invest in Iraqi oil. The primary 
purpose was to create competition between IOCs to increase oil production. 
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Accordingly, a new oil concession was granted to the British Oil Development 
Company (BODC) in 1932.79 
The BODC was created by a group representing Italian and British interests. The 
terms of the oil concession granted to the BODC were as follows: The concession 
was for 75 years and covered the area of 120,000 square kilometres west of the 
Tigris River and north of the 33rd parallel.80 Subsequently, a new company called 
Mosul Oilfields Ltd was established to acquire the BODC shares. The BODC 
started drilling across the concession area, but little oil was found. The lack of 
the oil production was concerning because of the expenses spent in drilling. The 
BODC continued drilling in different locations of the concession area to increase 
oil production. The discovered oil levels across the concession area were too low 
compared to the expenditures incurred in the exploratory drilling. This caused 
Mosul Oilfields Ltd financial difficulties, therefore, it started selling its shares to 
the IPC. The IPC continued purchasing more shares from Mosul Oilfields Ltd and 
by 1937, the IPC had effective control of the BODC. By 1942, the IPC purchased 
100% shares of the BODC through its subsidiary company, the Mosul Petroleum 
Company (MPC). The IPC then became the only company with an oil concession 
covering the Baghdad and Mosul provinces (Vilayets Baghdad and Mosul).81  
In addition to the 1931 and 1932 concessions which covered Baghdad and Mosul 
provinces, a new oil concession was granted to the Basra Petroleum Company 
(BPC) in 1938, which was another subsidiary of the IPC. The terms of the 1938’s 
oil concession granted to the BPC were like those of the 1932 concession. The 
concession was for 75 years and covered the rest of Iraq.82 By 1942, the IPC oil 
concession covered almost the whole of Iraq.  
The terms of the concessions were hugely in the interest of the IPC. The Iraqis, 
especially nationalists, were unhappy with the IPC oil concessions. It was widely 
believed that the terms of the concession were not negotiated but imposed on 
Iraq. The Iraqis were also not satisfied with the performance of the IPC. Oil 
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production was low, the number of the refineries built were insufficient to meet 
domestic needs, the amount of royalties received by the Iraqis were too low, 
and the IPC did not meet its contractual obligation to provide training facilities 
to Iraqis in oil industries.83 The above concerns put the pro-British Iraqi 
government under pressure to renegotiate the terms of the oil concession, 
especially after the daily oil production increased. Although the oil production 
was not satisfactory to the Iraqi government, it was higher than the daily 
production in the 1930s. In 1948, the Iraqi government and IPC began 
renegotiating the concession terms. The negotiation concluded with the IPC 
agreeing to increase the royalty payment from four to six shillings (gold) from 
November 1950.84  
3.8 The nationalist movement and its impact on oil agreements in Iraq 
 
 
The increased demand for oil after WWII led to the development and 
improvement of the oil concession terms, which were more favourable to the 
hosting countries. The nationalist movement in Iran demanded the 
nationalisation of the Iranian oil in the late 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, 
and around the same time Saudi Arabia started discussions with the Arab-
American oil company (ARAMCO) to re-negotiate the terms of the oil concession 
granted to ARAMCO in 1933, which resulted in increasing the royalty payment 
in the oil concession of 1933. The royalty payment terms were replaced with 
the 50-50 profit sharing agreement.85 The improvement and developments in 
the neighbouring country’s oil agreements and other developments in Venezuela 
persuaded the Iraqi government to re-negotiate the terms of the oil concession 
with the IPC. The terms of the oil concessions were negotiated and in early 1952 
an agreement was reached between the IPC86 and Iraqi government to amend 
the existing royalty payments to equal sharing of profits, requiring the IPC to 
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build more oil refineries to meet the domestic consumption and the oil 
production was to be increased.87  
 
Even with the amendments to the IPC oil concessions, the terms of the 
concession were still more favourable to the IPC. The IPC still received huge 
profits from Iraqi oil production. Therefore, the tension continued, and Iraqis 
insisted that Iraq and Iraqi people should benefit more from the oil revenues. 
As expected, the situation was exploited by the nationalist movement in Iraq 
and finally led to a military coup against the monarchy in 1958. The removal of 
the monarchy reshaped oil contracts in Iraq and 95% of the oil concession area 
was taken back from the IPC.88  
3.9 Road to nationalisation  
 
3.9.1 Abdul-Karim Qasim and the oil concession between 1958 and 1963 
The first oil concession granted to the TPC in 1925 did not produce any 
significant revenues for Iraq. Iraq did not have any active participation in 
drafting the concession and its terms. Iraq was under the British mandate and 
did not enjoy full sovereignty over the state’s affairs, including the oil 
concession. The British mandate over Iraq formally ended in 1932, but Iraq was 
still influenced by British government decisions. Therefore, it was not expected 
that the Iraqi government would act against British interests. The subsequent 
oil concessions were not very different from 1925 and their terms were still 
favourable to the IPC. The favourable terms to the IPC (formerly TPC) were 
successfully used by the nationalist groups against the royal family and 
monarchy system in Iraq and forced both the Iraqi government and the British 
government to amend the terms of the concession to make it more beneficial to 
the Iraqi government. Accordingly, the annual lump sum was replaced by 
royalty payments. Between 1931 and August 1950, the Iraqi government 
received royalty payments of four shillings per ton of produced crude oil. 
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Following the development in the oil industries and oil concession in Venezuela, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the IPC reached a new agreement in 1950, in 
which the royalty payments were increased to six shillings per ton of produced 
crude oil.89 The new agreement was undermined by the nationalist movement 
claiming that the new amendments still did not protect Iraq’s national interest. 
The nationalists demanded that Iraq must have full control over its oil and the 
terms of the oil concession must be more beneficial to Iraq. Therefore, 
nationalising Iraqi oil was the only means to achieve that goal. The situation 
further developed and led to a military coup in 1958, in which the monarchy 
was overthrown.  
Abdul Karim Qasim masterminded the revolution and he later became the first 
president of the Republic of Iraq. At the beginning of the revolution, Qasim 
promised Iraqi people to give top priority to the nationalisation of Iraqi oil. 
However, this was not an easy task soon after the revolution because the 
reconstruction of Iraq, as promised by Qasim, would need extra funds. Oil 
revenue was the only source to provide the funds needed for reconstructing 
Iraq.90 In addition, nationalisation required significant funds, expertise, and 
technology, which Iraq could not provide. Therefore, nationalisation was not in 
the interests of Iraq for the time being. Instead, Qasim chose to re-negotiate 
the terms of the concession with the IPC. The Qasim government demanded the 
relinquishment of the unexplored land of the oil concession. The IPC concession 
covered nearly 95% of the Iraqi territory. The IPC did not agree on the size of 
land to be relinquished. The negotiation continued for nearly three years; 
different options were discussed, but no agreement was reached.91 Saul Samir 
provides full details of the long negotiation between the Qasim regime and IPC 
in “The Iraq Petroleum Company’s route to nationalization”.92 The Iraqi 
government suspended the negotiation and instead passed Law No 80 of 1961, 
                                                          
89 Saul, Samir. “Masterly inactivity as brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company's 
route to nationalization, 1958-1972.” The International History Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 
2007, pp. 746–792. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40110926. 
90 M Khadduri. Republican Iraq: A study in ‘Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.  
91 Saul, Samir. “Masterly inactivity as brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company's 
route to nationalization, 1958-1972.” The International History Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 
2007, pp. 746–792. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40110926. 
92 See footnote 33.  
56 
 
delimiting areas of exploitation for oil companies,93 by which 99.5% of the IPC 
undeveloped concession area was relinquished. Almost all concession areas 
where exploration had not taken place were returned to Iraq. The IPC was 
allowed only to hold onto the areas where exploration and oil production were 
in operation, which was 0.05% of the IPC concession area. Qasim was not able 
to nationalise Iraqi oil, but he managed to reclaim 99,05% of the concession 
area from the IPC,94 which was only one step away from nationalisation.  
Oil operations were managed under concession agreements until 1963 when the 
Qasim regime was overthrown by a new military coup. During the Qasim era, 
the Iraqi government was in negotiation with the representatives of Kurdish 
people to settle the long political conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi 
government, which had lasted for decades. The division of the oil revenue was 
one of the controversial issues in that negotiation. The Kurds demanded 35% 
of national oil revenue, which was rejected by the Iraqi government.95 Oil and 
oil revenue has been a central issue of the historical conflict between the Kurds 
and Iraqi government for many decades and it remains unresolved. The current 
legal dispute between the central government and the KRG is a continuation of 
the long-rooted dispute throughout the history of Iraq, which may explain why 
settlement on the oil operations has been so complicated.  
3.9.2 Nationalisation of Iraqi oil 
Following the military coup over the Qasim regime in 1963, a new national 
government was formed. The new government promised to develop the oil 
operations within the areas relinquished from IPC. This was to increase oil 
production and to generate more funds for the reconstruction of Iraq. In doing 
so, Law No 11 was promulgated by the Iraqi government in February 1964, by 
which a new national oil company called the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) 
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was established,96  for exploration and production, excluding refining and 
distribution, within the areas taken back from the IPC and its subsidiaries in 
accordance with Law No. 80 of 1961. The other state departments were 
engaging with refining and distribution activities. Subsequently, a new law was 
passed, Law No. 97 of September 1967,97 which granted the INOC more areas 
for exploration and production. Under the new law, almost all concession areas 
were reclaimed from the IPC, which were previously granted to the INOC, 
including the current oilfield of North Rumaila, which is the biggest oilfield in 
Iraq. The new law granted INOC exclusive rights to carry out all types of oil 
operations from the exploration phase to extracting oil and exporting to the 
international market.  
The INOC was newly established and lacked sufficient funds, oil infrastructure, 
technical development, and expertise to manage the oil operations within the 
large areas assigned to it. Therefore, it had to rely on local and international 
companies to carry out the oil operations, in the form of subsidiaries, 
partnerships, and use of contractors. Developing the industry was aimed at 
maximising oil production within the areas relinquished from the IPC. Iraq could 
not get any assistance from countries who were shareholders in the IPC because 
of the damages those countries sustained from the relinquishment of the 
concession areas. Therefore, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union, who had no shares 
in the IPC, for assistance. Iraq and the Soviet Union concluded several 
agreements concerning different aspects of the oil industry. In 1969, they 
concluded the Iraqi-Soviet Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation98 
by which the Soviet Union through the “Techno Export Company”99  provided 
Iraq with technical expertise for the North Rumaila oilfield for exploitation, 
installation of pumping and degassing stations, gathering pipeline networks, and 
construction of the pipeline from the Rumaila oilfield to the terminal.  
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The Iraqi government also concluded several agreements with other foreign 
companies, including the French company, Enterprise de Racherches et 
d’Achtivities Petrolieres (ERAP) and a service contract in 1968.100 This was the 
first service contract Iraq concluded with a foreign oil company for oil operation, 
which was different from the concession agreement granted to the IPC 
previously.101 The terms of the service contract with the ERAP were as follows102: 
1. The service contract was for 20 years, 
2. The contract covered four different areas, which were 8,520 SKM onshore 
and 2,280 SKM offshore. That area would be reduced by 50% by the end 
of the third year, and a further 25% would be reduced by the end of the 
fifth year, and then the contracted area would be reduced to only the 
proven area at the end of the sixth year.  
3. The ERAP had to pay a royalty of 13.5% of posted prices and expenses 
and income tax, to pay bonuses of $2,000,000 on commercial discoveries 
of oil a further $2,000,000 every two years, to pay $5,000,000 in bonuses 
after 10 years from the date the contract became effective. 
4. The ERAP had to finance the exploration of the oil within the contracted 
area. The ERAP would not recover the exploration cost in the event the 
commercial discoveries were not found. The ERAP would recover the 
exploration cost if the commercial discoveries were found, the cost should 
be repaid as a free-interest loan by INOC at one-fifth of total yearly 
production or 10% a barrel. 
5. ERAP had to meet the expenses for the development of oil through loans. 
The Iraqi had to repay the loans to the ERAP within five years from the 
date of the first shipment of the oil, the Iraqi government had to pay 
interest on the loans at a rate of 6%.  
6. ERAP was acting as a contractor, to finance the exploration and 
development of oil, and to provide technical expertise. The INOC was to 
take over management of operations.  
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7. The produced oil was to be owned by INOC. The ERAP was to develop 
only 50% of discovered oil and the other 50% would be considered as a 
national reserve and was not subject for development by ERAP, but only 
when the daily oil production reached 75,000 bpd.  
8. The ERAP was entitled to buy 30% of the produced oil at a favourable 
price and conditions and the INOC was to sell the other 70% of the 
produced oil in the open market and at the market rate.  
9. The ERAP was to be paid a fixed fee of half a cent per barrel for the first 
100,000 bpd and one and a half cent per barrel above that. 
The agreement was the first service contract between Iraq and an IOC, which 
was categorised by some commentators as a risk service agreement.103 
Concluding their first service contract was a big achievement for the Iraqi oil 
industry. In signing that contract the Iraqi government acted as a sovereign 
actor and had better control over of its oil than with the concession system or 
the 50/50 profit sharing agreement. Although, as some members of the INOC 
argued, the agreement was not in the best interests of Iraq financially,104 Iraq 
acted as an oil owner and had full control over the management under the 
contract, while the ERAP was a contractor. This was a significant achievement 
and a historical development in the oil industries in Iraq or even in the Middle 
East, which brought the concessionary regime in Iraq to an end.105   
 
3.9.3 Law No. 69 of 1972: Nationalising the operations of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company Limited 
The dispute between the IPC and the Iraqi government continued over the 
concession area relinquished by the IPC and specifically over the North Rumaila 
Oilfield. Following the relinquishment, the IPC made claims for financial loss 
against the Iraqi government. The IPC claims on North Rumaila oil created an 
unfriendly environment in the western oil market. Iraq managed to make 
significant developments in the Rumaila oilfield with financial and technical 
assistance from the Soviet Union. Iraq was heavily reliant on its own oil 
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production to generate sufficient funds to meet its needs, especially after the 
IPC failed to increase oil production from the Kirkuk and Basra oilfields.106  
The increase in oil production was crucial for the Iraqi economy to fulfil its 
promises to the Iraqi people of rebuilding Iraq. Therefore, in February 1971, the 
Iraqi government formally requested the IPC to maximise the oil productions 
from the Kirkuk and Basra oilfields. It was not in the IPC interest to increase oil 
production as requested by the Iraqi government. IPC reduced oil production to 
half from Kirkuk’s Mediterranean in March and April 1971. The Iraqi government 
accused the IPC of the reduction in oil production as a plan to protect its partners 
interest in other countries where the IPC and its partners had oil concessions, 
such as Nigeria. The IPC denied the accusation and argued that the reason was 
the extra premium on Mediterranean liftings. The imposed premium made the 
exports of oil from Iraq more expensive than exporting oil from the Gulf to the 
European market.107  
The Iraqi government rejected the IPC’s arguments and could not overlook the 
fact that oil production was reduced in the Kirkuk oilfield at the same Shell 
increased the oil production in Nigeria. Shell and IPC were partners. For the 
same reason, Iraq maintained its previous position and firmly insisted on its 
demand for the increase of the oil production to the same level as before March 
1971, and Iraq also rejected the IPC’s request for a 35-cent discount per barrel 
on the posted prices.108 
The dispute over the level of oil production between the IPC and Iraq continued 
until May 1971 when Iraq came up with a new suggestion to settle the problem. 
The Iraqi government suggested the following points to the IPC to settle the 
dispute over the production level:  
(1) The IPC must give production to INOC at cost,  
(2) The IPC submit non-producing activities to INOC, or  
(3) The IPC must hand over control of the Kirkuk fields to INOC.  
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The deadline for the IPC to response to the Iraqi government suggestion was 
the end of May 1971. The IPC did not agree with any of the three options and 
argued that they were contrary to the terms of the oil concessions the Iraqi 
government granted to the IPC in 1929 and 1931. However, the deadline passed 
without the IPC providing the Iraqi government with a satisfactory answer.109 
The failure of the IPC to increase the oil production and its failure to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the three options from the Iraqi government to settle the 
dispute was a good opportunity and the right time for the Iraqi government to 
pursue the nationalisation of oil operations within the IPC contracted area, which 
Iraq had been working for since the 1950s. As all efforts to settle the dispute 
with the IPC were exhausted, Iraq proceeded with the nationalisation process. 
Accordingly, Law No. 69, nationalising the operations of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company Limited, was passed on 1 June 1972.110     
As a result of nationalising oil operations within the IPC’s concessions area, Iraq 
gained full control of 75% of its crude oil. The nationalising process did not cover 
the American and Dutch holding shares and Gulbenkian shares in the Basra 
Petroleum Company (BPC)’s concession area. A new national company called 
the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (ICOO) was established by Law No. 69 to 
take over the IPC’s concession area and assets.111  
The IPC claimed that the nationalisation of the IPC concession area and its 
assets were in breach of the concession agreement Iraq concluded with the IPC 
in 1929 and 1931, therefore, nationalisation was not legal. Accordingly, the IPC 
claimed the loss it sustained as a result of the nationalisation. In response to 
the IPC’s claim, Iraq made a counterclaim for the financial loss Iraq suffered 
due to the lack of oil production for the period when oil was first extracted until 
the nationalisation of oil operations started on 1 June 1972. After a long 
negotiation between the IPC and Iraq over the compensations they sought from 
each other, a settlement was finally reached in early 1973. Iraq agreed to pay 
the IPC $300 million in compensation, payable in crude. However, the amount 
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of the compensation awarded to the IPC was nullified by an IPC payment of 
$345 million in back claims. The $345, or $350 million, as some sources referred 
to, was compensation the IPC had to pay to the Iraqi government for the loss 
Iraq had sustained as a result of reduction of oil production by the IPC for the 
period mentioned above.   
Nationalising oil operations continued and extended to all remaining interests of 
the US and Dutch in BPC. By 1975, Iraq had managed to nationalise all oil 
operations. By nationalising the remaining foreign interests in the BPC, Iraq 
gained full control of all Iraqi oil and declared complete sovereignty over its oil. 
The INOC was granted exclusive rights for exploration, development, and 
production of oil throughout Iraq. IOCs could only be involved in oil operations 
through service agreements. The concession era completely ended in Iraq.112 
Nationalising Iraqi oil was a fundamental development in the oil industry. In 
1976, a new Ministry of Oil (MoO) was established with the responsibility to 
direct the planning and construction in the oil and gas sector. The MoO 
established several subsidiary companies to deal with internal petroleum 
products such as oil refining, gas processing, and internal marketing of gas 
products. The INOC remained responsible for the oil production, exporting, and 
sale of oil and gas to the international market. The INOC carried out its 
operations through several state-owned organisations, each assigned with 
certain responsibilities. The State Organisation for Northern Oil (SONO) replaced 
ICOO and was responsible for the operation of the northern fields. The Northern 
Petroleum Organisation (NPO) and a Central Petroleum Organisation (CPO) were 
assigned the responsibility for the operation in the central oilfields. The Southern 
Petroleum Organisation (SPO) was responsible for the operation of the southern 
fields. The State Organization of Oil Projects (SOOP) was assigned the 
responsibility for infrastructure and the State Organization for Marketing Oil 
(SOMO) was responsible for selling oil and gas to the international market. The 
INOC also contracted out some of its operations to the IOCs as contractors.  
The service contract was a model of agreement Iraq adopted in contracting out 
the oil development and production to IOCs. There are different types of service 
contracts which have been used in Iraq since the nationalisation of the oil in the 
                                                          
112 Joe Stork. “Middle East oil and the energy Crisis” (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
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1970s. Iraq continued to conclude service contracts with IOCs from the 1970s 
until the First Gulf War, when UN economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq by 
UN resolution No. 687 (1991), under which Iraq was forbidden from selling its 
oil to the international market. Therefore, IOCs stopped their operations in Iraq 
until after the invasion in 2003.113  
After invasion, Iraq chose to continue concluding service contracts with IOCs, 
despite the security situation and economic downturn, undeveloped oil 
infrastructure, and some national and international suggestion for a more 
generous type of oil contract, such as a production sharing contract, which 
would be more appropriate for Iraq at that time to attract IOCs to invest in Iraqi 
oil. The oil contracts provided to IOCs after the invasion are discussed in more 
details in the later chapters, especially in chapter four.  
3.10 Conclusion  
 
The history of oil operations in Iraq demonstrates how the petroleum regimes 
and oil contracts have developed throughout the history of Iraq. It shows the 
impact of political developments on the oil industry and the role oil played in all 
the political movements and political systems in Iraq. Every political reform or 
change brought major petroleum reforms and affected oil operations, especially 
the model contract used for contracting oil operations. The legal aspect of 
petroleum operations was not stabilised until the end of the 1970s and beginning 
of 1980 because of the unfair terms of the oil concessions which had been so 
favourable to IOCs. There were existing disputes between the Iraqi government 
and IOCs over the oil operations in Iraq and the favourable terms have always 
been a major issue in the concession agreements. At the beginning of the oil 
operations in Iraq, the Iraqi government was under the mandate of the British 
government, and even after the British mandate its decisions were influenced 
heavily the British government. As a result, the Iraqi government did not 
actively participate in the oil concession. Its role in the oil concession was limited 
to some legal formality like signing the concession agreement. Iraq did not have 
real attendance in negotiations for an oil concession. Iraq was not a fully 
sovereign country and was not able to strike a fair deal with IOCs. The position 
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of Iraq and its role in the oil concessions and oil contracts gradually 
strengthened. The Iraqi government has struggled to bring the oil operations 
under its control and to achieve the highest benefit for Iraq. After much difficulty 
and despite strong opposition from IOCs and their shareholders, Iraq finally 
managed to fully nationalise Iraqi oil in 1975. The petroleum regimes and oil 
contracts have been subjected to further developments and modernisation to 
ensure the best interests of Iraq and IOCs are protected.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE OWNERSHIP OF OIL AND GAS IN IRAQ 
                                            
4.1     Introduction  
 
The new Constitution of 2005 is starting point of the dispute between the Iraqi 
IFG and the KRG over the ownership of oil and gas. the current ownership 
dispute is unprecedent in the history of Iraq. There was ownership issue in the 
Oil concessions granted to the TPC (and later the IPC).  Although no specific 
term or clause in the concession granted ownership rights to the IPC to oil and 
gas in Iraq, nor was there any constitutional provision or national legislation 
granting the IPC ownership rights, however, the terms and clauses of the oil 
concessions were so favourable to the extent  that the rights granted to the IPC 
under the concession were akin to ownership rights.114 Iraq did not participate 
actively in drafting the terms and clauses of the oil concessions, and it had little 
control over the oil operations carried out by the IPC within its territories.115 
Therefore, there were concerns by the Iraqis that the IPC’s involvement in 
exploring, drilling, extracting, development, and selling the oil was that of 
owners rather than contractors. The unbalanced terms of the concessions were 
not in the interests of the Iraqi government, which led to the nationalisation of 
Iraqi oil in 1972.116 Under the new Constitution the ownership of oil and gas is 
legally complicated and controversial.  
4.2  Dispute between the KRG and the IFG over oil and gas ownership  
 
It must be made clear that there is absolute agreement between the IFG and 
the KRG that oil and gas in Iraq are owned by Iraqi people across Iraq. The 
                                                          
114 Benjamin Shwadran. Middle East oil: Issues and problems, 1977, pp 59-71 
115 Greg Muttitt. “Nationalizing risk, privatizing reward: The prospects for oil 
production contracts in Iraq.” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. Vol 
1, Number 2, 2007. Available at 
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ects_for_oil_production_contracts_in_Iraq  
116 Brown, Michael E. “The nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 1979, pp. 107–124. 
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dispute between these two governments is over who is entitled to exercise 
ownership rights over oil and gas operations on behalf of the Iraqi people. In 
other words, whether the Constitution vests the ownership of oil and gas in the 
IFG or in the KRG, or both, and whether Article 111 of the Constitution grants 
the KRG ownership rights to manage oil and gas on behalf of the Kurdish people 
within the KRG’s territories. The current dispute between the IFG and KRG is 
unprecedented in the history of Iraq. The Iraqi government has always been the 
only entity with the constitutional authority to manage oil and gas on behalf of 
Iraqi people throughout the history of Iraq. However, since 1991, the KRG have 
been acting unliterally in managing the region’s affair, including oil and gas, 
without the co-operation of the IFG. The KRG was established in 1992 by two 
main political parties, the Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP) and Patriot United 
Kurdistan (PUK). The KRG was not formally and expressly recognised by the 
Saddam Hussein regime and did not gain international recognition. The matter 
became more complicated when Iraq was invaded in 2003. The structure of the 
new Iraqi government was more complicated than ever before. The Constitution 
recognised it as a federal state for the first time in its history.117 The Constitution 
also recognised the KRG as a regional government with its own powers and 
authorities confirmed by constitutional provisions.118 The Constitution confirms 
that all legislation enacted by the KRG from 1992 remains in force, and all 
decisions issued by the KRG, including court decisions and all contracts should 
be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled by the KRG, provided 
they do not contradict the Constitution.119 Interpretation of the relevant articles 
concerning oil and gas management is disputed by the parties. The KRG argues 
that the Constitution grants exclusive rights to the KRG to manage oil and gas 
operations within its territories. This has been disputed by the federal 
government, who considers the KRG’s PSC with the IOCs unconstitutional.  
4.2.1  The Disputed Connotational Provisions  
The IFG confirms that the KRG must manage oil and gas operations in co-
operation with the IFG and the KRG’s PSCs with IOCs must be approved in 
                                                          
117 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en  
118 Article 117 of the Iraqi Constitution. Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/iq/iq004en.pdf  
119 Article 141 of the Constitution. Available at 
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advance by the IFG. The centre of the dispute is the interpretation of article 112 
of the Constitution. The arguments between the IFG and the KRG over the 
interpretation of article 112 and whether it grants the KRG an exclusive right to 
manage oil and gas, including signing PSCs with IOCs, without prior approval 
from the IFG. The dispute over oil and gas management under article 112 has 
triggered the issues of oil and gas ownership in Iraq and in the KRG. Article 111 
of the Constitution is the starting point to establish who is the owner of oil and 
gas in Iraq and whether the KRG is entitled to rely on article 111 to exercise 
ownership rights over oil and gas within its territories. Article 111 of the 
Constitution states that “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all 
the regions and governorates. “120 The article does not provide a definite answer 
to the question of “who owns oil and gas in Iraq and KRG”. It states that the 
Iraqi people own oil and gas but does not directly vest the ownership of oil and 
gas in either the federal government or the KRG. 
Article 111 has been interpreted differently by the IFG and the KRG. The Iraqi 
central government argues that Article 111 vests oil and gas ownership in the 
central government as a representative of all Iraqi people, including the KRG. 
The KRG argues that Article 111 does not deny the KRG ownership rights over 
oil and gas within its territories, rather the KRG is a constitutionally recognised 
regional government and represents the people within its territories. The KRG 
relies on the legal opinion of Professor Crawford in exercising its ownership 
rights in managing oil and gas operations under Article 111 of the 
Constitution.121 
Oil and gas ownership is directly relevant to the management of oil and gas 
operations. Whoever owns oil and gas in Iraq has the right to manage oil and 
gas operations. To establish oil and gas ownership, the research explores the 
relevant constitutional provisions, federal and regional legislation, the Iraqi Civil 
Code No 40 of 1951 (the Civil Code), and the relevant provisions of Sharia Law. 
Confirmation of ownership is profoundly important for oil and gas management 
because under the Civil Code the owner of oil and gas could exercise a different 
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range of rights over oil and gas, including exploitation, exploration, drilling, 
development, production, and exporting. In other words, the owner has the 
exclusive right to manage oil and gas operations, including signing contracts 
with the IOCs.  
Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to discussing the issue of oil and gas 
ownership in Iraq under the Constitution of 2005 and the relevant national law. 
It explores oil and gas ownership throughout the history of Iraq, from the time 
when oil was first discovered or when oil concession was first granted to the 
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) until now, in the light of constitutional 
provisions and relevant law and regulations. 
4.3 Ownership of Oil and Gas in General  
 
Different theories discuss the legal basis of the ownership of oil and gas beneath 
the land. The right to ownership of oil and gas varies from one country to 
another. In almost every oil-producing country, the ownership of oil and gas is 
vested in the state, regardless of which theory or theories are adopted by that 
state. The private ownership of oil and gas is still valid in some countries such 
as the USA. Oil and gas ownership theories have been developed over time. The 
political and legal concepts for the modern state are now more developed than 
ever before. States are now subject to international recognition and 
requirements. A recognised state has full sovereignty over its territories and its 
natural resources, including oil and gas, and can fully enjoy and exercise its 
ownership rights over oil and gas within its territory. This has been confirmed 
by the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 
December 1962122 and was confirmed by Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development of 1992.123 
                                                          
122 Article 1 of the UNGA Resolution 1803 of 1962 states that “the right of the peoples 
and nations to the permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of 
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Historically, oil was first discovered in the 19th century in Pennsylvania, USA,124 
and then discovered in many countries in the 20th century.125 Therefore, the 
theories framing the legal basis for oil and gas ownership vary from time to time 
and from one state to another. A summary of the most popular theories 
concerning oil and gas ownership is discussed briefly below for an understanding 
of the legal concept of oil and gas ownership.  
4.3.1  Legal concept of oil and gas ownership 
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 vests the ownership of oil and gas in the Iraqi 
people as is provided by Article 111, which is the only constitutional provision 
regarding oil and gas ownership. The Civil Code regulates almost all civil 
matters, including ownership of property, in Iraq. The Civil Code is based on the 
Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah,126 the Ottoman civil law which was in force 
in Iraq prior to WWI, when Iraq was still part of the Ottoman Empire, until 1953. 
The Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah was based on Sharia Law. The Civil 
Code was codified by Abd el-Razzak el-Sanhuri or ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, 
the Egyptian legal scholar127. Accordingly, the Civil Code originates primarily 
from two sources; the Islamic Sharia law and the Egyptian Civil Code128. The 
Egyptian Civil Code was codified by Abd el-Razzak el-Sanhuri, who studied law 
in France, and was based on Islamic Sharia law and western law. Therefore, the 
Iraqi Civil Code is also based on Sharia law and western law. Article 65 of the 
Civil Code states that “property is every right having a material value”.129 Article 
125 of the Civil Code defines property as “(Al Mulkiyya) Ownership is that which 
is owned by a person be it commodities or benefits”. In the explanation for 
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jurisdiction”. Available at http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF  
124 Halfdan Carstens. “The birth of the modern oil industry”, Geoexpro, Vol. 6, No. 3- 
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<http://www.encyclopedia.com>.  
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article 125 the Civil Code provides that “Explanation: Commodities such as 
things, immovables, and animals and benefits such as dwelling (habitation). 
Benefits were ranked as ownership and not as property because the ownership 
is that which a person can dispose of in a specified manner and property is that 
which is saved (stored) to be enjoyed when the need arises (Radd Muhtar) that 
its benefits are commodities which expire (are consumed) and cannot be 
stored.”130 
 
Article 126 defines property as (“Al Mal”) “that which human nature tends to 
have and may be saved (stored) until it is needed, regardless of whether it is a 
movable or a (movable)”. The Civil Code differentiates between property and 
ownership. In the explanation for article 126 it states that “The difference 
between ownership and property is specific and general: every property is an 
ownership and not every ownership is property because benefits are owned as 
we have already said and are not property as they cannot be stored until 
needed.”  
Under the Civil Code the owner can exercise three rights: disposal, enjoyment, 
and exploitation.131 The Civil Code did not directly deal with oil and gas or 
natural resources ownership because at the time the Civil Code was drafted and 
came into force, the ownership of oil and gas, or petroleum ownership, was 
regulated by the Iraqi constitution. However, the Civil Code regulates private 
ownership in general. Further details of ownership under the Civil Code is 
provided in the later parts of this chapter. 
4.3.2  The concept of ownership Under Islamic Sharia law 
The Sharia distinguishes between ownership (“Malik” in Arabic) and property 
(“Mal” in Arabic). There are different schools in Sharia (Islamic law), mainly 
Sunna and Shia. Sunni’s rely primarily on the Hanafi, Shafi’y, Maliky and 
Hanbali. The Shia relies on the Ja’fari school. The oil and gas contract and 
petroleum regime in Iran is based on the Ja’fari School.132 Saudi Arabia’s oil and 
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gas contract and petroleum regime is based on Hanbali’s school. Ownership in 
Sharia is an interest protected by law, which allows the owner of a thing to 
exercise a right to use, benefit, exploit and dispose of the thing in possession of 
the owner as permitted in Sharia law.133 Accordingly, ownership applies to things 
or properties (“Mal”) which could be possessed and have value.134 However, 
Sharia law considers certain things or properties as public properties that cannot 
be privately owned. The Maliki school considers minerals in situ public 
properties, which are not available for private ownership. Public properties must 
be controlled and managed by the state or the head of the state (“Imam”). This 
means that public properties are not owned by the state or Imam, but that the 
Imam only manages public properties on behalf of the people. This means that 
the Sharia law vested the mineral ownership in the people. In other words, what 
the state exercises over minerals in the ground is a sovereign right to manage 
the minerals operations within its territory. The management of the minerals 
must be conducted in a way to achieve the best interests of the people. What 
the Imam exercises under Sharia law is sovereignty over the minerals within its 
territories. That concept is consistent with the concept of the permanent 
sovereignty of the state over its natural resources within its territories under 
United Nations resolution 1803 of 14 December 1962. 
 
4. 3. 3  Absolute ownership 
This theory has been developed through common law principles.135 Under this 
theory, ownership of land extends to the deepest point of the earth beneath the 
land and on the surface to the sky. Accordingly, the landowner owns everything 
under the land to the deepest part of the earth, including oil and gas, and 
everything above the land up to the sky.136 The landowner only could claim the 
ownership of oil and gas when they are extracted and possessed by the land 
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owner.137 Under this theory, the landowner cannot claim the ownership of oil 
and gas under his or her land. Accordingly, all petroleum beneath the land is 
owned by the landowner once they have been extracted. Nevertheless, oil and 
gas beneath the land captured by others would not be owned by the 
landowner.138  
However, under the absolute ownership theory, ownership of oil and gas could 
be lost by reasonable drainage. This theory is still valid in USA139 and in the 
province of Alberta in Canada. Under this theory, private landowners are 
permitted to own oil and gas found on their lands, and have the right to sell, 
lease and use the land as the national law permits.140 
 
4.3.4 The rule of capture 
Under the rule of capture, the ownership of oil and gas can be acquired only by 
capture. The land owner cannot claim the ownership of oil and gas under the 
land until it is extracted or captured.141 Therefore, whoever extracts or captures 
oil and gas acquires ownership of the extracted oil and gas, regardless of 
whether they are under his or her land or drained from neighbouring lands. If 
the extracted oil and gas originated from, or moved to adjusted land, the person 
who captured it will acquire ownership without being liable to the owner of the 
adjusted land.142 However, if oil and gas were drilled at a slant or horizontally 
penetrating from the property of another, the oil and gas belong to the owner 
of the land where the extracted oil and gas were bottomed. The rule of capture 
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is still valid in some parts of the USA. The rule of capture is also called the 
‘qualified interest theory’.143 There are limitations to the rule of capture, i.e. 
interest limitations, the doctrine of correlative rights, and conservative laws.144 
 
4.3.5 Non-qualified ownership theory 
This theory is also called the non-ownership theory.145 The centre of this theory 
is that no-one owns oil and gas underground until it is extracted, and ownership 
of oil and gas is only acquired when they are extracted or captured. However, 
not everyone has the right to extract or capture them, only the owner of, or the 
person who has the right to drill, the land where oil and gas are available. This 
is because oil and gas are migratory, and they cannot be owned until they are 
extracted and reduced to possession.146 The practice of this theory dates to the 
19th century in the USA. The legal basis for this theory was the water ownership 
theory, which has a similar view. This theory has evolved, and it is now well-
established in US jurisprudence. 
 
4.3.6 State ownership theory 
Under this theory the state owns oil and gas under its land, and only the state 
or persons, natural or legal, with permission from the state, can exercise 
ownership rights over oil and gas, including exploration, drilling, development, 
and selling or transferring to the international market, in the best interests of 
its people.147 Due to the economic value and importance of oil and gas in 
people’s lives, the state as a representative of the people owns oil and gas 
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beneath its land. Currently, state ownership of oil and gas is common among 
oil-producing countries.148  
 
Under this theory, the state is permitted to expropriate privately-owned land for 
public use with or without fair compensation to the landowner. There are certain 
provisions in the constitutions of oil-producing countries on oil and gas 
ownership. There is also domestic legislation regulating oil and gas operations, 
including concessions, licenses, and contracts. 
 
Since the discovery of oil and gas in the 20th century in certain countries, i.e. 
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Indonesia, Norway, Venezuela etc. oil 
and gas law and agreements have been evolved in response to political and 
economic changes.149 The political changes in the above countries are always 
followed by improvement in terms of the concession agreement or a change of 
the model contract. Iraq is a good example to explain how the concession 
agreements were affected by political developments. Accordingly, the 
management of petroleum resources has seen profoundly improved, including 
the legal aspect of the petroleum operations and the organization and the 
management of state ownership. The rights the IOCs exercised in managing the 
petroleum were akin to the ownership rights. As a result of the above 
developments the management as an owner changed to management as a 
contractor. In Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iran, the model contract changed 
to a 50/50 profit sharing agreement in the 1950s. In Iraq, the concession 
agreement changed to a technical service contract in 1969.  
4.3.7 Ownership of oil and gas under domanial regimes 
This theory provides the legal basis for oil and gas ownership in states with a 
federal system, where there are central and local governments. The theory 
discusses who has the ownership right over petroleum in situ between the 
federal states and local governments in a federation.150 The constitution or 
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petroleum law are the primary sources to determine who has the right to 
manage oil and gas. i.e. exploration, drilling, developments, sale, exploitation 
and other operations, or the right to grant local or international companies 
various petroleum licenses and leases, concessions, technical service contracts, 
production-sharing contracts, pure service contracts, joint ventures, and other 
petroleum agreements.151 Every state has regulated this matter through certain 
provisions in its constitution, natural resources or petroleum legislation, and 
case law. In stabile countries, oil and gas ownership is settled by law, but in 
unestablished countries like Iraq, the issues of oil and gas ownership are not 
fully settled. The dispute over oil and gas ownership in Iraq and other countries 
where there is dispute over ownership is discussed further in this chapter.  
4.4       Oil and gas ownership throughout the history of Iraq  
 
Oil was first discovered in Iraq in 1927. The first oil concession agreement was 
to the TPC in 1925. Apart from the concession agreement, there was no other 
law regulating oil operations. There was no constitutional provision regarding oil 
ownership in Iraq and ownership in general was regulated by the Ottoman law 
called Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah,152 which was valid in Iraq until the 
Civil Code came into force in 1953.153 The valid and enforced law in Iraq was 
the Ottoman law until the 1940s and the early 1950s. Iraq was in a transitional 
period and the old laws were in force until replaced by a new one. Article 113 of 
the 1925 constitution stated that “Ottoman laws that were published before 
5th November 1914, and the laws published on or after that date remain 
applicable in Iraq until the publication of this law [Basic Law] and continue to 
be in force as far as circumstances permit, taking into account their latest 
                                                          
151 Silvana Tordo, David Johnston and Daniel Johnston. Petroleum exploration and 
production rights. Allocation Strategies and Design Issues. World Bank Working Paper 
No 179. 2010. The full text is available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8XwUPWVAl74C&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=the+ow
nership+right+over+petroleum+in+situ&source=bl&ots=AiDDJOsk3O&sig=rU9NYpyS
Xju1cQMzLnUacxABoHU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjwnLuXvoLbAhVKDMAKHeWxDq
AQ6AEIQTAF#v=onepage&q=the%20ownership%20right%20over%20petroleum%20i
n%20situ&f=false  
152 Full English version available at 
http://legal.pipa.ps/files/server/ENG%20Ottoman%20Majalle%20(Civil%20Law).pdf  
153 Nor Amanda. Shariah, Fiqh nnd Majalla Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah. Available at 
http://www.academia.edu/10100376/SHARIAH_FIQH_AND_MAJALLA_AL-AHKAM_AL-
ADLIYYAH  
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modification or cancellation relating to statements, orders and laws mentioned 
in the following article [Article 114]154 until such time when they are replaced or 
repealed by the legislative authority or until a decision is issued by the Supreme 
Court155 that makes them void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86”. 
Therefore, Iraq did not have a specific oil and gas regime governing oil and gas 
ownership or oil and gas operations at the beginning of its existence. The terms 
and clauses of the concession agreement were the only sources of law 
concerning oil in Iraq. There were general provisions in the Constitution of 1925 
regarding natural resources, but nothing specific regarding oil and gas. There 
was a presumption of state ownership of oil, which was based on the provisions 
for the Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah. The constitution as a supreme law and 
other domestic legislation must be explored to establish oil and gas ownership 
in Iraq.   
4.4.1 The ownership of oil and gas in the Constitutions of Iraq from 1925 to 2005 
Iraq was established in 1920 after WWI. Prior thereto, Iraq was part of the 
Ottoman Empire.156 In the San Remo agreement,157 the British government was 
granted a Class A mandate over Iraq. Although no oil and gas were found in 
Iraq before WWI, natural resources ownership and mineral ownership was 
regulated and organised by the Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah, which was 
based on the Islamic Sharia law. The first Iraqi government was established 
under the British mandate in 1921. Iraq had its first Monarchy constitution in 
1925,158 which entered into force when Iraq was still under the British mandate 
and remained in effect until 1958. In 1958, the monarchy system was 
overthrown in a military coup and a republican government was established. 
                                                          
154 Article 114 of the Constitution stated “All proclamations, regulations and laws 
issued by the Commander-in-chief of His Britannic Majesty’s forces in Iraq, the Civil 
Commissioner, and the High Commissioner. and those issued by the Government of 
His Majesty King Faisal during the period between the 5th November 1914, and the 
date of the coming into force of this constitution, shall be considered to be valid as 
from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by 
that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or 
until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with 
the provisions of article 86.” 
155 It was translated in some texts as a “High Court”. 
156 Iraq was called Mesopotamia when it was part of Ottoman Empire. Wikipedia. 
History of Iraq. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Iraq  
157 Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Conference of San 
Remo, Italy 1920, last updated 18.04.2018. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Conference-of-San-Remo  
158 The full text is available at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/iraqiconst19250321.   
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Interim constitutions were adopted in 1958, 1963, 1964, 1968, and 1970. The 
Interim constitution of 1970 remained in effect de jure until 1990 when the 
Transitional Administrative Law was adopted. During this time, Iraq was in the 
process of drafting a new constitution. A draft constitution was prepared but 
never ratified by parliament due to the start of the first Gulf War. The 
Transitional Administrative Law remained in force until 2003 when Iraq was 
invaded by the Coalition forces. After the invasion, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority was adopted and applied in Iraq until the Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period came into effect in 2004. Following 
a general election in 2005, the new Iraqi government was established, at the 
same time new constitution was ratified by the Iraqi people in a national 
referendum.159  
The Constitution of 1925 did not contain specific provisions concerning oil and 
gas. The Constitution was called the “Basic Law of Iraq” or “Fundamental Law 
of Iraq”. It was comprised of 9 Parts and 122 Articles.160 It was drafted in 1925 
and amended in 1925 and 1943.161 The Constitution referred to property, rights 
of the property, and property safeguards in general, but there was no specific 
article in respect of oil and gas or oil and gas ownership, or natural resources 
ownership. The amendments were concerning the property and rights of 
property in general. Article 10 states that, “All rights of ownership shall be 
safeguarded. No forced loans may be imposed, nor may any real or personal 
property be sequestrated, nor any prohibited article confiscated, except in 
conformity with law. All unpaid forced labour and general confiscation of 
movable or immovable property are absolutely forbidden. There shall be no 
expropriation of the property of any person except in the public interest, and in 
such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and on 
condition that just compensation be paid”162. 
                                                          
159 Klaas Glenewinkel. List of Iraq’s Constitutions. Niqash, 2006. Text available at 
http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/society/477/  
160 The Arabic version is uploaded by Jala Mistafa and available at 
https://www.academia.edu/13376362/First_Iraqi_constitution_1924 . The English 
version available at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/iraqiconst19250321.htm  
161 Global Justice Project: Iraq. http://gjpi.org/library/primary/iraqi-constitution/  
162 The full text is available at http://gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/iraqiconst19250321.  
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This article provided general protection to the privately-owned properties of the 
people. The second part was impliedly relevant to oil and gas, “There shall be 
no expropriation of the property of any person except in the public interest, and 
in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and on 
condition that just compensation be paid”. Although oil was not discovered at 
the date this article came into effect, people could rely on it after the discovery 
of oil. The Iraqi government had to pay fair compensation to people whose land 
were expropriated for oil exploration and oil development. This article did not 
confirm the state ownership of the petroleum.  
Article 93 of the same Constitution stated that “No property of the State may 
be sold, granted, leased or otherwise disposed of except in accordance with 
law”. This article referred to the property of the state and how should be 
managed and that it can be exploited only in accordance with the law. The article 
made no reference to the state ownership of petroleum in any way.  
Article 94 stated that “No monopoly or concession shall be granted for dealing 
with or using any of the natural resources of the land, nor for any public service, 
nor shall the State revenues be farmed out, except in accordance with law, 
provided that where the period relating to them exceeds 8 years, they must in 
each ease be the subject of a special law”. This article referred to the grant of 
concession for natural resources. Although it did not specifically refer to oil and 
gas, it does cover oil and gas. It did not clearly confirm that oil and gas are 
owned by the state. The practical reality was that the Iraqi government, as a 
landowner, granted the concession to the TPC, which could not be ignored or 
overlooked. No matter how much influence the British government had over the 
IFG in granting favourable oil concessions to the TPC, the IFG was acting as a 
landowner in the concession agreement. One may argue that Iraq did not fully 
participate in drafting the terms of the oil concession. The concession was 
drafted and granted to the TPC under the British government’s influence. This 
argument may undermine the legality of the concession agreement but did not 
change the reality of the Iraqi ownership of the conceded land.  
Article 113 stated that “Ottoman laws published before the 5th November 1914, 
and laws published on or after that date which remained in force in Iraq until 
the publication of this law, the Constitution, shall remain in force so far as 
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circumstances permitted, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity 
with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the for-mentioned 
articles, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the 
High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with 
the provisions of article 86” . Article 113 confirmed that all Ottoman laws which 
were in force before the constitution came into effect remained in force unless 
it was modified or repealed by a new law. Therefore, Iraq could rely on the 
Ottoman law regarding the state ownership of the petroleum resources within 
its territories. The Ottoman Land Code 1585 regulated land ownership.163 The 
land was generally owned by the state and the individual. The state could 
expropriate the land owned by the individual for the public interest with fair 
compensation to be paid to the landowner.164 Therefore, the Iraqi government 
could refer to the Ottoman Land Code of 1585 as evidence of the state 
ownership of petroleum resources. It was accepted that Iraq was not a 
sovereign state and did not have full sovereignty over its territories. Not having 
full sovereignty over its land may affect its ability and capacity to deal with the 
natural resources, including oil and gas. It would limit or restrict it from 
exercising its ownership right fully over the land.   
This constitution was in force until 1958 when the monarchy was overthrown 
and replaced by a republican system. The 1925 constitution was repealed and 
replaced by a new interim constitution of the Republic of Iraq in 1958. 
The 1958 constitution comprised of 30 articles, mostly dealing with the outcome 
of the revolution and the new Iraqi government. It did not contain provisions 
regarding oil and gas or petroleum.165 Although the interim constitution of 1958 
did not specifically deal with petroleum matters, a new national law was enacted 
to regulate oil operations. Law No 80 of 1961, delimiting areas of exploitation 
                                                          
163 BEKI. Ottoman land registration law as a contributing factor in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Jon-Jay Tilsen 2003. Available at http://www.beki.org/dvartorah/landlaw/  
164 Cemal Biyik and Ayse Yavuz. The importance of property ownership and 
management system in the Ottoman empire in point of today. Available at 
https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/morocco/proceedings/TS1
0/TS10_4_biyik_yavuz.pdf  
165 Full text, English version, available at 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/1958_Interim_Constitution__English_.PDF  
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for oil companies,166 was passed, in terms of which 99.5% of the IPC 
undeveloped concession area was relinquished. Almost all concession areas 
where exploration had not taken place was returned to Iraq. This was discussed 
in detail in chapter two.  
The 1958 constitution did not introduce new constitutional provisions concerning 
petroleum ownership in Iraq. Similar, the interim constitutions of 1963, 1964, 
1968 brought no great changes and amendments to petroleum ownership in 
Iraq. The position regarding state ownership of petroleum remained unchanged, 
and no constitutional provisions were introduced in respect of same.  
4.4.2 Interim Constitution of 1970167 
The interim constitution of 1970 was introduced after Iraq had been through 
many political, economic, and legal developments. These changes impacted 
positively on the oil concession agreements. Therefore, oil and gas ownership 
was significantly developed. The interim constitution of 1970 made petroleum 
ownership clear. Article 13 (public property and planning) stated “National 
resources and basic means of production are owned by the People. They are 
directly invested by the Central Authority in the Iraqi Republic, according to 
exigencies of the general planning of the national economy”.  
Article 13 clearly confirmed that petroleum ownership vested in the people, but 
directly managed by the central government as the people’s representative. 
Article 16 provided protection for private ownership and the circumstances and 
conditions where private property could be expropriated. Article 16 
(ownership, private property): 
 
(a) Ownership is a social function, to be exercised within the objectives 
of the Society and the plans of the State, according to stipulations of the 
law. 
(b) Private ownership and economic individual liberty are guaranteed 
                                                          
166 John M. Blair. “Iraq and the battle for oil. A historical insight”. Excerpt from The 
Control of Oil. 1977. https://www.globalresearch.ca/iraq-and-the-battle-for-oil-a-
historical-insight/24810  
167 Full text in English is available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070929101911/http://www.mallat.com/iraq%20const
%201970.htm  
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according to the law, and on the basis of not exercising them in a manner 
incompatible with the economic and general planning. 
(c) Private property is not expropriated except for considerations of public 
interest and for just compensation in accordance with the law. 
(d) The maximum limit of agricultural property is prescribed by the law; 
the surplus is owned by the people. 
 
Under Article 16, private ownership was protected and could not be expropriated 
except when the public interests required so, and a fair and just compensation 
must be paid to the landowner and those who had sustained loss as a result of 
the expropriation. The interim constitution of 1970 is the first constitution which 
clearly referred to petroleum ownership in Iraq. From 1958 to 1970 domestic 
legislation was passed regarding oil concession and petroleum operations in 
Iraq. Chapter two provides further information regarding all legislation and the 
developments in the oil concession agreements between the Iraqi government 
and IPC and its subsidiaries.  
Article 18 of the same constitution stated that “[foreigners' property] 
Immobile ownership is prohibited for non-Iraqi, except otherwise mentioned by 
a law”. This article was highly relevant to petroleum ownership as it prohibited 
foreign ownership of immovable properties,168 lands, buildings, plant (ations), 
bridges, dams, mines, and other real estate things. The provision of this article 
impliedly prohibited the IOCs’ ownership of the oil concession area. In 
accordance with the provisions of the 1970 interim constitution, the ownership 
of oil and gas vested in the people of Iraq and all oil and gas operations were 
managed by the Iraqi government on behalf of the people. The legal state of 
the petroleum ownership remained unchanged until 1990 when a new draft of 
the interim constitution was prepared, but never enacted due to the first Gulf 
War. The 1990 interim constitution did not contain something different to the 
provisions in the 1970 interim constitution. The provisions of articles 13, 16, 
and 18 were repeated in articles 13, 16 and 18 in the draft interim constitution 
                                                          
168 Chapter 3, Article 62 of the Iraqi Civil Code No 40 of 1951 has divided the 
properties in things into two categories, movable and immovable things. Immovable 
are lands and buildings, plant (ations), bridges, dams, mines, and other real estate 
things. The full English version text is available at http://gjpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/01/civilcode1-197.pdf  
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of 1990;169 the wording was even the same. The 1990 interim constitution did 
not provide something different from the previous one. For the period from the 
First Gulf War in 1991 when the UN-imposed economic sanctions on Iraq until 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the state of petroleum ownership had not changed. 
In 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authorities were granted the legislative power 
to pass law regarding everything in Iraq.  
4.4.3 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)  
The CPA was established on 12 May 2003 to govern Iraq for an interim period 
until a national Iraqi government formed. It was headed by Paul Bremer, an 
American diplomat, who ran Iraq for over a year from 12 May 2003 to 28 June 
2004.170 Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of (2003), CAP was 
vested with all three powers of the executive, legislature, and judiciary171 in Iraq 
from the time of its establishment until its dissolution on 28 June 2004. Between 
1991 and 2003, Iraq was affected as a result of the war and UN economic 
sanctions for over 12 years. Reconstructing Iraq and reviving its economy were 
the top priorities of the CAP’s reconstruction plan. For the plan to become a 
reality and become effective, foreign investments were needed, but the foreign 
investment environment was very poor and unattractive. New laws and 
regulations were needed to boost the investment sector to encourage foreign 
companies to participate in the reconstruction process. 
The first step taken by the CPA was the adoption of several regulations and 
orders, by which many parts of the Iraqi laws concerning foreign companies 
or/and foreign investors were “suspended or replaced”. Orders 37, 38, 39, 40 
concerned foreign investments. The main purpose of those orders was to 
remove the existing barriers in the Iraqi legal system concerning foreign 
investment, which can be summarised here as follows:  
                                                          
169 Full text, English version, is available at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/iz01000_.html  
170 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, BenJamin Runkle, Siddharth Mohandas. Occupying 
Iraq: A History of The Coalition Provisional Authority. The full text is available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf  
171 CAP Regulation (1) Section 1(1) states that the CPA “shall exercise powers of 
government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq 
during the period of transitional administration . . .” and Section 1(2) states that “The 
CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve 
its objectives . . .”  
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1. The Iraqi Interim Constitution (1990) prohibited private ownership of 
natural resources and the “basic means of production.”172 It also prohibits 
foreign ownership of immovable (real) property as well.173  
2. Article (12) of the Iraqi Company Law No. 21 of 1997 prohibited 
foreigners from becoming shareholders in Iraqi companies and prohibited 
them from investing. Only Iraqi citizens were permitted to become 
shareholders in a company. Arab national citizens were treated as Iraqi 
nationals. 
3. Under the Commercial Agency Law No. 51 of (2000) the agent must be 
an Iraqi national and must be resident in Iraq.174  
4. Iraq did not have Western-style competition law. 
5. Iraq was not a member of the WTO. 
 
The above points were indirectly relevant to oil and gas operations in Iraq as 
IOCs were required to become involved with the reconstruction of the oil and 
gas sector.   
Orders No. 37, 38, 39 and 40 were passed to provide certain legal protections 
which were essential elements to create a proper and safe environment for 
foreign investment. The said orders impacted foreign investment dramatically.  
Order No. 37 provided the new tax regime which covered both individuals and 
corporations. It repealed most of the existing tax laws and replaced them.175 
This was to show that foreign investors or foreign companies were not treated 
less favourably than national companies as required by the WTO.  
Order No. 39 of the CPA was promulgated on 20 September 2003 and replaced 
“all existing foreign investment law[s]”,176 and suspended Company Law No. 21 
                                                          
172 Article (13) of the Iraqi Interim Constitution (1990).  
173 Ibid Article (18).  
174 Article 4. (Commercial Agency) 
(1) To grant the commercial agent a license he should be: 
      (a) Of Iraqi nationality and resident in Iraq. ( Full text of the law available in English 
at http://128.252.251.212/Library/cdroms/foreigntax/Iraq/iraq  
175 CPA Order (37) Section (2) (a), (b) and (c). The full text of the order is available in 
English at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030919_CPAORD_37_Tax_Strategy_for_2
003.pdf  
176 CPA Order (39) Section (3) (1) “This Order replaces all existing foreign investment 
law”.  
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of 1997. The order abolished some existing Iraqi laws and regulations 
concerning foreign investment and suspended others. The order provided 
national treatment for foreign companies; foreign companies and Iraqi 
companies had to be treated alike unless the order provided otherwise.177 This 
was the first time since the 1950s in Iraq that foreign companies enjoyed such 
legal protection. 
Section (6) of the order revoked all legal restrictions concerning foreign 
participation in national companies and prohibited discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investors. Section (6) of the order did not affect “natural resources”, 
banking, and the insurance sector. The previous restrictions on foreign 
companies in respect of those three sectors remained unchanged. Article (16) 
of the Iraqi Interim Constitution (1990), which prohibited foreign companies 
from owning “real property” (land, houses, and buildings) was repealed by 
section (8) of Order 39, which repeated the same restriction and confirmed that 
foreign ownership of real property in Iraq is not permitted.  
However, section (8) (2) of Order 39 allowed foreign companies to own land 
only for residential projects, such as buildings and houses. 
Overall, Order 39 was the most developed company law in Iraq which provided 
foreign companies with national treatment in almost everything with certain 
exceptions as mentioned above, and increasing legal protection to the level that 
exempts CPA’s contractors and sub-contractors from being subject to any Iraqi 
law. Order 39 was superseded and replaced by the 2006 Iraqi national 
investment law, and the Constitution.  
It is clear from the above that the provisions of the CPA orders did not change 
oil and gas ownership and the type of oil and gas contracts that the former Iraqi 
regime provided to IOCs. The oil and gas sector remained unaffected for 
unknown reasons.  
4.4.4 Oil and Gas Ownership under the new Iraqi Federal Constitution 
The KRG was formed following a general election in 1992. The former Iraqi 
regime had no direct constitutional control over the KRG area. The KRG had full 
effective control and acted like a sovereign state over all matters concerning the 
                                                          
177 Ibid Section (4) (1) and (2). 
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KRG, including oil and gas. The KRG had its own government, parliament, and 
judiciary. The circumstances changed after the invasion. The KRG agreed to 
participate in the new Iraqi government and to establish a formal relationship 
between both governments regulated by the Constitution. An agreement was 
reached in principle and the Constitution was elected and became effective in 
2006. Practically, the relationship between the KRG and central government has 
been through many difficulties due to disagreement over several issues. Oil and 
gas was the most controversial issue between them. The KRG had been 
exercising full control and managing oil and gas within its territories from 1991. 
Oil was first extracted in 1994 from Taq Taq oil field. Although the former Iraqi 
regime had no direct control over the KRG’s affairs, the KRG was still part of 
Iraq and did not have formal recognition from the central government. The KRG 
extracted oil and sold it to the neighbouring countries between 1994 and 2003, 
which was not disputed by the former Iraqi regime. The silence of the former 
Iraqi regime on the KRG’s oil operations at that time did not confirm the KRG’s 
exclusive right to manage oil and gas, nor KRG’s ownership of oil and gas within 
its territory.   
The circumstances changed after 2005. The Constitution recognised the KRG as 
a regional government and Iraq as a federal state178 for the first time since the 
establishment of Iraq in 1920. The KRG gained formal recognition and its 
relationship with the central government is now regulated by the Constitution.179 
The KRG and central government must act in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution. The central government claims that the KRG’s PSCs with IOCs 
are not constitutional. The Constitution does not grant the KRG an exclusive 
right to manage oil and gas within its territories and claims the KRG does not 
have the constitutional right to form or enter or sign contracts with IOCs without 
prior approval from the central government. The KRG has denied any 
wrongdoing regarding its oil and gas contracts with IOCs and confirms its PSCs 
                                                          
178 First Article of the Iraq Constitution of 2005 states “The Republic of Iraq is a single 
federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is 
republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a 
guarantor of the unity of Iraq.” Full text of the constitution available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=230000.  
179 First part of Article 117 of the 2005 constitution state “First: This Constitution, 
upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing 
authorities, as a federal region.” Full text of the constitution available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=230000.  
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with IOCs comply with the Constitution. The centre of the legal arguments 
between both sides is Article 112 of the Constitution, concerning the 
management of natural resources, including oil and gas. The issues of the KRG’s 
oil and gas contracts with IOCs, its legality in the light of Article 112, and 
domestic legislation are discussed in detail in the next chapter. One of the issues 
in dealing with the oil and gas dispute is the ownership of oil and gas. The 
question is who owns oil and gas within the KRG’s territories. Oil and gas 
ownership is extremely important, and its directly relevant to the ongoing 
dispute between the central and KRG over the KRG’s oil and gas contracts with 
IOCs. The ownership right is defined by the Civil Code as the right to use the 
property, the right to exploit it, and the right to dispose of it. No other person, 
natural or legal, can enjoy the ownership right over a property without the 
owner’s permission.  Therefore, establishing the ownership of oil and gas within 
the KRG’s territories is a crucial first step’.  
4.5      Constitutional provisions concerning Oil and Gas Ownership  
 
Article (111) of the 2005 Constitution states that “Oil and gas are owned by all 
the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” This is compatible with 
the direction of international law on oil and gas ownership, which confirms that 
the natural wealth and resources are the property of the peoples. The state is 
only a tool for management, distribution, and development. The state has a 
duty to manage the natural resources in the best interests of the people. At the 
outset of this chapter, reference was made to the United Nations resolution 1803 
of 14 December 1962, which confirms the right of people and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. The people and nation’s 
rights to the natural wealth and resources must be respected by other nations 
and must be managed by their governments in the interest of their national 
development and the well-being of the people. People should not be deprived of 
their own means of subsistence and well-being under any circumstances. 
Article 111 of the Iraq constitution clearly vests oil and gas ownership in the 
people of Iraq, regardless of their religion, ethnicity, and location. However, 
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there are two different interpretations or opinions among the jurisprudence for 
this article:180 
First: The ownership of oil and gas under the Constitution is the property of all 
the Iraqi people in all regions and governorates. Article 111 vests the ownership 
of oil and gas in all people in Iraq in all regions and governorates. The ownership 
in this sense cannot be divided between the Iraqi people. The ownership of oil 
and gas is similar to the “Waqf Property”,181 which is property used for the 
benefit of people, and only its revenues may be used. The property itself cannot 
be sold or given to a third party. Therefore, the asset remains fixed and cannot 
be disposed of. The wording of the article does not restrict the ownership of oil 
and gas, in the sense that the text addresses all Iraqi people in all regions and 
governorates, in the sense that Oil and Gas are shared by all Iraqi people and 
the share of each partners is dispersed and uncontrolled or concentrated in a 
geographical location. Oil and gas in the Kurdistan region is the property of all 
people of Iraq, which means that people in Basra and Kurdistan have a common 
share in the oil of Iraq, from Basra province in the south to Kurdistan region in 
the north and vice versa. The people in the provinces of Muthanna and Qadisiyah 
have a common share in every barrel of oil produced in the land of Iraq, whether 
in the province of Basra or in the province of Dhi Qar or in the Kurdistan region. 
Therefore, this common property does not allow any region or any irregular 
province in the territory to be occupied, or the revenues of oil and gas within its 
geographical scope.  
The supporters of the above interpretation opine that the competent authority 
to deal with the ownership of the people (wealth of oil and gas) as an agent for 
the owner (the people), or as a representative of all Iraqi people across Iraq is 
the federal legislative authority represented in the Federal Parliament as it 
represents all Iraqis in their provinces and regions. The Iraqi Parliament is a 
                                                          
180 Ismail Alwan Al-Tamimi. “Ownership of oil in Iraqi civil law”. Modern Discussion, 
2016. The Article is in Arabic language and it is available at: 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=526956  
181 Waqf: (Pl: Awqaf/waqfs) Literally waqf means to stop, contain, or to preserve. In 
shari’ah, a Waqf  is a voluntary, permanent, irrevocable dedication of a portion of 
one’s wealth – in cash or kind – to Allah. Once a waqf, it never gets gifted, inherited, 
or sold. It belongs to Allah and the corpus of the waqf always remains intact. The 
fruits of the waqf may be utilised for any shari’ah compliant purpose. What is Waqf - 
Awqaf SA". awqafsa.org.za. Retrieved 29 March 2018. 
http://www.awqafsa.org.za/what-is-waqf/  
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competent authority to enact legislation governing the subject of oil and gas 
and the IFG has the duty to implement the legislation in the best interests of 
Iraqi people. Oil and gas are from the “private domain”. This means that all 
movable and real property, which are not directly allocated to be used for the 
public interest, is owned by the state or other public authority bodies. They need 
to meet only two conditions: that they are owned by the state or by other public 
authorities.  
Oil and gas are classified as the "extractive domain", which includes all that is 
extracted from the ground of metals such as gold, coal and oil. Therefore, the 
ownership of oil and gas belongs to the state in all regions and provinces, but 
its revenue can be distributed in a fair manner commensurate with the 
distribution of the population in the regions and provinces throughout the 
country. There should be a fixed share for a fixed term for those regions and 
provinces were affected by the acts of the former Iraqi regime and were unfairly 
deprived and their territories were damaged by the former Iraqi regime. This is 
to ensure the balanced development of the different regions of the country. 
Justice and fairness in the distribution of oil and gas revenues cannot be a 
mechanism for sharing oil and gas revenues between regions and governorates 
without a regulator or inspector. The word “justice” is a vague term and varies 
from one person to another, therefore, achieving justice and fairness in oil and 
gas revenue distribution among all regions and provinces in Iraq requires an 
auditor or legal regulator. This legal regulator or auditor is embodied in Article 
106 of the Constitution,182 which requires a public commission to be established 
with the participation of representatives from different regions and provinces 
across Iraq to audit or monitor the distribution of the federal revenues fairly, or 
equally between all the regions and provinces. The public commission has other 
tasks too, as stated in Article 106. The distribution of oil and gas revenue is now 
                                                          
182 Article 106 of the Iraqi Constitution states that “A public commission shall be 
established by a law to audit and appropriate federal revenues. The commission shall 
be comprised of experts from the federal government, the regions, the governorates, 
and its representatives, and shall assume the following responsibilities:  
First: To verify the fair distribution of grants, aid, and international loans pursuant to 
the entitlement of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.  
Second: To verify the ideal use and division of the federal financial resources.  
Third: To guarantee transparency and justice in appropriating funds to the 
governments of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region in 
accordance with the established percentages”. 
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regulated by oil and gas revenue. The Iraqi government has an annual budget 
and the budget of each region and provinces are designated in the general 
budget and is subject to voting by the Iraqi Parliament.  
Despite the agreement among the supporters of this view that the ownership of 
oil and gas vests in all the Iraqi people in all regions and provinces, there have 
been a number of criticisms, summarised as follows: 
(1) The right of ownership is a real right in property which must be 
transferred to a legal person. this can be a natural person, or juristic 
person such as a limited company, and since the Iraqi people do not enjoy 
juristic or legal personality, transferring the title or ownership of oil and 
gas to it is metaphorical. In that case, the Iraqi state is the real owner of 
oil and gas because the Iraqi state has juristic personality and therefore 
can act as a legal person under the provisions of Article 47 of the Civil 
Code.183 Article 1048 of the Civil Code stipulates that “Perfect Ownership 
vests onto the owner a right to dispose absolutely of that which he owns 
through use, enjoyment, and exploitation he shall enjoy…….”.184  
(2) The state of the other natural wealth and resources, such as iron, sulphur, 
copper and mercury have been ignored by the provisions of Article 111. 
Article 111 should have been written as follows: “Natural resources 
including oil and gas are owned by all the Iraqi people” to cover the other 
mineral and natural resources. 
                                                          
183 Article 47 of the Civil Code No 40 of 1951 state that” Juristic Persons are  
(a) The State 
(b) The administration and the public institutions which ………………………………. 
(c) The districts, municipalities, and villages which are …………………………………. 
(d) Religious sects …………………………………………………………………………………………. 
(e) Dedications (Waqfs). 
(f) Commercial and civil companies except those of which have been excluded by 
a provision in the law. 
(g) Societies which have been incorporated in accordance with the provisions of 
the law. 
(h) Every group or persons or combination of property which is granted a juristic 
personality by the law. 
184 Full text of Article 1048 of the Civil Code No 40 of 1951 is available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/landesa_production/resource/871/Iraq_civil-
code_1951_Part-4-of-
4.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAICR3ICC22CMP7DPA&Expires=1524483125&Signature=
XdqfcYY9XPPAtwmFFSdNX78dpqU%3D  
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(3) There is a difference between the Arabic version185 and the English 
version in the phrase "oil and gas is the property of ......". The word “ وه, 
hwa” is used after the word gas. The word “hwa” is used in Arabic to refer 
to a thing in singular. The English translation of the word “hwa” is “is” 
which is singular and only refers to one thing, if you refer to more than 
one thing the correct word is “are”. In the Arabic version the word “hwa” 
refers to gas only. Therefore, if the Arabic version is translated to English 
the meaning would be “the gas is owned by all the people”, which does 
not cover the oil which comes before the word ‘gas’ in Article 111. This 
linguistic problem should have been noticed and corrected by the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee. The wording of Article 111 should 
have been as follows: "Oil and gas are the property of ...". This problem 
does not appear in the English translation version as the English version 
correctly states that “oil and gas are”. It should be noted that Iraq is an 
Arabic country and Arabic and Kurdish languages are the official 
languages in Iraq under Article 4186 of the Constitution.  
Second: This group interprets and analyses the provisions of Article 111 in light 
of the provisions of Article 112 of the Constitution. They agree with the first 
group that oil and gas are the property of all Iraqi people. However, they believe 
that there are two different groups of oilfields to which the Constitution refers 
in Article 112; the current or existing oilfields, at the time of drafting the 
constitution and or precisely the time it came into effect, and the future oilfields. 
This group agrees that the ownership of the existing fields is owned by all Iraqi 
people, but they disagree with the first group in respect of the future fields.187 
They argue that the ownership of future fields is different from the ownership 
of the current or existing fields in terms of the revenue distribution. In support 
of their position, the second group relies on the first part of Article 112, which 
only refers to the current or existing fields, and makes no reference to the future 
                                                          
185 Arabic version of Article 111: ١١١)ةداملا( ٠تاظفاحملا و ميلاقلاا لك يف يقارعلا بعشلا لك كلموه زاغلاو طفنلا 
186 Article 4: “First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official 
languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, 
such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government 
educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other 
language in private educational institutions.” 
187 Ismail Alwan Al-Tamimi. “Ownership of oil in Iraqi civil law”. Modern Discussion, 
2016. The Article is in Arabic language and it is available at: 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=526956  
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fields. The first part of Article 112 states that “The IFG, with the producing 
governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil 
and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues 
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the 
country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions 
which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions 
that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in 
different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.” In 
accordance with Article 112, the IFG together with the producing governorates 
and regional governments undertakes the management of oil and gas extracted 
from the present fields. The management of the present fields must be 
conducted by the IFG and the producing governorates and regional 
governments and they must agree on the distribution of oil and gas revenue 
from the present fields. 
Both arguments lack specification and legal authority to support their 
conclusions. The wording of Article 111 of the Constitution is vague and unclear 
as to who exactly owns oil and gas in Iraq. It states that oil and gas are owned 
by all Iraqi people in all regions and governorates. As identified above there is 
a difference between the Arabic version and its English translation. The Arabic 
version literally refers to gas only. It could be inferred that only the gas is owned 
by the all Iraqi people in all governates. It may be argued that the intention of 
the draftsman was that oil and gas are owned by all Iraqi people, but then this 
must be clearly demonstrated by Article 111. 
The KRG can rely on Article 111 in its argument that the KRG has the exclusive 
right to manage oil and gas within its territories. Under the Constitution, people 
within the KRG territory are Iraqi people and KRG is a regional government, 
therefore oil and gas within the KRG are owned by its people. Accordingly, the 
KRG as a representative of the people within its region has the exclusive right 
to manage oil and gas, including signing contracts with IOCs.188 On the other 
hand, the IFG could argue that there is nothing in Article 111 to confirm that 
the KRG has the exclusive right to manage oil and gas within its territories. 
Article 111 vests the ownership of oil and gas in all Iraqi people but does not 
                                                          
188 Richard Devine and Safwan Al-Amin. “Oil and gas regulation in Iraq: Overview”. 
Practical Law. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-581-    
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specifically refer to the Kurdish people or people within the KRG’s territories. Oil 
and gas historically have been managed by the central government as a 
representative of all Iraqi people, including Kurdish people, since the discovery 
of oil in Iraq. The Iraqi economy is primarily based on oil and gas revenue and 
it accounts for more than 90% of the IFG’s budget. Therefore, it is impossible 
to imagine that the ownership of this wealth will be for the regions and 
governorates producing it, especially since the number of oil and gas producing 
governorates does not exceed one-third of the governorates who do not produce 
oil and gas. Depriving the non-producing region and governorates from oil 
revenues will create serious economic and social injustice and political division 
between the producing and non-producing governorates.  
The KRG does not dispute the fair distribution of oil and gas revenue between 
all regions and governorates.189 The KRG believes that they should have a right 
to deal with all oil and gas operations independently and should have a right to 
take their shares of the revenues and return what remains after handing their 
shares to the IFG. The IFG does not dispute the revenue sharing with the KRG, 
but they want to be involved in the revenue collection and redistribution.190 
There have been concerns about the lack of transparency and corruption in oil 
and gas sales and revenues. Corruption is a big problem currently in Iraq and 
in the KRG specifically over oil and gas deals and revenues.191 Corruption and 
lack of transparency are part of the dispute between the KRG and central 
government, and are barriers preventing the disputed parties from reaching a 
settlement on oil and gas issues.  
It should be noted that during the UN economic sanctions on Iraq, the Kurdistan 
region received its shares from oil revenues achieved under the memorandum 
of understanding on oil for food programme adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 (1991). The Kurdistan region received 
                                                          
189 Ari Mamshae. Baghdad not sincere about KRG budget, 2015. Rudow. 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/110320151  
190 Michael Knights. Baghdad-KRG negotiations: Closer than ever to a fair deal. The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2014. www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/pdf/baghdad-krg   
191 Coralie Pring. Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. U4 Answer Expert. 
Anti- Corruption Resource Centre. 2015 
https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Iraq_2015.
pdf  
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17% shares from oil for food. This programme was not directly controlled by the 
former Iraqi regime and was not subject to the actual authority of central 
government in Baghdad.  
4.6      Oil and Gas Ownership in the Iraqi Civil Code No 40 of 1951 
 
The Civil Code has not dealt directly with the ownership of oil and gas but has 
dealt with the scope of ownership in general. The Civil Code does not limit the 
ownership right to the surface of the land but extends to what is above the land 
and what is beneath it, to the extent the landowner could fully enjoy the benefit 
of the land. Article 1049 of the Civil Code deals with the issue of the scope of 
land ownership in three sections. Section (1) states that “The owner of a thing 
is also owns everything which is deemed by usage to constitute an essential 
element thereof such as it cannot be separated therefrom without the thing 
owned perishing, deteriorating or changing”. This section deals with the 
ownership in general, the owner of the thing, and whether the thing is movable 
or immovable and tangible or intangible. The essential element cannot be 
separated from that thing without perishing, deteriorating, or changing. Under 
this section, the owner of land owns the dust, the stones, the plant and trees. 
The ownership right is not limited to the thing itself and the core elements that 
are part of its composition, but also extends to things which could be taken 
away from it and its accessories. 
Section (2) of the same article states that “The ownership of land includes that 
which is above and below as far as can be usefully enjoyed in height and in 
depth”. The ownership right of a landowner is not limited to the surface of the 
land but is extended to what is above it to the sky and under the land to the 
depth of the earth. The landowner owns the space above it and is entitled to 
use the space above the land for planting, construction, or laying of wires. The 
owner of the land also owns the layers beneath it. The landowner has a right to 
dig wells or extend pipes or extract stones and others. The landowner’s right is 
protected by law and others are not allowed to use or benefit from the space 
above the land and the depth under the land without landowner’s permission.  
A further section of the same article states that “The ownership of the surface 
of the land may by agreement be separated from that which is above it and that 
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which is below it”. Section (3) permits that the ownership of the land could be 
separated from what is above or below it by agreement. It is permissible to 
agree to the possession of above the surface of the earth, the space above and 
the construction above the land could be owned by others as in the flat. The 
owner of the land can sell the underground to the other, or the ownership of the 
underground could be separated from the ownership of the surface such as the 
tunnels and warehouses.  
Article 1050 of the Civil Code states that “No one can be deprived of his 
ownership except in the cases and in the manner provided for by law and in 
consideration of a fair compensation payable in advance”. This article prevents 
the owner from being deprived of his property except by law in exchange for a 
fair compensation paid in advance. It confirms that the property cannot be 
expropriated except in the cases and manner prescribed by law. The law 
regulating the expropriation is the Acquisition Law No. (12) of 1981,192 which 
requires the upfront payment of fair compensation to the owner whose property 
is expropriated under the provisions of the Acquisition Law. It is noted that the 
Acquisition Law did not distinguish between the amount of compensation to be 
paid for the land expropriated by the Ministry of Oil after oil and gas are found 
and the expropriation of the land which is used for other purposes.  
It is clear from the above provision that the state can expropriate the privately-
owned land for public use, including searching for oil and gas, or extracting oil 
and gas when they are found, in consideration of fair compensation payable to 
the landowner.  
The Civil Code, as discussed above, is based on Sharia law. It is therefore 
important to discuss how the Sharia law regulates the ownership of oil and gas.   
4.7     Ownership of oil and gas in Sharia law  
 
Sharia jurisprudence deals with the ownership of oil and gas within the 
ownership of minerals. There are different definitions for ownership in Sharia, 
but they are all consistent with the primary elements of ownership. All 
                                                          
192 The full English translated version of the Acquisition Law No. (12) of 1981 is 
available at the Iraqi Local Governance Law Library at: http://www.iraq-lg-
law.org/en/content/acquisition-law-no-12-1981  
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definitions agree that there must be possession of the thing owned and the 
owner can exercise the ownership right over the thing owned unless there is 
impediment preventing the owner from doing so. A unique character of the 
ownership in Sharia is the owner can prevent others from using, benefiting from, 
or disposing of the property owned except with the owner’s permission and in a 
manner permitted by Sharia.193  
The concept of mineral ownership - as stated in the Al-Muhit dictionary (  سوماقلا
طيحملا)– encompasses the jewels of the earth including gold, silver, copper, iron, 
and others.194 The mineral means the things beneath the land, which is part of 
it and not treasure buried by man. The scholars of the Hanafis, the Shaafa'is 
and the Hanbalis agree that the mineral if discovered on land is the property of 
the landowner or belongs to the owner of the land. Land ownership includes 
minerals. This concept was adopted by the Majallah Al- Ahkam Al- Adliyyah in 
Article 1194 which stated that “Whoever owns a piece of land in absolute 
ownership is likewise owner of what is above it and what is below it. That is to 
say, he may deal with it as by erecting buildings on a piece of land he owns in 
absolute ownership and raising it as high as he wishes. He may also dig the 
ground and make store-rooms therein and dig wells as deep as he wishes.” The 
scholars of Maliki’s have a different approach, arguing that the minerals belong 
to the Imam, the head of the state, as a representative of the people. The 
minerals do not belong to the land as they are beneath it; therefore, they are 
not the property of the landowner, but they belong to all Muslims. The Maliki’s 
used a “Maslahah-based, (the best interest of the people)” approach based on 
compelling public interest.195 
Under the ancient Islamic jurisprudence, minerals mean everything that settles 
in and comes out of the earth. It includes gold, silver, copper, lead, mercury, 
tin, agate, sapphire, emerald, arsenic, sulphur and oil. The Imam, the head of 
the state, as a representative of all people has the exclusive right to manage 
                                                          
193 Ismail Alwan Al-Tamimi. “Oil ownership in Sharia”. Modern Discussion, 2016. The 
Article is in Arabic language and it is available at: 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=526452  
194 Maji Alddin Al-Firoz Abadi. Al-Muhit dictionary ( طيحملا سوماقلا ). It is in Arabic 
language and is available at: https://islamhouse.com/ar/books/141373/  
195 M. Ali Sadiqi. Ownership of oil and gas in light of the Maqaasid Ash-Shari’a. 
https://www.academia.edu/12313575/Ownership_of_Oil_and_Gas_Under_Islamic_Sh
ariah_Law  
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the minerals in the best interest of the people.196 Maliki's doctrine regarding 
mineral ownership is based on two points: first, the minerals that are in the 
depths of the earth are older than the landowner who owns them. Therefore, 
the landowner does not own them through the ownership of the land. The 
second is that minerals are necessary for humans and they would be improperly 
exploited if they were owned by individuals. If the minerals are only owned by 
a few individuals, there would be an unfair distribution of the nation’s wealth.  
The three historical scholars, the Hanafis, the Shaafa'is and the Hanbalis, 
support the private ownership of the minerals, including oil and gas, but the 
Maalikis support state ownership, based on the Muslahah, the best interest of 
the people. All Muslim countries have adopted the state ownership approach of 
the minerals, including oil and gas.  
4.8     Conclusion 
 
Iraq is one of the countries that adopted state ownership of oil and gas. This 
has been the case since the discovery of oil in the 1920s. Private ownership of 
oil and gas has not been recognised. The owner of the surface land does not 
have a right to oil and gas. The Constitution confirms that oil and gas are owned 
by all Iraqi people. This has been interpreted differently by the central and 
regional governments and caused practical difficulties. The central government 
argues that under the Constitution the state of Iraq, as represented by the IFG 
in Baghdad, is the only authority could act on behalf of all Iraqi people. 
Therefore, only the IFG should have the exclusive right to manage oil and gas 
including the right to explore, develop, extract, exploit and utilise. This includes 
the right to appoint contractors to assist with these activities. 
The KRG takes the view that the federal regions and provinces have the right to 
explore, develop, extract, exploit and utilise oil and gas within their territories 
without consulting the IFG. 
It is impliedly accepted by parties of the dispute that the relevant articles of the 
Constitution concerning oil and gas are vague and not clear on oil and gas 
                                                          
196 Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Figh az-Zakat: A comparative study. the rule, regulation 
and philosophy of Zakat in the light of the Qur’an and Sunna. Translated by Dr. 
Monzer Kahf. 1999, p. 53. 
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ownership and who has the exclusive right to manage oil and gas within KRG 
territories. To resolve this problem, the parties agreed to enact a new law 
governing oil and gas. Therefore, the Federal Oil and Gas Law (2007)197 was 
drafted and passed to the Iraqi Parliament for ratification. This law has not been 
yet ratified by Iraqi parliament due to disagreement between the Shia, Sunni, 
and Kurds over certain provisions in that law.198   
Despite the ongoing dispute between the IFG and the KRG, both sides have 
concluded many oil and gas contracts that grant IOCs right to explore, develop, 
extract, and sell oil and gas, although the character and extent of such rights 
are considerably different. The type of contract used by KRG is materially 
different from the one used by the IFG. KRG uses the production sharing 
contract, while the IFG uses the technical service contract. The characters of 
each type of contract and the differences between them is discussed in detail in 
the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
197 The full English version of the law is available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/Kurdistan%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Law
%20English__2007_09_06_h14m0s42.pdf  
198 Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno. Why Iraqis cannot agree on an oil law. Council on 
Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-iraqis-cannot-agree-oil-law  
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CHAPTER 5   AN EVALUATION OF THE KRG’s PSC UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive examination of the legality of the KRG’s 
production sharing contracts (PSCs) with international oil companies (IOCs) and 
their effect on the relationship between the IFG and the KRG. The chapter 
examines the legal arguments forwarded by both sides concerning the legality 
of the KRG’s PSCs. It further explores the relevant provisions of the Constitution 
and the domestic legislation and regulation concerning the management of oil 
and gas operations within the KRG’s territories. It provides a comprehensive 
discussion and analysis of the disputed issues and the attempts to resolve them 
to finally settle the ongoing dispute between the governments in Erbil (KRG) 
and Baghdad (Central Iraq) since 2004.  
The chapter examines the terms of the KRG’s PSC199 and highlights how its 
terms and clauses are different from those of the technical services contract 
(TSC),200 which has been used as a model contract in managing oil and gas 
operations by the Iraqi government since the nationalisation of petroleum in 
1972.  
This chapter examines the key legal issues of the constitutional dispute between 
the central government and KRG over the legality of the KRG’s PSCs with IOCs, 
and the KRG’s right to unliterally manage oil and gas operations within KRG’s 
territories and the disputed territories under Articles 111 and 112, as well as 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution and domestic legislation.  
5.2 The dispute over KRG’s production sharing contract  
 
5.2.1 Background of the dispute between KRG and the Iraqi government  
The KRG was formed in 1992 and functions as a semi-autonomous self-
administration government. The region is well-endowed with oil and gas 
reserves but there have been some significant challenges in establishing an oil 
                                                          
199 All KRG PSCs signed since 2002 are available on the KRG Ministry of Natural 
Resources at http://previous.cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&p=1  
200 Iraqi Service Contract ..?details publication date, etc… 
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industry, including that the KRG lacked sufficient financial resources and 
technical knowledge to invest in oil and gas operations. The search for oil and 
gas within the KRG’s territory required huge funds and developed infrastructure 
and expertise. The lack of information and data in respect of the quantity of oil 
and gas in KRG’s territories makes the exploration for potential oil and gas within 
the KRG increasingly risky and time-consuming.  
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, under the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) and thereafter the newly formed Iraqi government, a new Foreign 
Investment Law favourable to international companies was passed in 2006201. 
The primary purpose of the investment law is to persuade foreign companies, 
including IOCs, to invest in Iraq amid the security concerns which caused huge 
hesitation among foreign companies and international oil companies interested 
in doing business in Iraq. Although the security situation in KRG was much 
better in comparison with other areas in Iraq, there were other challenges facing 
the IOCs investment in the KRG’s oil sector. In addition to the lack of data and 
official reports regarding the quantity of oil and gas, the costs involved in 
extracting the potential petroleum and legal and political uncertainty were also 
concerning factors. The KRG, therefore, decided to introduce a better model 
contract to take into account the above issues.202 The KRG had to create a more 
attractive oil and gas contract to persuade IOCs to invest in the KRG’s oil and 
gas sector203. Accordingly, the KRG introduced the PSC model as the preferred 
framework to manage oil and gas operations. After the ‘invasion’, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) suggested to Iraqis that the PSC be used as a model 
contract to persuade IOCs to invest in Iraq’s oil and gas204. Due to the security 
concerns, which were at the highest level, IOCs were hesitating to invest in Iraq 
at that time. The Iraqi political parties did not approve the CPA’s suggestion, 
                                                          
201 The Investment Law No (13) of 2006. The full text of the law is available at 
http://investpromo.gov.iq/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Ammn-Invest-Law-En.pdf  
202 Robin Mills. Under the mountains: Kurdish oil and regional politics. The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Study. 2016. The full text is available at 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kurdish-Oil-and-
Regional-Politics-WPM-63.pdf  
203 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq. Annex 2 
204 Philip Thornton. Iraq’s oil: The spoils of war. Independent. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqs-oil-the-spoils-of-war-
328526.html 
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instead they believed that the TSC was still the preferred model by the Iraqi as 
it was in the best interests of Iraq.205  
The following identifies the core issues of the dispute, and the rationale of PSCs 
and TCSs in the international oil and gas industry, before examining the 
contractual situation in the KRG.  
5.2.2  The core of the disputed issues 
The KRG adopted the PSC as a model contract with IOCs for oil and gas 
exploration and production206. In 2004, the KRG concluded the SC with the DNO 
(Norwegian oil company).207 Prior to that the KRG concluded a PSC with Genel 
Enerji in 2002.208 The PSC was concluded before the invasion of Iraq, when the 
former Iraqi regime had exclusive authority for oil and gas management. The 
KRG’s PSC with DNO attracted media attention due to the strong opposition 
from the newly formed federal Iraqi government. The act of the KRG in signing 
the PSC with the IOC without prior approval from the IFG was considered by the 
IFG as an act of an independent government. The DNO’s PSC was concluded 
amid the process of setting up a new Iraqi government that represented all Iraqi 
people, including the Kurds. Therefore, the KRG’s act of signing PSC with IOCs 
without consultation and advance approval from the IFG received strong 
opposition from the IFG.  
However, the favourable clauses of the KRG’s PSC persuaded IOCs to race to 
invest in the KRG’s oil and gas sector to the extent that it reduced their 
participation for the IFG’s bid for a petroleum exploration and development 
contract. From 2005 to mid-2013, the KRG concluded 50 PSCs with IOCs. By 
contrast, Iraq’s fourth licensing round showed a poor turn up by IOCs. The 
primary reason for the IOCs changes of direction towards the KRG was the 
                                                          
205 See Greg Muttitt. Crude Designs: The Tip-Off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth – PLATFORM with 
Global Policy Forum, Institute for Policy Studies (New Internationalism Project), New 
Economics Foundation, Oil Change International and War on Want - November 2005. 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/crude-designs-the-rip-off-of-iraqs-oil-
wealth  
206 Estelle Rami. Oil Contracts and Policy in Iraq. 2014. https://bsabh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/DEC-TR-Oil-Contracts-Policy-in-Iraq.pdf  
207 Full text of the PSC between the KRG and DNO is available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&r=296&h=1&s=030000&p=33  
208 Full text of the PSC between the KRG and Genel Enerji is available at 
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difference in model contracts offered by the KRG. The IFG offered the TSC to 
the IOCs because it achieves the highest benefit for the Iraqi people. The terms 
and clauses of the KRG’s PSC are more favourable to IOCs than the Iraqi’s TSCs. 
The differences between both contractual models are discussed further in this 
chapter.  
The IFG disputes the KRG’s PSC for two main reasons. First, the KRG does not 
have the legal authority to conclude or sign oil contracts with IOCs without prior 
approval and consent from the IFG. Second, the PSC is incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution.  
Since the establishment of the Iraqi Government in 2004, there has been an 
ongoing dispute between the IFG and the KRG on various matters. The 
disagreement over oil and gas operations is the centre of that dispute, which is 
the main hurdle to normalising relations between the IFG and the KRG. The 
dispute has escalated to the extent that the KRG attempted to separate from 
Iraq through a general referendum on the KRG’s independence on 25 September 
2017.209 More than 92% of the Kurdish people voted for independence.210 
However, the IFG strongly opposed the outcome of the referendum, arguing 
that it was unconstitutional.211 The disagreement between the IFG and KRG led 
to military confrontation, by which the IFG regained most of the territories, 
including Kirkuk, which it lost during its war with ISIS. 
The long-standing dispute between the IFG and the KRG over oil and gas 
management is based on two main points:  
1. The 2005 constitution does not grant the KRG an exclusive right to manage 
oil and gas operations, specifically granting or signing contracts with IOCs 
                                                          
209 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41382494 LISTING OF WEBSITES 
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without prior approval or consent from the IFG. This has been repeatedly 
confirmed by the Iraqi government officials on different occasions.212  
2. The production sharing contract model is not compatible with the provisions 
of the 2005 constitution.213  
Analysing the terms and clauses of the KRG’s PSC in connection with the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution is the starting point to understand the 
legal aspect of this dispute. Further examination is conducted in relation to the 
issues that the IFG considers in arguing the unconstitutionality of the KRG’s 
PSC. The chapter explores why the PSC model has not been used since the 
discovery of oil by the Iraqi government, the differences between the PSC and 
the TSC, why the TSC is the acceptable model contract of the IFG and which 
is the only model used in Iraq since the nationalisation of oil, and finally which 
model of contract provides the highest benefit for the Iraqi people.  
To answer the above questions and understand the issues in dispute, the terms 
and conditions of the PSC must be examined and then compared to those of the 
TSC used by the IFG. There are four common model contracts for oil and gas 
operations; technical service contracts, production sharing contract, concession 
agreements, and joint ventures. These are the most popular model contracts 
                                                          
212 In an interview with Ruba Husari on 1 April 2009, Mr Hussein Al-Shahristani, the 
former Iraqi Minister of Oil, argued that KRG should not sign oil and gas contracts 
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version in 2006, his interpretation of the disputes between Baghdad and Ebril and his 
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for petroleum operations. The research is confined to the TSC and PSC as the 
two model contracts used by both the IFG and the KRG in managing the 
petroleum operations in Iraq. Their terms and clauses will be examined 
separately in light of the Iraqi Constitution and the constitutional test “to achieve 
the highest benefit for the people of Iraq”.   
5.3   International oil and gas contracts  
 
There are different models of the oil and gas contract are in use by the oil and 
gas producing countries across globe. The following contracts are the main 
popular models of oil and gas contracts: 
 5.3.1  The rationale of production-sharing contracts    
The PSC model was first used in Indonesia in 1966.214 Following the 
revolutionary development of the oil and gas contract model across oil-
producing countries, Iraq nationalised its oil during the 1960s and managed to 
sign its first TSC in 1969. In the 1960s, there was a strong nationalist movement 
across oil and gas producing countries, demanding that the national interest 
must be a priority in petroleum operations. In chapter three, reference was 
made to those countries where the petroleum regimes and oil model contracts 
were by the nationalist movement. The introduction of the new model oil 
contract was a result of the nationalist movement struggling against the 
unfairness of the concession agreement to the host country. Indonesia was one 
of the countries who refused to continue with the concession agreement 
contract,215 believing that the PSC was a much better model oil contract to 
adopt. Unlike the concession agreement, under the PSC the host country can 
enjoy full sovereignty over its natural resources, exercise much more control in 
managing oil operations, and gain more profits from oil production and 
revenues. The PSC is a profit-sharing contract between a host country and the 
IOC. Under the PSC, the IOC must pay all expenses and costs for exploring and 
                                                          
214 Brad Roach, Alistair Dunstan, “The Indonesian PSC: the end of an era”, The Journal 
of World Energy Law & Business, Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2018, Pages 116–135, 
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Institute for Energy Studies (1999), 10. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/WPM25-ProductionSharingAgreementsAnEconomicAnalysis-
KBindemann-1999.pdf.  
104 
 
developing oil and gas in exchange for an agreed portion of the oil production. 
The profit from the produced oil and gas is shared between the host country 
and the IOC as per the terms and clauses of the contract. Under the PSC, the 
IOC gains ownership of the produced oil. The ownership starts on the surface of 
the land when oil and gas are extracted. The PSC does not grant ownership of 
oil and gas under the land to the IOC. Under the concession agreement, the IOC 
owns the oil and gas under the land.216 Although the clauses and terms of PSC 
have been developed, it was first introduced in response to the unfair terms of 
the oil concession agreement.  
 
However, the PSC is not free of criticism. Professor Thomas Wälde, from the 
University of Dundee, described the PSC as a compromised solution to the 
concession agreement between the host country and the IOC which “gives to 
the government political and to the company commercial satisfaction. The 
government can be seen to be running the show – and the company can run it 
behind the camouflage of legal title symbolizing the assertion of national 
sovereignty.”217 Dr Peter Well made a comparison between the KRG PSC and 
the Iraqi IFG TSC, which shows that the TSC would provide more revenue than 
the PSC.218 There has been strong criticism by nationalists and opposition parties 
in host countries over the use of the PSC for being too generous to IOCs 
compared to the profits the IOCs make under the TSC in the form of a fixed fee 
per barrel from the produced oil. Another serious criticism against the PSC is 
the duration of the contract, which would lock the host country into long-term 
contracts with unfair terms.219 Therefore, the critics see little difference between 
the PSC and the concession agreement, they describe it as a modern form of 
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the traditional concession agreement.220 The PSC model is now used by 
countries lacking the financial ability and technical expertise,221 and where there 
is uncertainty about the volume of oil underground. Under the PSC, IOCs must 
pay all costs for exploring, extracting, developing, and exporting oil to the 
international market. IOCs will recover the expenditure only when the 
discovered oilfield is commercially productive.222 The IOC bears most of the 
financial risk in searching and exploring for oil. Therefore, the terms and clauses 
of the PSC must provide IOCs with satisfactory financial gain to weight out that 
financial risk. Under the PSC, the oil resources technically and legally remain 
with the state, but IOCs directly manage oil and gas operations in the contracted 
area. On the other hand, the PSC model is used only by countries who do not 
have financial resources and technical expertise to carry out the oil operations 
efficiently (i.e. developing countries). Therefore, the PSC will benefit both the 
host country and the IOC. Countries where oil reserves are known or where the 
oil underground is perfectly surveyed such Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran etc, will only 
use the TSC model, in which the IOC conducts all oil operations in return for a 
fixed fee per barrel. Under the PSC, IOCs will start searching for oil, and then 
develop the oilfields if the discovery is commercial.223 This process usually 
requires IOCs to spend large capital over a long period in searching for oil and 
developing it. Once oil is discovered and is financially commercial, in some cases 
if the oilfield could produce 5000 barrel per day or more, then the project will 
proceed to the production phase. If the produced oil is less than 5000 barrels 
per day, in other words if the production is not financially commercial, then the 
project will not continue and will not enter the production phase. In that case, 
the IOC will lose all costs incurred in the exploration and search for oil. The IOC 
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is entitled to recover the cost oil, the expenditure incurred in searching for oil, 
and the cost the IOC spent in oil operations when the project is commercially 
productive. There are two kinds of cost oil; capital cost oil and operating cost 
oil.224 Capital cost oil is the expense that the IOC spends for oil exploration and 
development. The operation cost oil is the capital that the IOC spends after the 
discovery of oil for extracting, transferring, and selling the produced oil and gas 
in the international market. The percentage the IOC can recover from the 
produced oil, or oil revenue, for the capital cost oil is subject to the terms of the 
PSC between the host country and the IOC, but it is usually between 30 and 
60%.225 The IOC is entitled to recover the full operation cost oil from the total 
production. The royalties and bonuses must be paid to the host country from oil 
production. The remainder of the oil production is the profit oil, which will be 
shared between the IOC and the host country in accordance with the terms and 
clauses of the PSC. This could be 60% for the host government and 40% for the 
IOC, or any other rates the parties to the PSC agreed on.226 The share the host 
government takes is always higher than the share the IOC takes from the whole 
oil production. In addition to its share from the profit oil, the host government 
takes the income tax, royalty and bonuses.227 Royalties are usually between 10 
to 20% of the total oil production and they are paid at all phases of production. 
It is common under the PSC that the IOC must pay bonuses to the host country. 
The IOC must pay income tax at the rate specified by the host country’s tax 
regime.228 The total percentage the host government can take from oil 
production is between 75% and 90% of the project’s total revenue.229 Therefore, 
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the profit the IOC can take from oil production depends on the market price. If 
the oil price increases the IOC’s share or profits the oil production will increase, 
but if the oil price dropped the income the IOC can take from the oil production 
will decrease. This would adversely affect the IOC’s participation in the oil 
operations, as happened in Kurdistan. When the oil price was above $100 per 
barrel, there was a big competition among the IOCs to invest in Kurdistan’s 
petroleum. When the oil price dropped sharply, the oil operations, including 
exploration and production, were badly affected to the extent that many IOCs 
ceased investment in the Kurdistan. This was due to the low profit the IOCs 
made when the oil price was low.230 
 
The main aim both parties want to achieve from the PSC is maximum income 
or profit from oil production. In doing so, the host country will use its legal 
authorities to create a legal regime that allows the state the flexibility to modify 
the terms of the PSC. This is an important term of the PSC, which will allow the 
host country to modify the terms of the PSC to reflect the economic and political 
developments affecting the oil price and oil production.231 For the IOC, 
maximum access to oil reserves will guarantee the maximum profit, along with 
the reducing risk through stabilising clause. The parties desire to maximise profit 
will create difficulties during the negotiation phase. However, fairness in the oil 
production division between the host country and the IOC can be achieved 
through so-called R-factor ratios. The R-factor protects the host country’s 
interest when the oil price is high, by reducing the possibility of windfall profits 
going to the IOC. At the same time, it protects the IOC’s interest by providing 
a greater profit oil percentage to the IOC when the oil price is low.232 Therefore, 
                                                          
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WPM25-
ProductionSharingAgreementsAnEconomicAnalysis-KBindemann-1999.pdf. 
230 C. Frappi. “Oil and state building in Iraqi Kurdistan”. 2016. ResearcGate. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carlo_Frappi/publication/308777708_Oil_and_S
tate_building_in_Iraqi_Kurdistan/links/57ef78cd08ae280dd0ad7477/Oil-and-State-
building-in-Iraqi-Kurdistan.pdf?origin=publication_detail  
231 Bede Nwete, “To what extent can renegotiation clauses achieve stability and 
flexibility in petroleum development contracts”, 2 I.E.L.T.R. (2006), 56, 57.  
232 Kristen Bindemann, “Production-sharing agreements: An economic analysis”, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (1999), 10. 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WPM25-
ProductionSharingAgreementsAnEconomicAnalysis-KBindemann-1999.pdf. 
108 
 
R-factor provision in a PSC is crucial in protecting the parties’ interests 
considering that the oil market is volatile and oil price could change dramatically. 
  
The duration of the PSC is another important provision of the PSC. The period 
of the contract is divided based on the exploration, development, and production 
phases. The duration of the PSC is criticised as being lengthy.233 It ranges from 
25 to 40 years for the whole process, from the exploration phase to the 
production and selling oil and gas in the international market. The exploration 
period is normally three to five years, and in certain circumstance will be 
extended for a further two years. The development period could last for 10 
years. The production period is the longest period of the contract, ranging from 
10 to 20 years, with the possibility of extension for a further five years based 
on the production circumstances. The lengthy duration of the PSC has been 
criticised for imposing certain restrictions by the IOC on the host government 
for a long period. However, the criticisms are mitigated by the fact that the PSC 
requires the IOC to carry out enormous work throughout the exploration, 
development, and production process, which requires the IOC to spend huge 
capital to build and/or develop massive oil and gas infrastructure.234   
 
Given the high risk that the IOC takes in using large capital to invest in PSC, 
legal protection against the host country in modifying the terms and clauses of 
the PSC throughout the PSC in response to the economic, legal, and political 
developments during the contract is essential. IOCs insist on the stabilisation 
clause,235 which protects the IOC’s interest against any unfair changes to the 
terms and conditions of the contract. Therefore, stabilisation clauses are key for 
protecting the IOC’s interests.236 However, restricting the host country from 
modifying the terms and clauses of the PSC in response to the oil and gas market 
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development would be detrimental to its interests. Therefore, the renegotiation 
clause provides some flexibility for the host country to protect itself in 
circumstances where the terms and clauses of PSC go against the host country’s 
legal regime or where the IOC’s profit margins become too great.237 The parties 
to the PSC use its terms and clauses as effective tools in mitigating many of the 
risks. 
 
5.3.2   The rationale of technical service contracts  
The TSC was first used in Argentina between 1958 and 1961 for exploration, 
drilling, and development.238 It is defined as an agreement between the host 
country and IOC for oil operations, by which the IOC conducts oil and gas 
operations, explorations, drilling and productions, in return for a fixed fee per 
barrel for the produced oil.239 Unlike the PSC, under the TSC the host country 
has more control over the oil operations. The IOC works as a contractor to carry 
out the works contracted for a fixed fee paid to the IOC as a reward of its capital 
and operational expenses. Under the TSC, the IOC does not get a share in the 
produced oil, rather the fixed fee per barrel is paid to the IOC in return for using 
its resources and capital in oil operations. There are different types of TSC, the 
most popular types are the risk service contract, pure service contract, technical 
assistance contract, and buyback service contract.  
1. Under risk service contracts, the IOC uses its own resources to conduct 
oil operations, exploration, drilling and production. The cost incurred in 
the exploration for oil will only be recovered if the discovery of oil is 
commercial. 
2. Under pure service contracts, the IOC is contracted to conduct oil 
operations within the contracted area. The difference between this model 
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and the risk service contract is the IOC will recover the oil cost incurred 
in searching for oil regardless of whether oil discovery is commercial. The 
host government will take the risk of searching for oil. The IOC will also 
acquire an interest in the produced oil. 
3. The technical assistance contract is slightly different from the other types 
of TSCs. Under the technical assistance contracts the IOC gets a fixed fee 
to carry out the task assigned to it but does not acquire an interest in the 
produced oil if the discovery is commercial.240  
4. Buyback service contract. Under this contract the IOC conducts petroleum 
developments for a fixed fee. The IOC will recover the expenditure from 
the petroleum revenue, but it would not get a share in the produced oil. 
The IOC would hand over the petroleum operation to the host country 
when production started. This type of contract is used by Iran.241  
Under the standard PSC, the host government, directly or through a national oil 
company, and the IOC work together much like a joint venture. The PSC allows 
IOC to gain ownership for the share of the produced oil. The IOC first recovers 
the expenditure incurred in oil and gas operations from the produced oil 
revenues. Once the oil cost is recovered the profit is shared between the host 
government and the IOC in accordance with the terms and clauses of the PSC. 
Under the TSC, however, the relationship between the host government and the 
IOC is fundamentally different. The host government directly, or through a 
state-owned national oil company (NOC), will have absolute control of the oil 
operations. The IOC participates in oil operations as a contractor in return for a 
fixed fee per barrel, known as a remuneration fee per barrel (RFB). The TSC 
does not grant shared ownership of the produced oil, although in certain 
circumstances the IOC has priority to buy a certain amount of the produced oil. 
Although the IOC bears all capital expenditure and financial risk, like under the 
PSCs, all operating costs are compensated only by the remuneration fees per 
barrel (RFB). The IOC must pay tax over the RFB at the standard tax rate of 
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35%. This could be less or more, based on the terms of the contract. All 
revenues from the produced oil and gas apart from the RFB return to the host 
government.  
The above comparison between the PSC and TSC is based on the terms and 
clauses of both models in general. To pay close attention to the differences 
between the terms and clauses of the KRG’s PSC and the IFG’s TSC, an 
examination of the terms and clause of the KRG’s PSC and IFG’s TSC is required. 
This provides a core contrast between these two types of the model contracts 
for oil and gas and how the legal dispute originated between these two 
governments 
Oil and gas operations are regulated by the constitution, domestic legislation, 
and the type of contact concluded between the host government and the IOC. 
The model contract is used by the host government with the IOC must be 
compatible with the national constitution and domestic legislation.  
5.4     The KRG Production Sharing Contract  
Generally, in most oil producing-countries, oil and gas operations are regulated 
by the constitution, domestic legislation, and the type of contract (PSC, TSC, 
lease or licence) entered into between the host government and the IOC over 
petroleum operations. It follows that the model contract concluded by the host 
government with the IOC should be consistent with both the national 
constitution and domestic legislation. The KRG adopted the PSC as a model 
contract in managing their petroleum operations and has concluded over 50 
PSCs with IOCs during the last 15 years.242 The IFG strongly opposes the KRG 
management of petroleum operations within its territories and its PSC. The IFG 
argues that its objection over the KRG’s PSC is based on the Iraqi Constitution 
provisions in term of the KRG’s PSC legality and revenue’s productivities.243 The 
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Iraqi government claims that its TSC generates more revenue for the Iraqi 
people than the KRG’s PSC. This is so only if the oil price is high, because in 
certain circumstance the PSC may provide more revenue to the host 
government than the TSC, especially when the oil price is low. There are other 
differences between the PSC and TSC, which are the only two model contracts 
are now used in Iraq. Tariq Shafiq argues that centralisation of oil and gas 
management will strengthen Iraq’s position and provide the highest benefit for 
the Iraqi people, while managing oil and gas by two different authorities in Iraq 
undermines the federal centralisation of oil and gas management.244 The KRG’s 
Minister of Natural Resources, Dr Ashti Hawrami, argues that the PSC is the best 
model of contract to be used in Kurdistan. Given that there is a high risk in 
searching for oil in Kurdistan, the petroleum sector is not developed in Kurdistan 
and large funds, expertise, and technology are required to manage oil 
operations. Therefore, the PSC is the only model which could persuade IOCs to 
invest in the Kurdistan petroleum sector.245  
Under the standard terms of the KRG’s PSC, the period of the exploration phase 
is for a maximum of seven years. This begins with an initial period of three years 
and is extendable for seven years.246 Even at the end of that seven years, the 
contractor is entitled to request a further extension in accordance with Article 
6.7. The development phase is initially for 20 years. The IOC has an automatic 
right to extend the period for a further five years. The IOC is entitled to request 
a further extension of the production period and such request should be made 
at least a year before the end of the production period.247 
                                                          
is not acceptable that KRG continues signing oil and gas contracts without the 
knowledge and approval of the central government which represents everyone. The 
full text of the interview is available at https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=264  
244 Tariq Shafiq in an interview with Ruba Husari on 30 December 2011. 
https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=2413  
245 An interview conducted by Ruba Husari with Dr Ashti Hawrami on 10 August 2010. 
The full text of the interview is available at https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=1979  
246 Model production sharing contract for exploration and production in Kurdistan,  
Article 6.2. The full text is available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/pdf/MODEL_PRODUCTION_SHARING_AND_EXPLORATION_PRO
DUCTION_IN_KURDISTAN.pdf The full text of the interview is available at 
https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=2413 
247 Model production sharing contract for exploration and production in Kurdistan, 
Article 6. 10, 6.11 and 6.12. 
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5.4.1 The PSCs KRG has signed with IOCs between 2002 and present:  
The KRG has signed over 5o PSCs with the IOCs during the last 17 years. All 
PSCs have been signed by the KRG are provided in annex 3.248 
5.4.2     Critical review of the PSC in the KRG  
 
The KRG concluded five PSCs in 2002, 2003 and 2004, with IOCs. the first PSC 
was concluded with Genel Enerji in 2002 and 2004, a PSC was concluded with 
Pet Oil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International Exploration of 
Production Inc in 2003, and two PSCs were concluded with the DNO in 2004. 
These contracts were signed before the invasion of Iraq and before the 
Constitution came into force in 2006. All those contracts except Pet Oil 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products International Exploration of Production Inc, 
state “WHEREAS, the people of the Kurdistan Region own the natural resources 
of the Kurdistan Region, and the Government of the Kurdistan Region therefore 
has the power to exploit those resources for the benefit of the people of the 
Kurdistan Region”. While the KRG vest the ownership of oil and gas in the people 
of Kurdistan, there are no clear legal authorities, constitutional provisions, or 
national legislation confirming that statement. When those contracts were 
granted to IOCs, the KRG did not have its own constitution, nor domestic 
legislation granting ownership of the natural resources to the people of 
Kurdistan. There was no Iraqi legal provision confirming same. It is not clear on 
what basis the KRG inserted the ownership provision in the PSC. The legal issue 
here is whether the KRG concluded those contracts with IOCs as a 
representative of the people of Kurdistan on the basis that oil and gas are owned 
by the people of Kurdistan. In the absence of a clear legal provision confirming 
that oil and gas in the KRG’s territories are owned by the people of Kurdistan, 
those contracts lack a legal basis. Accordingly, the legality of those contracts 
could be disputed simply because there is no KRG or Iraq legal provision 
granting the people of Kurdistan the right of ownership over the natural 
resources within the KRG territories prior to the enforcement of the Constitution.  
                                                          
248 The full texts of all the contracts are available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=1 . 
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However, the concerns over the legality of the said contracts may be mitigated 
by the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law of Kurdistan Region- Iraq Law No (22) 2007.249 
Gas Law No (26) 2007 came into effect in 2007. Article (3) of the Law No (22) 
2007 states “First: Petroleum in the region is owned in a manner consistent with 
Article 111 of the Federal Constitution. The Regional Government is entitled to 
a share from the revenues from producing fields, consistent with the share of 
all Iraqi people, in accordance with this law and Article 112 of the Federal 
Constitution”. Article (3) is drafted to mirror Articles 111 and 112 of the 
Constitution, the two main articles dealing with oil and gas ownership and 
operations by the IFG and the regional government and the governates. 
Accordingly, the KRG has removed the ownership clause in all PSCs concluded 
from the date the Constitution came into effect in 2006 and replaced the 
ownership clause with “The Government enters into this Contract pursuant to 
the Government’s rights and authorities under the Constitution of Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 2007. In accordance with the Constitution of Iraq, 
the prevailing Laws of the Kurdistan Region comprise the Kurdistan Region Law 
and, with regard to a matter wholly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Government of Iraq, the federal Laws of Iraq”. The wording of the above 
provision may not be the same in all PSCs, but the meaning is the same. In all 
PSCs, the KRG refers to the Constitution and the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas 
Law 2007 as a legal basis for its PSCs.  
Secondly, Article 54 states “First: All agreements related to Production Sharing 
Contracts entered into by the Regional Government prior to the entry into force 
of this Law, shall be subject to review by the Regional Council to make them 
consistent with the provisions of this Law, taking into consideration the 
prevailing conditions when these agreements were entered into. The decisions 
of the Regional Council in this regard shall be final and may be published. 
Second: All authorisations and memoranda of understanding related to oil and 
gas which were signed by the Regional Government prior to the entry into force 
of this Law shall be null and void unless they are approved by the Regional 
Council.”  
                                                          
249 The full text of the law is available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/Kurdistan.  
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The Kurdistan Regional Oil and Gas Law 2007 was passed to accommodate the 
legal and economic changes the Constitution imposed on oil and gas operations. 
Following the enforcement of the Constitution, the Kurdistan parliament passed 
an oil and gas law for the KRG to show that all oil and gas operations, including 
its PSCs, are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution250, 
which has always been disputed by the IFG. To clarify the disputed points 
between the KRG and the IFG over the KRG’s PSC, the relevant provisions of 
the Constitution and the KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 need to be analysed and 
the terms of the KRG PSC need to be fully examined in light of the constitutional 
provisions. The starting point is the Constitution and the articles concerning the 
KRG legal system and legislation regulating oil and gas operations and finally 
the KRG PSC251.  
 
5.5  The KRG’s right to Manage Oil and Gas Operations under the Constitution   
 
The Constitution is the supreme law in Iraq. The citizens of Iraq voted for a new 
constitution in 2005 and it came into force in 2006. Article 1 of the Constitution 
states that Iraq is a federal government.252 This is the first ever legal provision 
in the history of Iraq recognising Iraq as a federal state. There has been no 
similar provision in any of the previous constitutions from the establishment of 
Iraq in 1920 until 2005. The first part of Article 117 of the Constitution 
recognised the Kurdistan Reginal Government as a regional government for the 
first time in the history of Iraq.253   
The Constitution identifies the matters over which the IFG has exclusive 
authority, the matters over which the KRG has exclusive authority, and the 
matters in which they have shared authority. The Constitution refers to the 
                                                          
250 Interview with Dr Bayazid Hassan available at Annex 2. 
251 Interview with Dr Bayazid Hassan available at Annex 2. 
252 Iraqi Constitution, Article 1” The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent 
and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, 
representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of 
the unity of Iraq”. 
253 Article 117: First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the 
region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
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situations where the Federal and Regional authorities are conflicted. Sections 
four and five of the Constitution deals with these.  
Article 110 states that:  
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the 
following matters: 
  First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic 
representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying 
international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing, 
and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign 
economic and trade policy.  
Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, 
including establishing and managing armed forces to secure the 
protection and guarantee the security of Iraq’s borders and to 
defend Iraq.  
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy; issuing currency; 
regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate 
boundaries in Iraq; drawing up the national budget of the State; 
formulating monetary policy; and establishing and 
administering a central bank.  
Fourth: Regulating standards, weights, and measures.  
Fifth: Regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, residency, 
and the right to apply for political asylum.  
Sixth: Regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail.  
Seventh: Drawing up the general and investment budget bill.  
Eighth: Planning policies relating to water sources from outside 
Iraq and guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and its just 
distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws 
and conventions.  
Ninth: General population statistics and census.  
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Article 110 does not specifically refer to oil and gas operations as one of the 
matters over which the IFG has exclusive authority. It may be argued that oil 
and gas contracts could be categorised under international agreement or 
commercial policy under the first and third points. Therefore, oil and gas 
operations could fall within the scope of the matters over which the IFG has 
exclusive authority. In the absence of a specific provision concerning oil and gas 
operations, this argument has weight. The difficulties in accepting the above 
argument are that, in addition to the lack of a specific provision in Article 110 
in relation to oil and gas operations, the Constitution contains separate articles, 
specifically Articles 111 and 112, regulating oil and gas operations. Therefore, 
it would be premature to assume that Article 110 covers petroleum operations.  
 
Article 121 grants the regional government executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers in accordance with the Constitution. The regional government can 
exercise these powers over all matters concerning the region, except the 
matters in the exclusive authority of the IFG. The first and second parts of Article 
121 state:  
 
First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with 
this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the 
exclusive authorities of the federal government.  
Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national 
legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities 
of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right 
to amend the application of the national legislation within that 
region.” 
 
Accordingly, the KRG can exercise executive, legislative and judicial powers over 
all matters within its authority and within its territories. The second part of 
Article 121 grants KRG priority in the event of conflict between regional and 
federal laws and legislations in matters outside the scope of Article 110 and 
matters regulated by a specific constitutional provision. Accordingly, in the 
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event of conflict between the regional and federal legislation in matters in the 
exclusive authority of the regional Government, the regional legislation will 
prevail. Article 121 came into effect in 2006 and it does not address any 
contradictions in legislation passed by the KRG between 1992 and 2006. 
Therefore, Article 141 of the Constitution was designed to deal with any 
contradiction caused by the KRG’s legislation, court and government decisions, 
and contracts concluded by the KRG, including oil and gas contracts the KRG 
with the IOC, from 1992 until the effective date of the Constitution254. Article 
141 states: Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall 
remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of 
Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid 
unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of 
Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not 
contradict with the Constitution.”  
 
Therefore, the Constitution recognises all legislation, decisions (including court 
decisions) issued by the KRG, and contracts concluded by the KRG between 
1992 and 2006, as long as they do not contradict constitutional provisions. In 
the event contradiction occurs, the KRG’s legislation, decisions and contracts 
must be amended or modified to conform with the Constitution. The KRG has 
made amendments to oil and gas contracts concluded before the Constitution 
came into effect, specifically to the part of the contracts related to the legal 
basis of the KRG’s authority to grant and sign oil and gas contracts. This was 
confirmed by Dr Ashti Hawrami.255 
 
Articles 111 and 112 deal directly with the ownership and management of oil 
and gas operations in Iraq. The interpretation of these articles is the main cause 
for the legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG. Article 111 vests the 
ownership of oil and gas in the Iraqi people. This causes practical difficulties; it 
is not clear how the Iraqi people could exercise the ownership rights over oil 
and gas. The Constitution does not grant ownership rights to a specific authority 
in Iraq. It may be argued that Article 112 provides the federal and regional 
                                                          
254 Interview with Dr Bayazid Hasan available at Annex 2. 
255 An interview conducted by Ruba Husari with Dr Ashti Hawrami on 10 August 2010. 
The full text of the interview is available at https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=1979.  
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authorities with oil and gas ownership. This cannot be right, because article 112 
concerns the management of oil and gas, not ownership rights. The concept of 
ownership is wider than mere management. Article 112 states that: 
 
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues 
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts 
of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the 
damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former 
regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that 
ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and 
this shall be regulated by a law.  
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and 
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary 
strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques 
of the market principles and encouraging investment. 
 
The first part of Article 112 is about the management of oil and gas by the 
federal government, the producing governorate, and the regional government, 
the KRG. The article does not provide the mechanism nor manner in which the 
management would be undertaken. In addition, the article was drafted vaguely, 
therefore the federal and regional government have not been able to agree on 
one interpretation. The article has been interpreted differently by both 
governments and academics. Therefore, the management of oil and gas under 
Article 112 is a complex subject which requires further examination.  
 
5.5.1  Constitutional Provisions over the Management of Oil and Gas 
Operations  
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the first Iraqi government was 
established. Almost all Iraqi people, Shia, Sunni and Kurds, agree on the 
decentralisation of the power. Therefore, the IFG’s power has been curbed over 
different matters, including oil and gas management.  
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The first part of Article 13 of the Constitution confirms that it is the supreme law 
in all parts of Iraq. The second part confirms no laws or any legal text that 
contradicts the provisions of the Constitution should be enacted. The 
Constitution is the highest legal statue in all Iraq, including the KRG, and any 
legislation inconsistent with the provisions thereof is void.256 Accordingly, neither 
the IFG nor the KRG should enact any legislation contradicting the Constitution.  
Article 110 provides the details of the matters over which the IFG has exclusive 
authority and Article 114 identifies shared authority. Neither article 110 nor 114 
clearly categorise petroleum policy and petroleum operations within the 
exclusive authorities of the IFG or KRG. Instead, oil and gas management and 
operations are dealt with by two separate articles in the Constitution, Articles 
111 and 112. These Articles were designed primarily to deal with petroleum 
operations, therefore, neither the IFG nor the KRG could claim to have exclusive 
authority over the management of petroleum operations without legal 
justification in accordance with Articles 111 and 112. It is argued that the 
wording of Articles 111 and 112 are deliberately vaguely drafted in order to curb 
the IFG’s power over oil and gas operations within the regional government, so 
the IFG could not unliterally manage oil and gas operations and formulate 
petroleum policies alone in Iraq.257 This weaknesses of Articles 111 and 112 
have been exploited by the disputed parties to interpret them differently.258 The 
two articles were originally designed to strike the balance of power in respect of 
the management of petroleum operations between central and regional 
government. They have now become the main points of a long-standing dispute 
between the IFG and the KRG. 
It is now clear that there is a constitutional crisis over oil and gas management 
in Iraq. The previous experience between the two rivals shows that the 
                                                          
256 Iraqi Constitution of 2005. Article 13: First: This Constitution is the preeminent and 
supreme law in Iraq and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. 
Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. Any text in any 
regional constitutions or any other legal text that contradicts this Constitution shall be 
considered void.  
257 Anna E Richer. Oil in Iraq: How to overcome the resource curse. 2014.  
258 Ellen Scholl. “Shaping Iraq’s oil and gas future’. Global Energy Centre, Atlantic 
Council. 2018 
The full article can be accessed at 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Shaping_Iraqs_Oil_and_Gas_Future_web_010
8.pdf  
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constitutional provisions are part of the problem, not the solution. Some scholars 
claim Article 114 should not have granted the regional government priority in 
the event of a contradiction between federal and regional laws.259 However, it 
would be difficult to look for similar situations in other federal systems in the 
world. This is because Iraq has been through many political and legal crises prior 
to adopting the federal system. It should be noted that the KRG was formed 
before the formation of the current Iraqi government. The federal system was 
introduced, and the constitution enacted at a time when Iraq was politically and 
legally unstable. The KRG concluded PSCs with IOCs prior to the enforcement of 
the Constitution and before the formation of the Iraqi Government. This issue 
and its effect on the ongoing legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG over 
who has the exclusive right to manage the petroleum operations in Iraq is 
discussed in the later parts of this chapter and the later chapters. There were 
two governments inside Iraq, including the IFG and the KRG, before the 
enactment of the Constitution. 
5.5.2 The wording of Articles 111 and 112 of the Constitution  
The constitutional provisions were purposely drafted in a way to curb the IFG’s 
power over the governorates and regions, specifically in respect of petroleum 
operations. The people of Iraq did not want to experience the same situation 
they had under the dictatorship of the former regime. The decentralisation of 
power would guarantee a democratic and stabilise society in Iraq and therefore, 
the balance of power between the IFG and the KRG was one of the objectives 
the Kurdish political parties actively struggled to achieve through the 
Constitution.  
It should be noted at the outset that in addition to the external factors, the 
neighbouring countries and global powers have been playing negative roles in 
this long-standing dispute between the IFG and the KRG to protect their interest 
in Iraq.260 External factors must be considered when analysing the obstacles 
preventing the disputed parties in reaching an agreement on the management 
                                                          
259 Moradi, J., Saie, A., “Energy strategy of a study of obstacles on the way of 
federalism in Iraq”. J. Am. Sci. 2013. 7. The full text is available at 
http://www.jofamericanscience.org/journals/am-
sci/am0907/050_9407am0907_407_409.pdf  
260 Quan, H., 2012. Growth against democracy: Savage developmentalism in the 
modern world. Lexington Books.  
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of petroleum operations. However, the constitutional issue over the 
management of petroleum operations is the main factor. 
Articles 111 and 112 are the first constitutional provisions in the history of Iraq 
to legally oblige the IFG to share the management of the natural resources with 
the regional government. There is no equivalent to Article 112 in previous 
constitutions. In previous chapters, reference was made to all previous 
constitutions in Iraq between 1921 and 2005, all constitutions emphasised public 
ownership of natural resources. Oil and gas operations have traditionally been 
managed by the central government. 
The wording structure and ambiguity of Article 111 allows the disputed parties 
to come up with different interpretations and various arguments regarding the 
ownership of oil and gas. Article 111 states “Oil and gas are owned by all the 
people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates”. The KRG argues that Article 
111 grants the ownership rights of natural resources within the KRG’s territories 
to the Kurdish people. Therefore, the KRG as a representative of the Kurdish 
people has an exclusive right to manage oil and gas operations. On the other 
hand, the IFG argues that Article 111 vests the ownership in the people of Iraq 
and the IFG, as a representative of all Iraqi people in all regions and 
governorates, should manage the petroleum operation in Iraq. Therefore, no 
regional government or governorates could manage oil and gas operations 
unliterally without prior approval from the IFG.  
The arguments over the wording of Articles 111 and 112 and their correct 
interpretation has attracted international writers and authors. Zedalis believes 
Articles 111 and 112 grant priority to the IFG. He believes the purpose of these 
constitutional provisions is to maximise the economic benefit for all Iraqi people 
across Iraq regardless of ethnicity and religion.261 It is also argued that the Iraqi 
government, in rejecting the KRG’s claim of having the exclusive right over oil 
and gas operations within its territories, primarily relies on these two articles. 
Article 111 grants ownership to the Iraq people in all parts of Iraq and the IFG 
is the only entity representing all Iraqi people. The ownership of the petroleum 
                                                          
261 R, J, Zedalis. “The role provincial governmental units can play regarding oil and gas 
development agreements in the Kurdish North: Allocation of Iraqi constitutional 
power”, The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 6(4), 2013.  
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belongs to the Iraqi government and the KRG’s PSCs do not have a constitutional 
basis.262  
Crawford has a different view on the KRG’s right to manage petroleum 
operations in the light of the constitutional provision. He argues that the KRG’s 
PSCs are constitutional under Article 112.263 The KRG refers to Crawford’s finding 
in defending the legality of its PSC. The KRG published Crawford’s legal opinion 
on its formal website as a legal authority to confirm that it has an exclusive right 
in managing the petroleum operations, stating: 
In 2008, the KRG received an expert independent legal opinion (PDF) 
that confirms the KRG’s constitutional authority to manage the Kurdistan 
Region’s oil and gas resources. The KRG asked for a formal independent 
legal opinion from Professor James R. Crawford, a professor of 
international law, through Clifford Chance, a multinational legal 
firm. Professor Crawford concluded, “The Kurdistan Region oil and gas 
Law is consistent with the Constitution of Iraq”.264  
Dr Yousif, speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, also referred to Crawford’s legal 
opinion as a legal basis of the KRG’s right of managing the petroleum operations 
and the legality of its PSCs.265 Prof Peter Cameron looks at the constitutional 
conflict between the KRG and the IFG over oil and gas management from a 
different angle. He believes the conflict is for political and economic gain. Law 
and legal arguments in this dispute are nothing but politics by other means.266  
There is no consensus between the scholars and authors over the interpretation 
of Articles 111 and 112. The crucial issue here is that Article 111 and 112 are 
                                                          
262 Ben Holland, CMS Cameron McKenna. “Are Kurdistan’s oil contracts 
constitutional?”, Energy in the Middle East 2012,  
 www.cms-cmck.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/63538de4-c6c3-47ee-
aea9-c58e03f60e57/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/de7979f5-590b-44a9-ae76-
c5d5fc52b686/ADIPEC%20BH%20Kurdistan%20copy.pd  
263 Professor James Crawford. The authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
over oil and gas under the Constitution of Iraq, 2008. The full text is available at 
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/publications/57-the-crawford-opinion  
264 The full text is available at http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/the-ministry/legal-
framework/laws  
265 Interview of Yousif Mohammed Sadiq, the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament. 
Available at Annex Two. 
266 Peter D. Cameron. “Contracts and constitutions: The Kurdish factor in the 
development of oil in Iraq”. International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol 5, 
Number 1, July 2011, pp. 81-99.  
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two separate articles concerning two different matters. The former concerns 
ownership of oil and gas in Iraq and the latter is about the management of oil 
and gas in Iraq. There is clear language distinction between these two articles. 
While the language of Article 111 vests the ownership of oil and gas in the people 
of Iraq across the country, article 112 regulates the management of oil and gas 
in a way that guarantees the maximum profits for the Iraqi people. It also 
emphasises the fair distribution of oil and gas revenue among the Iraqi people. 
Article 112 is the most complicated and controversial legal provision concerning 
the management of oil and gas in Iraq, which has been interpreted, and analysed 
differently by the KRG, IFG, and domestic and international writers.  
Article 112 provides that “The federal government, with the producing 
governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil 
and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues 
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the 
country”. This is about the management of oil and gas between the IFG, 
producing governorates, and regional government, the KRG. However, it is not 
clear how the management of oil and gas should be conducted under Article 
112. Zedalis believes that there should be consultation and cooperation between 
the KRG and the IFG over oil and gas management within the KRG’s 
territories.267 However, the argument here is the cooperation between the KRG 
and IFG in managing oil and gas is confined to the current producing field268. It 
does not encompass future fields269. This would grant the regional government, 
i.e. the KRG, greater power in managing the future fields within its territories. 
This argument is considered as a contradiction between Article 111 and 112.270 
Crawford believes the current fields under Article 112 are those fields that were 
in operation and producing oil and gas prior to the enforcement of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the fields discovered after the enforcement of the 
Constitution are not covered by Article 112271. The fields discovered after the 
                                                          
267 Zedalis. Rex J. Oil and gas in the disputed Kurdish territories: Jurisprudence, 
regional minorities and natural resources in a federal system. (1st edition), Routledge, 
2012.  
268 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq available at Annex 2. 
269 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq available at Annex 2. 
270 Deeks, Ashley and Burton, Matthew, “Iraq's constitution: A drafting history” 
(2007). Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 40, p. 1, 2007. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068137  
271 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq available at Annex 2. 
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enforcement of the Constitution are called “future fields”. The KRG strongly 
defends its right to manage the petroleum resources within its territories under 
the definition of the “present fields” in Article 112.272 Therefore, the KRG has 
exclusive rights to manage petroleum operations from the “future fields”.  
The distinction between the “present fields” and “future fields” is the most 
significant point in interpreting Article 112. Crawford argues that there is no 
conflict between Articles 111 and 112, and the KRG’s claim of its right to 
managing petroleum operations within its territories. He argues that the 
management of petroleum operations by the IFG or the KRG are both the 
management by the Iraqi people in terms of Article 111. The IFG is required by 
Article 112(1) to cooperate with the producing regions and governorates across 
Iraq in managing the petroleum operations and distributing oil and gas revenue 
in a fair manner among all Iraqi people.273 
The distinction between the present fields and future fields is confirmed by Dr 
Yousif,274 Dr Baizid, the member of oil and gas committee of the Iraqi parliament 
from 2006 to 2014,275 and Dr Sherko Jawdat, the current chair of oil and gas 
committee of the Kurdistan Parliament.276 They all believe that the KRG has a 
right to manage oil and gas operations from the fields which have been 
discovered after the enforcement of the Constitution without the co-operation of 
the IFG.  
It is important to note that Article 112 does not grant an exclusive right to the 
IFG to manage the petroleum operations within the producing regions and 
governorates. The second part of Article 112 imposes on the IFG to cooperate 
and work together with the producing regions and governorates in managing oil 
and gas extracted from the “present fields” only. The language of Article 112 
cannot be overlooked. It must be accepted that the wording of Article 111 and 
                                                          
272 Mills R. “Under the mountains: Kurdish oil and regional politics”. Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies (2016). The full text is available at 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kurdish-Oil-and-
Regional-Politics-WPM-63.pdf  
273 Professor James Crawford. The authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
over oil and gas under the Constitution of Iraq. The full text is available at 
http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/Crawford_Opinion.pdf  
274 Interview with Dr Yousif Mohammed Sadiq. The full text is contained in Annex 2. 
275 Interview with the Dr Bayazid Hassan. The full text is contained in Annex 2. 
276 Interview with Dr Sherko Jawdat. The full text is contained in Annex 2. 
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112 are vaguely drafted, which has caused legal difficulties in interpreting these 
articles on how oil and gas operations should be managed in the producing 
regions and governorates. The current legal dispute between the KRG and the 
IFG stems from the language defects in these articles.277 It is clear from the all 
literature that there is no single or definite interpretation of Articles 111 and 
112.  
Secondly, these articles should be interpreted in conjunction with the other 
relevant constitutional provisions and legislations. Further consideration should 
be given to the practical difficulties in implementing the current interpretations 
of these two articles by both the IFG and the KRG. In situations like this when 
the disputed parties could not agree on one interpretation for these articles, the 
matter should be referred to the competent authority for settlement over the 
interpretation of these two articles. In this case, the Iraqi Federal Court is the 
only competent authority to interpret the Constitution. Further discussion is 
provided later in this chapter on the Iraqi Federal Court and its constitutional 
power of interpreting constitutional provisions and domestic legislation.  
Decentralisation of the power over petroleum operations was one of the 
principles affirmed by the Constitution. Significant consideration should be given 
to the point that the IFG has not claimed exclusive right over oil and gas 
operations within the regional governments and producing governorates. It is 
the KRG who claims that the Constitution grants it an exclusive right to manage 
oil and gas within its territories. This distinction should be made first. What the 
IFG argues is the KRG does not have a constitutional right in managing the 
petroleum operations, including granting the PSC to IOCs unliterally without 
cooperation with, and prior approval from, the IFG. intensive arguments have 
been forwarded by different writers and petroleum and constitutional analysts.  
It is argued that the relevant articles in the constitution grants regional 
governments and producing governorates the right to manage the petroleum 
operations over oil and gas produced from the fields discovered after the 
enforcement of the Constitution, and the fields that will be discovered in the 
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future within their territories.278 The Constitution grants more power to the 
regional governments than those granted to the IFG in terms of managing 
petroleum operations. In accordance with Articles 115 and 121, in the event of 
contradiction between the regional and federal and legislation, the regional law 
will prevail. The legislation of the regional government has “legal supremacy” 
over federal governments in petroleum matters.279 This is assuming that 
petroleum matters are not one of the matters in the exclusive authority of the 
IFG as stated in Article 110 of the Constitution, and accordingly the IFG does 
not have exclusive authority over oil and gas management. Articles 112, 115, 
and 121 clearly restrict the IFG’s authority to oil and gas in the regional 
governments and producing governorates. These articles force the IFG to 
cooperate with the governorates and regional government in managing the 
petroleum operations from the “present fields” only and in the case of 
contradiction between the federal laws and the regional laws, priority should be 
given to the latter.280  
The KRG’s distinction between the “present fields” and “future fields” is a valid 
point and it cannot be overlooked. In the absence of a clear legal provision 
preventing KRG from managing oil and gas operations from future fields, it 
would be unlikely for the IFG to be successful in its bid to deny the KRG’s right 
to manage the petroleum operations based on the constitutional provisions.281  
To demonstrate that its oil and gas law and PSCs are compliant with the 
Constitution, the KRG has always referred to the Constitution in its PSCs with 
IOCs. Following the enforcement of the Constitution, the KRG amended, 
modified or removed the paragraphs in oil and gas contracts concluded with 
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IOCs prior to the enactment of the Constitution. After the enforcement of the 
Constitution, the KRG enacted its own oil and gas law, the Oil and Gas of 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq, Law No. (22)- 2007. The KRG oil and gas law provides 
the directives by which the KRG manages the petroleum operations, including 
signing the PSC with IOCs, within its territories. The KRG made it clear that its 
oil and gas law is based on the Constitution and it is compatible with the relevant 
provisions thereof. The KRG’s argument has been disputed by the IFG and it 
argues that neither the KRG’s PSC, nor its oil and gas law constitutional.  
The KRG oil and gas law recognises the PSC as a model contract to be used by 
the KRG in managing oil and gas operations. The IFG expressed serious concerns 
over the KRG’s PSC and its terms. The IFG claims the terms of the KRG’s PSC 
are so generous to IOCs and they do not achieve the highest benefit for the Iraqi 
people as is stipulated by the Constitution. The provisions of the oil and gas law 
and the terms of the KRG’s PSC are critically examined in light of the relevant 
articles of the Constitution later in this chapter. All oil and gas operations within 
the KRG’s territories are conducted in accordance with the KRG’s PSC. The KRG’s 
oil and gas production constitutes 20% of the Iraqi oil and gas production. A 
comparison will be made between the PSC and the TSC model which is used by 
the Iraqi government. Both model contracts are evaluated legally and 
economically to show which model protects the Iraqi national interest and which 
one is best suited the KRG’s petroleum sector.   
5.5.3. Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region Law No. (22) 2007 
Following the formation of the KRG in 1992, the KRG started searching for oil 
and gas on the basis that the petroleum revenues would make a reliable 
contribution to the KRG’s economy. There was information confirming the KRG 
territories were rich with petroleum resources. There were oilfields discovered 
by the former Iraqi regime before 1990, but they were left undeveloped. The 
KRG started developing those oilfields first and exporting the produced oil to the 
neighbouring countries by tankers.282 The extracted oil, although not 
satisfactory, helped to boost the KRG’s economy. To maximise oil and gas 
production, the KRG continued searching for oil and developing discovered 
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fields. Due to the financial and technical difficulties, the KRG was not able to 
make substantial developments or increases in oil production from the existing 
fields and could not carry out proper explorations for further discovery. Foreign 
funds, expertise, and technology were required to assist the KRG in developing 
the present petroleum resources, and to carry out further exploration for more 
discoveries. The KRG managed to persuade only a small number of IOCs to 
invest in searching for oil and gas and developing the existing fields for the 
period up to 2003. In doing so, the KRG adopted the PSC as a model contract 
with clauses favourable to IOCs.283 After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the political 
and securities situation in Iraq was helpful for the KRG to develop its own 
petroleum policy. Iraq was under UN economic sanctions; IOCs were restricted 
from investing in Iraqi petroleum by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 661.284 
Following the formation of the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) in 2003,285 the 
UN economic sanction was lifted on Iraq286 and Iraq passed a new foreign 
investment law.287 The new foreign investment law contained favourable clauses 
and legal protection to foreign investors to persuade foreign companies to 
actively participate in rebuilding Iraq, specifically in the petroleum sector, which 
was badly damaged by war and UN economic sanctions.288 The better security 
situation in Kurdistan coupled with the weakness of the new Iraqi government 
was a good opportunity for the KRG to persuade IOCs to invest in KRG’s 
petroleum resources. The PSC was a new model contract in Iraq, as the TSC was 
the only model contract has been used by the Iraqi government after the 
concession agreements were terminated in the 1960s.289 The KRG was 
successful in its attempts to attract IOCs to engage in the KRG’s petroleum 
resources. Due to the favourable clauses of the KRG’s PSC, IOCs were racing to 
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invest in the KRG’s oil and gas resources to the extent that the KRG managed 
to sign over 50 PSCs with IOCs between 2004 and 2015.290 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the first PSC was granted to a Norwegian 
company DNO, which triggered the IFG’s strong opposition. The KRG’s 
determination to pursue its own petroleum policy and independently sign PSCs 
with IOCs pushed the IFG to openly express its objection to the KRG’s right to 
manage the petroleum resources within the KRG’s territories. The Constitution 
contains certain articles concerning the management of petroleum operations as 
discussed above, and in response thereto, the KRG enacted its own oil and law 
in 2007 which provides the regulatory framework for oil and gas management. 
That was to confirm that the KRG’s unilateral management of oil and gas within 
its territories is consistent with the Constitution. However, the IFG does not have 
an oil and gas law for regulating oil and gas operations within its territories. 
By passing its own oil and gas law, the KRG shows that it complies with the 
constitutional provisions and confirming that it is only implementing its 
constitutional obligation and its acts of managing the petroleum operations 
within the KRG’s territories are conforming with the constitutional provisions.291 
The KRG's Oil and Gas Law No (22) contains 17 chapters and 61 articles. At the 
end of the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law, it confirms that all acts of the KRG concerning 
the petroleum operations within its territories are compliant with Articles 111, 
112 and 115 of the Constitution. Article 2 (2) of the KRG Oil and Gas Law refers 
to Article 115 paragraphs (1) and (2) and Article 121 of the Constitution that 
“no federal legislation, and no agreement, contract, memorandum of 
understanding or other federal instrument that relates to Petroleum Operations 
shall have application except with the express agreement of the relevant 
authority of the Region”.292 In Article 3, 1- 7 of the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law, the 
KRG provides the full legal basis for its exclusive rights to carry out petroleum 
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operations in accordance with Articles 111, 112 and 115 of the Constitution.293 
Article 1 (16) and (17) define both “current field” and “future field” to show that 
the KRG is compliant with Article 112 of the Constitution. Article 1 (16) states 
that “Current Field: a Petroleum Field that has been in Commercial Production 
prior to 15 August 2005;”, while Article 1 (17) states that “Future Field: a 
Petroleum Field that was not in Commercial Production prior to 15 August 2005, 
and any other Petroleum Field that may have been, or may be, discovered as a 
result of subsequent exploration.”294 The KRG argues that there is no legal 
provision preventing it from acting unilaterally in managing the “future field”, 
providing that the Constitution only refers to the “current field” and there is no 
any other federal law or legislation after or prior to the enforcement of the 
Constitution regarding the “future field”.295 The KRG makes a valid legal point 
here. The lack of federal oil and gas law undermines the IFG’s position to 
confront the KRG with a valid legal argument over the “future field”. It must be 
accepted the constitutional provisions have not been adequately drafted in 
respect of the management of the petroleum operations. The legal dispute over 
the management of the petroleum resources and who has authorities to do so 
stems partly from the vaguely drafted relevant constitutional provisions. 
Therefore, an amendment to the relevant articles of the Constitution would 
provide a successful solution to part of the problem, such as adding the term 
“future field” after the term “current field” to Article 112 and amending Article 
111 in a way to make it clear who has the ownership rights over oil and gas in 
Iraq or whether ownership is shared between them. Another solution would be 
passing a new federal oil and gas law that provides a full legal framework for 
managing the petroleum operations in Iraq. The potential Federal Oil and Gas 
Law should provide an adequate response to all the problems associated with 
Article 111, 112, 115 and 121 of the Constitution. 
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The disputing parties accept that there are legal challenges in reaching a 
compromise over oil and gas management. Although this has not expressly been 
confirmed by the IFG, attempts at passing a federal oil and gas law 2007 
(amended 2011) would confirm that the IFG impliedly accepted there are legal 
challenges that must be resolved before an acceptable solution could be reached 
over this long-standing dispute. The Federal Oil and Gas Law 2007 (amended 
2011) was drafted as a solution to the ongoing dispute between the IFG and the 
KRG. 12 years have passed, and the law has not been ratified by the Iraqi 
Parliament. The necessity of the Federal Oil and Gas Law 2007 and the reasons 
this law has not been ratified by the Iraqi parliament are discussed later in this 
chapter.  
   
Articles 115 and 121 are profoundly important legal provisions for the KRG to 
challenge any objection from the IFG to that the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law 2007 
would contradict the relevant constitutional provisions or current practice of the 
petroleum operations in Iraq. These two articles have high legal value for the 
KRG in the event regional law contradicts the federal law. Articles 115 and 121 
grant the KRG a right to enact laws and legislations on any matters concerning 
the region, except the matters in the exclusive authorities of the IFG. These two 
articles provide legal immunity and protection to the KRG from any legal actions 
or challenges from the IFG against KRG’s laws and legislations. Therefore, the 
IFG confines its challenges to the KRG’s ability to manage oil and gas operations 
within the constitutional provisions that the Constitution does not grant the KRG 
exclusive right to manage petroleum operations within its territories without 
cooperation and advance approval from the IFG, and that the KRG’s PSCs are 
not consistent with the Constitution.  
Thus, Article 121 specifically undermines the federal legal supremacy over the 
regions. The second part of Article 121 empowers the KRG with legal supremacy 
to reject the federal laws and legislation that contradicts the KRG’s laws and 
legislations. Priority is for the regional laws and legislations in the matters which 
are outside the IFG’s exclusive authorities. Article 121 restricts the federal 
authorities over the regional governments, and regional laws and legislation will 
prevail in the event of a conflict. Accordingly, the KRG is able to limit the 
133 
 
application of the federal laws and legislations within its territories.296 The 
question arises as to what extent the KRG is permitted to act against the 
federal’s direction in the matters outside the federal’s exclusive authorities. Is 
there any constitutional limitation on the KRG to exercise its right to enact laws 
and legislations in contradiction to the national laws and legislation? Full 
consideration must be given to the legal implication of Article 121 in terms of 
the KRG’s ability to manage the petroleum operations within its territories. If It 
is accepted that the KRG has exclusive right to manage its oil and gas, or to 
manage the so-called the “future field”. Are there any constitutional limitations 
on how this right should be exercised? Providing that KRG uses the PSC as a 
model contract, which has not been used in Iraq at any times since the discovery 
of oil in Iraq, and it has always been a matter of argument whether the terms 
of the PSC are constitutional or not. Given that Article 112 of the constitution 
requires petroleum operations to be carried out to provide maximum profits to 
the Iraqi people, and any acts or omissions of the IFG and the KRG should not 
undermine the sovereignty of Iraq. Answering these questions requires practical 
measurements and an evaluation of the economic gain of the KRG’s PSC, 
specifically petroleum revenues and profits, and then comparing the KRG’s 
petroleum profits to those from the IFG’s TSC. This would be an extremely 
difficult task in the absence of accurate data and lack of transparency in 
petroleum operations, considering that Iraq was ranked 168/180 by 
Transparency International for 2018.297 There is no accurate data about the KRG 
oil and gas revenues. There are concerns about the transparency of the KRG’s 
PSC and oil and gas revenues.298  
Article 3 of the Oil and Gas Law only refers to the producing fields in accordance 
with Article 112 (1) of the Constitution. The KRG differentiated between 
“producing fields” as of 15 August 2005 and “future fields” which would be 
discovered and developed after the enforcement of the Constitution. This is to 
confirm that the constitutional provisions only apply to the producing fields in 
terms of Article 112 of the Constitution. The fields discovered or developed after 
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that date are in the sole responsibility of the KRG. The KRG is the only authority 
with exclusive rights to unilaterally manage the petroleum operations from the 
“future field” without cooperation with the IFG. 
The Oil and Gas Law provides further details on the establishment of the regional 
council and other relevant authorities and organisations to manage the 
petroleum operations within the KRG’s territories from the first point, exploration 
and searching for oil and gas, to the final point of exporting the KRG’s produced 
oil and gas in the international market and return its revenues to the KRG.299 It 
provides the details of how different entities and organisations, responsible for 
oil and gas management, should be established, as well as their authorities and 
functions in carrying out the petroleum operations at different stages and levels. 
An important feature of the KRG Oil and Gas Law is its formal adoption of the 
PSC as the oil and gas model contract with IOCs in managing petroleum 
operations. Chapter 10, Article 37 of the Oil and Gas Law provides general terms 
of the KRG’s PSC.300 Article 37. A (1) states that “An initial exploration term of 
a maximum of five (5) years, divided into two subperiods, of three (3) years and 
two (2) years, extendable on a yearly basis for up to a maximum total of seven 
(7) years.”  
The maximum 7 year period is extendable for a further two years, subject to 
the fulfilment of minimum work obligations and making such request in writing 
30 days prior to the end of the current extension period, as stated in Article 6 
of the KRG’s model production sharing contract.301 Accordingly, the maximum 
period of exploration period is nine years, while the development period is for 
an initial period of 20 years. This could be extended automatically for a further 
five years. The contractor, the IOC, has a right to request an extension in writing 
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for a further five years.302 The development period is for a maximum of 30 years. 
This has been confirmed in Article 37 (4) of the KRG Oil and Gas Law No. (22)-
2007. The duration of the KRG’s PSC is longer than that of Iraq’s STC which is 
for a maximum period of 25 years.303  
Article 37 (6) grants the IOC the right to recover the oil cost from the produced 
oil and gas after deduction of royalties, to a maximum not exceeding 45% for 
crude oil and not exceeding 60% for natural gas. After the recovery of the 
petroleum cost, the remainder of the produced oil and gas will be shared 
between the IOC and the KRG.304 The IOC is liable for the applicable tax in 
accordance with Article 40, which includes surface tax, personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, customs duties and any other similar taxes, windfall 
profits or additional profits tax, and any other tax, levy, or charge expressly 
included in its petroleum contract. That notwithstanding, the second part of 
Article 40 allows the KRG to exempt the IOC from tax if the KRG and IOC agreed 
on that in the contract.  
 
In the event of a dispute arising between the KRG and the IOC over the 
interpretation and application of terms of the PSC, the second part of Article 50 
provides dispute resolution methods. The parties should first attempt to resolve 
the dispute through negotiation. If an agreement cannot be reached between 
the parties, the dispute should be referred to international arbitration. Article 
43 grants the KRG Minister of Natural Resources significant power to waive 
sovereign immunity in relation to “legal proceedings and the enforcement of 
judgment” in petroleum contracts.305  
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The KRG Oil and Gas Law No. (22) -2007 grants more powers to the Minister of 
Natural Resources in regulating the PSC and its terms and clauses.306 The above 
articles confirm the IFG’s claim that the KRG Oil and Gas Law is so favourable 
to IOCs that it undermines Iraqi sovereignty. Articles 43 and 50 provide IOCs 
with significant legal protection in a dispute between the KRG and IOC. If the 
dispute cannot be settled internally, it should be referred to Arbitration outside 
Iraq. Secondly, the Minister of Natural Resources, on behalf of the KRG, may 
waive sovereign immunity in the legal proceedings and enforcement of 
judgements in petroleum contract.307 This is a profoundly important legal 
provision for the IOC to take advantage of in negotiation with the KRG on the 
terms and clauses of the PSC. Waiving sovereign immunity by the KRG’s Minister 
of Natural Resources is not consistent with Article 109 of the Constitution.308 
Sovereignty is reserved for the federal authority. Implementing Article 43 of the 
KRG Oil and Gas Law will constitute a clear breach of Article 109 of the 
Constitution. The absence of Article 43 may affect the IOCs’ desire to invest in 
the KRG’s petroleum resources. Removing or amending Article 43 will risk the 
legal protection IOCs enjoy under the current KRG oil and gas contracts in any 
potential dispute that may arise.309 
Petroleum operations within the KRG are regulated by oil and gas Law of 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq Law No. (22)-2007 and KRG’s PSCs. The KRG has 
repeatedly referred to constitutional provisions as the basis of its Oil and Gas 
Law of 2007 and its PSCs with IOCs. All the KRG oil and gas contracts are PSCs 
with one exception, which is the service-type contract signed for the Khor Mor 
and Chemchemal fields which the KRG signed with Dana Gas and Crescent 
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Petroleum.310 The IFG argues that the PSC is not consistent with the principle of 
“achieving the highest benefit for the Iraqi people” as stated in the second part 
of Article 112 of the Constitution, compared to the benefit achieved by the TSC 
used by the IFG. This argument has been supported by Iraqi analysts, stating 
that the IFG’s long-term service contract achieves higher benefit for the Iraqi 
people than the KRG’s PSC.311 The KRG strongly rejects the IFG’s argument and 
confirms that its PSC achieves “the highest benefit” for the people of the region 
as stipulated by Article 112. The KRG refers to the report prepared by Dr Pedro 
Van Meurs. The report compares the KRG’s PSC to the IFG’s TSC and argues 
that the KRG’s PSC achieves a higher benefit for the Iraqi people.312 In assessing 
the KRG’s PSC to “achieve the highest benefit to the people of Iraq”, there are 
a number of factors to consider. The lack of official data regarding oil and gas 
reserves, the hostile environments of oil and gas business in KRG, and the cost 
of searching and developing oil are major concerns for IOCs. Therefore, 
investing in the KRG’s petroleum operations is riskier, more time-consuming, 
and requires more funds than those within the IFG.313 The oilfields within the 
IFG area are already developed and most of them are in operation.314 IOCs would 
take a greater risk by spending huge funds in searching for oil, and in oil and 
gas development in the event the discovery was commercial, in the KRG’s 
petroleum operations. Moreover, the KRG would gain technical expertise, 
economic and employment benefits, and petroleum infrastructure. In addition 
to the above reasons, the legal uncertainty which is caused by the long-standing 
dispute with the IFG has weakened the KRG’s position in contractual 
negotiations. Therefore, investing in the KRG oil and gas operations involves 
potential legal challenges and is economically risky. If the KRG offers the same 
terms and clauses as the IFG offers to IOCs, the KRG’s PSC would not outweigh 
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the above difficulties for IOCs, and it would not be attractive to foreign 
investment. Therefore, oil revenue or the monetary gain cannot be used as the 
sole measurement in assessing the measure of “to achieve the highest benefit” 
in petroleum operations. Even the returned revenue from petroleum production 
will vary from time to time based on oil and gas prices.315 Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that the KRG’s PSC is more favourable to IOCs than the IFG’s TSC.   
The legal issues with the KRG’s PSC and the constitutional interpretations of the 
relevant petroleum articles confirm that the long-standing legal dispute between 
these two governments cannot be ignored. At the same time, the political factors 
behind the scene are acknowledged.316 The real concern for the IFG, as was the 
case with the former Iraqi regimes, is the KRG’s independent petroleum policies 
and management, which is considered a road towards Kurdish independence. 
Nevertheless, the political element does not undermine the legal issues in this 
dispute. Therefore, any future agreement on the petroleum management in the 
KRG will require a detailed legal solution. On that basis, the disputed parties 
agreed that passing a new petroleum law to cure the legal defects in the 
constitutional provisions and domestic laws regulating petroleum operations is 
required. Accordingly, the draft Federal Oil and Gas Law was prepared at the 
end of 2006 and was sent to the Iraqi Parliament in February 2007 with the 
intention of ending the long-standing legal dispute in Iraq over the management 
of oil and gas operations.   
 5.5.4 The IFG’s draft Oil and Gas Law 
(a) Background  
 
In response to the constitutional issues regarding the ownership and 
management of the petroleum resource between the KRG and the IFG, to 
manage petroleum operations in a manner that achieves the highest benefit for 
the people of Iraq, and to provide an acceptable solution to the disagreement 
between the IFG and the KRG over who has the exclusive rights to manage 
petroleum operations (including signing petroleum contracts with IOCs), the 
                                                          
315 Peter Wells. Iraq’s technical service contracts- A good deal for Iraq. 
https://www.extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/34  
316 The political issues in the dispute between the KRG and the IFG are confirmed by 
all interviewees, in annex 2.  
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prime minister at that time, Noori Al-Malik, set up a commission of three Iraqi 
oil experts, Tariq Shafiq, Thamir Ghadban, and Farouq al Kassem, to prepare a 
draft Federal Oil and Gas Law. The draft was completed and submitted to the 
Council of Ministers for approval in August 2006.317 The draft was approved by 
the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval in 
February 2007.318 The primary purpose of drafting the Federal Oil and Gas Law 
(FOGL) “was to optimise Iraq’s oil and gas exploitation, maximise return for the 
nation and to unite the country”,319 with the aim of finding a compromised 
solution and common grounds between the IFG and the KRG to ensure the 
efficiency of petroleum operations across Iraq and increasing the petroleum 
production for the highest benefit for the people of Iraq. There was pressure 
from the USA on the disputed parties to reach an agreement regarding passing 
a federal law governing petroleum operations in Iraq. General Petraeus, in an 
interview with the New York Times, stated that “The hydrocarbon law is of 
enormous importance, and I think it is reasonably doable as well”.320 The KRG’s 
primary concern in the said FOGL was protection of its rights to manage 
petroleum operations, including signing oil and gas contracts with IOCs. The 
draft FOGL did not grant the KRG the same level of independence and authority 
in concluding oil and gas contracts with IOCs. Article 10 (C) of the FOGL states 
that “The initial contract mentioned in Article 10B must be submitted to the 
Federal Oil and Gas Council within thirty (30) days from the day of the initial 
signing or it is considered cancelled”. This caused the KRG real concern 
regarding its right to sign agreements with IOCs. Under Article 10 (C), all oil and 
gas contracts were subject to the Federal Oil and Gas Council approval, which 
                                                          
317 Tariq Shafiq. Iraq’s petroleum law: Problematic issues and its fate. Presented to the 
Economic Forum 2013-Beirut, Iraq Economic Forum 2013 Beirut. Full text is available 
at http://iraqieconomists.net/en/2013/04/05/iraqs-petroleum-law-problematic-issues-
its-fate-by-tariq-shafiq/  
318 Christopher M. Blanchard. Iraq: Oil and gas legislation, revenue sharing, and U.S. 
policy. 2009. Congressional Research Service. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34064.pdf  
319 Tariq Shafiq. Iraq’s petroleum law: Problematic issues and its fate. Presented to the 
Economic Forum 2013-Beirut, Iraq Economic Forum 2013 Beirut. The full text is 
available at http://iraqieconomists.net/en/2013/04/05/iraqs-petroleum-law-
problematic-issues-its-fate-by-tariq-shafiq/.  
320 “General says Iraq pullback would increase violence”. New York Times. 27 April 
2007. The full text is available at https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/ILEI-Oil-and-Gas-Law.pdf  
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was the only authority with exclusive right to regulate the petroleum policy and 
management in Iraq.321  
(b) Key provisions of the draft Federal Oil and Gas Law 2007 
 
Article 1 confirms that oil and gas are owned by the Iraqi people in all regions 
and governorates.322 It restates the same language of Article 111 of the 
Constitution over oil and gas ownership in Iraq.  
Article 2 confirms that the Iraq Oil and Gas Law No.__ 2007 applies to all 
Petroleum Operation across Iraq. This means the law also applies to the 
petroleum operations within the KRG’s territories. Under Article 2, no other 
federal or regional laws or legislation, including Oil and Gas Law of Kurdistan 
Region. Law No. (22) 2007, would regulate oil and gas operations. Iraq would 
have one unified federal law regulating all oil and gas activities in all regions and 
governorates. Article 2 (B) limits the application of this law and states the said 
law does not apply to the refining of petroleum, its industrial use, nor the 
storage, transport, and distribution of petroleum products.   
Article 5 makes the Iraqi Council of Representative the only competent authority 
to enact all federal legislation on crude oil and natural gas. It grants the Council 
of Ministers the right to formulate petroleum policies and to propose the 
legislation regarding petroleum operations to the Council of Representatives. 
The Federal Council for Oil and Gas (FCOG), Ministry of Oil (MoO), and the Iraqi 
National Oil Company (INOC), together with the Council of Ministers are 
responsible for regulating petroleum policies, plans, and managing all petroleum 
operations in Iraq. The FCOG is responsible for reviewing and approving 
exploration and production contracts and the model contract to be used in Iraq. 
Article 5 grants more authorities to the FCOG and the MoO in regulating the 
petroleum policies and petroleum operations in Iraq with participation from the 
regional authorities. Under Article 10, all petroleum contracts are signed by the 
                                                          
321 Greg Muttitt. Fuel on the fire: Oil and politics in occupied Iraq. 2011. 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xRVj0g82jNUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&ot
s=3WsTMQnwz_&sig=6ZYrjKREx3sn7WW2wjSu_l6VIog&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f
=false  
322 Article 1 of the Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law OF 2007. The full text is available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/Draft%20Iraq%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20
Law%20English__2007_03_10_h23m31s47.pdf  
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Ministry of Oil, INOC and the regional authorities, the KRG, contracts, including 
the contracts previously signed by the KRG, must be submitted to the FCOG 
within 30 days from the date initially signed for approval.323 The FCOG has 
authority to reject the contract if its terms and clauses do not meet the 
requirements specified in Article 9 (B),  
All model contracts shall be formulated to honour the following objectives 
and criteria:   
1- National control;  
2- Ownership of the resources;  
3- Optimum economic return to the country;  
4- An appropriate return on investment to the investor; and  
5- Reasonable incentives to the investor for ensuring solutions which are 
optimal to the country in the long-term related to  
a- improved and enhanced recovery,   
b- technology transfer, c- training and development of 
Iraqi personnel, d- optimal utilisation of the 
infrastructure, and e- environmentally friendly 
solutions and plans.”   
 
The most serious change the FOGL introduced was the model contract to be 
used by the IFG and regional authorities with IOCs, which is the exploration and 
production contract under Article 9 of the draft. This has been confirmed again 
in Article 12. This would seriously affect the KRG’s petroleum operations as all 
its contracts are the PSC.  
The draft was submitted to the Iraqi Parliament in May 2007 for approval, but 
received strong opposition from academics, oil experts, Iraqi oil federation 
unions, and Arab Sunni and Kurdish political parties for various reasons. 
Academics and oil experts criticised the draft because their opinions and views 
were not taken into consideration by the drafting committee. The unions 
                                                          
323 Article 10 (C) of the Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law No.___ 2007. “The initial contract 
mentioned in Article 10B must be submitted to the Federal Oil and Gas Council within 
thirty (30) days from the day of the initial signing or it is considered cancelled.”  
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strongly opposed because they believe the Draft would undermine the 
nationalisation of Iraqi petroleum because it did not clearly deny the use of the 
PSC, which grants IOCs too much control over Iraqi oil and gas.324  
The FOGL granted the KRG a right to sign a petroleum contract only in respect 
of the fields in Annex 3. The draft divided the oil fields in Iraq into four areas, 
Annex 1, Annex 2, Annex 3 and Annex 4. The INOC was granted authority over 
the fields in Annex 1 and 2. The KRG was given contracting authority over the 
fields in Annex 3. The Draft was silent on Annex 4. It is estimated the fields in 
Annex 3 consist of 7% of the Iraqi oil fields. The Annexes were not published 
with the draft, but by the KRG on its website in 2007.325  
The FOGL granted significant control to the federal authorities, the FCOG chaired 
by the Prime Minister, the MoO, and the INOC who were in control over 
petroleum policy and petroleum operations. The FCOG had responsibility for 
deciding federal petroleum policies, exploration plans, field development, and 
pipeline plans. All petroleum contracts, including the previous contracts signed 
by the KRG and the contracts that will be signed by the KRG, must be referred 
to the FCOG for approval within 30 days from the date initially signed.   
It appears from the presentation of Tariq Shafiq at the Economic Forum 2013-
Beirut that he was strongly in favour of centralised petroleum operations. He 
argues that Article 111 and 112 of the Constitution must be interpreted in light 
of Article 2, 49, 109 and 110 of the Constitution, which all confirm that the IFG 
is the only authority competent to represent the people of Iraq in all regions and 
governorates, and therefore it should have the exclusive right to manage the 
petroleum operations in Iraq.326 He confirmed his view in support of the 
centralisation of oil and gas management in Iraq in the interview in 2011.327 
                                                          
324 Introduction to the laws of Kurdistan, Iraq Working Paper Series. Iraq Legal 
Education Initiative (ILEI), Stanford Law School. American University of Iraq, 
Sulaimani. 2013. Available at https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/ILEI-Oil-and-Gas-Law.pdf  
325 https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ILEI-Oil-and-Gas-Law.pdf  
326 Tariq Shafiq. Iraq’s petroleum law: Problematic issues and its fate. Presented to the 
Economic Forum 2013-Beirut, Iraq Economic Forum 2013 Beirut. Full text is available 
at http://iraqieconomists.net/en/2013/04/05/iraqs-petroleum-law-problematic-issues-
its-fate-by-tariq-shafiq/ 
327 Mr Tariq Shafiq in the interview with Ruba Husari on the 30 December 2011. 
https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=2413  
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Shafiq strongly criticised the 2007 version to the extent that it did not reflect 
the original version of 2006 which was prepared by him and his colleagues. 
Shafiq argued that:  
The final negotiated draft was announced on 15 March 2007 (often 
referred to as April 2007 Draft), by unanimous agreement within the 
ministerial committee, which was chaired by Kurdish Deputy Prime 
Minister, Dr Barham Saleh. Regretfully, the original first Petroleum Law 
2006 which we drafted has been modified to such an extent that I and 
my colleague Farouk al-Kasim believe that it no longer provides for the 
standards of optimisation, efficiency, accountability and transparency, 
nor is it any longer in keeping with maintaining the unity of the nation 
nor securing the broader national interest for generations to come.”328 
 
The 2006 draft was available for the public at the time of drafting the 2007 one, 
and copies were provided to the federal and regional authorities for their review 
and consideration. The 2006 draft was published by Shafiq at the time of his 
presentation at the Economic Forum 2013 in Beirut.329 The drafters of the 2006 
version listed all the petroleum laws and legislation in the preamble of 2006 
draft and confirmed that all Iraqi petroleum laws and legislation from 1943 to 
2006 were considered. Comparing the 2006 version with the 2007 version 
confirms Shafiq’s above statement. Comparing Article 1 of the 2006 draft to 
article 1 of the 2007 version will illustrate the differences. Article 1 of 2006 
states that “Ownership of all Iraqi Petroleum resources in situ, including oil and 
natural gas, is vested in the entire Iraqi people. The authority to take decisions 
relating to exploration, development, production and disposal of oil and natural 
gas, on behalf of the sovereign people of Iraq, has been and remains vested in 
the Federal Government of Iraq. All such decisions shall be made on the basis 
of Iraqi Federal laws”, while Article 1 of the 2007 version states “Oil and gas are 
owned by all the people of Iraq in all the Regions and Governorates”. Article 1 
                                                          
328 Tariq Shafiq. Iraq’s petroleum law: Problematic issues and its fate. Presented to the 
Economic Forum 2013-Beirut, Iraq Economic Forum 2013 Beirut. Full text is available 
at http://iraqieconomists.net/en/2013/04/05/iraqs-petroleum-law-problematic-issues-
its-fate-by-tariq-shafiq/ 
329 The full text of the original version 2006 draft is available at 
http://iraqieconomists.net/eng/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2013/04/PL-draft-bill-
2006-Iraq-engl.-version.pdf  
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of the 2007 version is the exact wording of Article 111 of the Constitution. By 
contrast, Article 1 of the 2006 provides further information about the concept 
of the ownership and interpretation of Article 111 of the Constitution. Article 1 
of the 2006 version is more like the drafter’s interpretation of Article 111 of the 
Constitution, which vests petroleum ownership in the IFG as the only 
representative of the people of Iraq. This concept is strongly disputed by the 
KRG. The KRG representative, in the conference held in 2007 in Dubai regarding 
the draft petroleum law prepared by Mr Shafiq and his colleagues, rejected the 
draft because it was influenced by the nationalist and “Baatthy’s ideology”, the 
former Iraqi regime ideology.330  
 
The 2006 draft was drafted by three Iraqi experts who had been working in the 
Iraqi petroleum industry for a considerably long time. They were involved in the 
former Iraqi regimes oil and gas policies and operations. The centralisation of 
the petroleum policies and management is reflected in the 2006 draft. They 
were very much in favour of federal management of petroleum operations 
through the MoO and the INOC, with the participation of the regional 
government only in respect of the petroleum within Annex 3, the oilfields within 
the KRG’s territories. The 2006 draft was based on the author’s interpretation 
of Article 111 and 112, and other relevant articles of the Constitution. The 
authors relied on the Joseph C. Bell’s analysis for the concept of petroleum 
ownership and management in accordance with Articles 111 and 112 of the 
Constitution.331 The 2006 Draft, with the consent from the MoO, is solely based 
on the Bell and Saunders’ memorandum. Shafiq stated that “In the absence of 
an official legal interpretation of these articles, the authors, with the MoO’s 
consent, based their draft on a constitutional interpretation given in a study 
published in May 2006 by the Iraq Revenue Watch 
                                                          
330 Tariq Shafiq. Iraq’s petroleum law: Problematic issues and its fate. The full text is 
available at http://iraqieconomists.net/eng/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2013/04/Tariq-paper-Iraq’s-Petroleum-Law-revised-for-IEN-
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331 Joseph C. Bell, Hogan and Hartson LLP. Professor Cheryl Saunders, University of 
Melbourne Australia. Memorandum, Iraqi oil policy-constitutional issues regarding 
federal and regional authorities. Hogan and Hartson LLP. Professor Cheryl Saunders, 
University of Melbourne Australia. The full text is available at 
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Saunders-07_06.pdf  
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(www.iraqrevenuewatch.org), “Iraqi Oil Policy-Constitutional Issues Regarding 
Federal and Regional Authority”, authored by Joseph C. Bell, Hogan and Hartson 
LLP, and Professor Cheryl Saunders, University of Melbourne Australia”. The 
KRG’s interpretation, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was based on the 
legal opinion of Professor Crawford. The issue here is not whether Professor 
Crawford or Bell and Saunders have authority to interpret the Iraqi Constitution. 
These interpretations of the relevant articles of the Constitution concerning 
petroleum policies and management lack legal authority. The Constitution 
grants the Federal Supreme Court in Iraq sole authority to interpret 
constitutional provisions332. Article 93 of the Constitution states that “The 
Federal Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the following: Second: 
Interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.”  
Any other international and national interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions would have no legal authority in the absence of the formal 
interpretation from the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq. What has been noted in 
this long-standing dispute between the IFG and the KRG is the absence of the 
Federal Supreme Court role in settling this matter or the reluctance of the 
disputed parties to refer this matter to the Federal Supreme Court for 
settlement333. The disputed parties prefer to settle the dispute without the 
Federal Court’s involvement. Following the formation of a new Iraqi government 
after the general election in May 2018, and a new KRG following the general 
election in September 2018, there have been attempts to settle the difference 
between the KRG and the IFG.334 The role of the Federal Supreme Court and its 
authority is discussed further in this chapter.  
5.5.5  Draft Federal Oil and Gas Draft 2011 
Due to the huge criticism against the 2007 draft from KRG, Sunni Arab, 
academics and others, it was amended in 2011. The 2011 draft is not 
substantially different from the 2007 version. The amendments are limited to 
re-drafting some articles and changing places of several articles, but it did not 
bring any substantial changes to the matters in dispute between the IFG and 
the KRG. Under the 2011 draft, petroleum policies and management are the 
                                                          
332 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq available at Annex 2. 
333 Interview with Dr Bayazid Hassan available at Annex 2 
334 Interview with Dr Sherko Jawdat, the Head of the Oil and Gas Committee at the 
Kurdistan Parliament. The full text of the interview is available at Annex 2.  
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responsibility of the Minister of Council, MoO, FOGC and INOC, and the KRG only 
has the right to conclude petroleum contracts for the fields from Annex 3, 
subject to approval from the FOGC. The 2011 draft grants the MoO an authority 
to conclude service contracts as the model contract to achieve the highest 
benefit for the people of Iraq. The 2011 draft re-states that all oil and gas 
contracts must be submitted to the FCOG within 30 days from the date initially 
signed by the federal and regional authorities. The MoO and the Council of 
Ministers continue to enjoy the same powers granted to them by the 2007 draft.  
In summary, the three drafts in 2006, 2007, and 2011 did not obtain consensus 
from all Iraqi people, specifically not the Sunni and Kurds. The federal 
hydrocarbon, or oil and gas law, has been revised twice. In 2011, the Oil and 
Energy Committee of the Iraqi Parliament published an amended version of the 
draft under the Federal Oil and Gas Law 2011.335 This has not been ratified by 
the Iraqi parliament. Although the draft did not contain any clear provisions to 
make oil and gas as one of the matters under the exclusive authority of the IFG 
as in Article 110 of the Constitution, the management structures provided by 
the draft would make the IFG the only authority responsible for all petroleum 
operations. The KRG is not restricted from concluding petroleum contracts but 
is limited to the fields within the Annex 3 territories, and subject to federal 
approval. The FCOG must approve the model contract and its terms signed by 
the KRG within 30 days from the date initially signed. The KRG would not have 
exclusive authority under the 2011 draft as it does now in signing the petroleum 
contracts. One of the matters the Draft insisting on is reviewing all petroleum 
contracts which have been concluded previously between the KRG and IOCs. 
Article 47 states:  
The competent body in the Kurdistan Region shall within not more than 
three months from the enactment of this law review all exploration and 
Production contracts concluded with all entities prior to the enforcement 
of this law to conform said contracts to the objectives and the general 
provisions of this law to achieve the highest economic benefit for the Iraqi 
People, taking into consideration the objective circumstances in which 
                                                          
335 The English version is available at 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/December%202015/Iraq%20Federal%20Oil%20an
d%20Gas%20Draft%20Law%202011.pdf  
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said contracts were concluded. The Bureau of Independent Advisors shall 
assess the contracts herein referred to in this article and its opinion as to 
the handling of said contracts shall be binding.  
The contracts concluded between the KRG and IOCs must be consistent with the 
provisions of Federal Oil and Gas Draft Law 2011 to “achieve the highest 
economic benefit for the Iraqi people”. Reviewing the KRG’s existing oil and gas 
contracts is a complicated process, involves legal challenges, and is subject to 
potential claims by the IOC against the KRG for remedies if the reviewing 
process leads to annulment or amendments to the KRG’s previous contracts or 
as a result, the IOC sustains a financial loss.  
Maliki's cabinet was unsuccessful in its attempt to have the federal petroleum 
law ratified by the Iraqi parliament. The KRG continues to manage the petroleum 
operations within its territories in accordance with the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 
2007, and the IFG still depends on the legislation of the former Iraqi regime in 
managing federal oil and gas operations. To date, Iraq has no unified federal 
petroleum law for managing petroleum operations across Iraq.  
 
5.6 The Federal Supreme Court and the dispute between the IFG and the KRG  
 
The Federal Supreme Court is the only authority in Iraq authorised to settle 
constitutional disputes. The normal process of settling any dispute between the 
federal and regional governments over constitutional issues is that the parties 
must first attempt to resolve the dispute through negotiation. If agreement was 
not reached, then the matter must be taken to the Federal Supreme Court for 
determination. The dispute over the management of oil and gas operations 
between the KRG and the IFG is one such dispute involving serious constitutional 
issues, which has been going on for nearly 15 years and has adversely affected 
the relationship between the IFG and the KRG and the stability of the political 
system in Iraq. Given the seriousness of this matter and directly affects the 
country’s economy, it should have been referred to the Federal Supreme Court 
for determination.  
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Article 93 of the Constitution states:  
The Federal Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the following:  
First: Overseeing the constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect.  
Second: Interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.  
Third: Settling matters that arise from the application of the federal laws, 
decisions, regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal 
authority. The law shall guarantee the right of direct appeal to the Court 
to the Council of Ministers, those concerned individuals, and others.  
Fourth: Settling disputes that arise between the federal government and 
the governments of the regions and governorates, municipalities, and 
local administrations.  
Fifth: Settling disputes that arise between the governments of the regions 
and governments of the governorates.  
Sixth: Settling accusations directed against the President, the Prime 
Minister and the Ministers, and this shall be regulated by law.  
Seventh: Ratifying the final results of the general elections for 
membership in the Council of Representatives.  
Eight:  
A. Settling competency disputes between the federal judiciary and the 
judicial institutions of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region.  
B. Settling competency disputes between judicial institutions of the 
regions or governorates that are not organized in a region. 
 
Article 93 grants the Federal Supreme Court the exclusive right to interpret the 
Constitution. Although the constitutional provisions concerning the management 
of oil and gas have been interpreted by the IFG, the KRG, and different legal 
scholars, none of the above have jurisdiction or legal authority, under the 
Constitution, to interpret the Constitution. The right to interpret Articles 111 and 
112 is reserved for the Federal Supreme Court. The disputed parties have tried 
various means to settle this matter and to reach an agreement, including 
ongoing negotiations since 2004, threatening the IOCs to blacklist them if they 
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do not stop investing in the KRG oil and gas by the IFG,336 urging foreign 
countries to refrain from petroleum trading with the KRG, and restricting oil and 
gas importing with the IFG.337 The dispute even escalated to military 
confrontation on different occasions.338 The dispute further escalated to the 
extent that the KRG threatened to hold a public referendum over the 
independence of Kurdistan. On 24 September 2017, over 92% of the Kurdish 
people, including Kurdish people from the disputed territories, voted yes for the 
independence. This result fuelled the conflict between the two governments. 
Less than a month after, the IFG engaged in a military offence on the KRG and 
regained all territories that the KRG claimed after the Iraqi troops withdrew from 
them because of the ISIS attacks, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk,339 which 
are disputed areas between the IFG and the KRG.340  
Surprisingly, the parties have been reluctant to settle this long-standing and 
legally complicated dispute through the Federal Supreme Court. In 2012, the 
IFG raised a legal action seeking an order from the Federal Supreme Court to 
stop the KRG from exporting oil and gas independently outside Iraq. The Iraqi 
Federal Supreme Court rejected the IFG's claim.341 This confirms that the KRG 
has legitimacy to enact energy laws and conclude petroleum contracts. The 
Federal Supreme Court did not grant the Ministry of Oil the injunction due to a 
lack of sufficient information regarding the constitutional provisions and 
                                                          
336 Asharq Al-Awsat. Iraq nullifies Kurdish oil deals. 2007. https://eng-
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domestic legislation concerning the KRG’s right to export oil and gas 
independently. The Federal Supreme Court, in refusing to grant such injunction 
stated that “[granting such an injunction] would give an impression of a 
premature decision on the subject matter of the proceedings and the decision 
that shall be issued by the court' which would contravene the judicial 
“context/norms”. 342 Following this decision, the KRG continued exporting its oil 
and gas independently. In response thereto, the Maliki government cut the 
KRG’s share of the federal budget until the KRG relinquished all petroleum 
revenue to the IFG for redistribution. The KRG refused. Since then the battle 
between the IFG and the KRG is focused on oil and gas revenue and the KRG’s 
share of the federal budget. In response to the KRG’s stance over oil and gas 
revenue, the IFG did not send the KRG’s share of the federal budget until 
January 2019 when the federal parliament voted for the federal budget of 
2019.343 In accordance with the federal budget for 2019, the KRG must hand 
over or export 250,000 bpd through the Sell Oil Market Company (SOMO).344 
The IFG fulfilled its obligations under the 2019 budget and resumed sending the 
KRG sufficient funds to pay its employees’ salaries. The MoO’s Thamer Al-
Ghadban confirmed on the state television Al-Iraqiyah that the KRG has not 
begun exporting the 250,000 bpd oil through SOMO.345 This is a temporary 
agreement between the IFG and the KRG to ease the financial crises the KRG 
has been through since 2014, until a final agreement is reached between the 
disputed parties346.  
On 27 June 2018 the Federal Supreme Court reviewed the case again and 
decided to postpone the procedural hearing for 14 August 2018. The Federal 
Supreme Court further delayed the procedural hearing to allow the parties to 
submit expert reports and further information regarding the dispute. The Court 
heard the case again on 7 April 2019 and based on the parties’ request, the 
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hearing was adjourned again to allow the parties to submit further information 
or to reach an agreement on the constitutional issues and passing of a FOGL.347 
The case is still ongoing. 
The Federal Supreme Court has difficulties dealing with this matter. The parties’ 
agreement on certain constitutional issues regarding Article 111 and 112 of the 
Constitution and the FOGL is required before the court can make final judgement 
on the KRG’s right to extract and export oil and gas independently.  
5.7 The management of oil and gas operations within disputed areas between 
the IFG and KRG  
(a) Background  
 Iraq was one of the new states formed by the British Government and it 
geographically consisted of the three former Ottoman Vilayets of Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul. Vilayet Mosul covered a large area in northern Iraq, 
including Kirkuk province. Kurds claim its ownership over most areas of Mosul, 
specifically the areas most populated by Kurdish people at the time Iraq was 
first formed in 1920. Since the formation of Iraq, Kurdish people have struggled 
to have their own state. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk and other Kurdish 
populated areas which have been administrated by the central government since 
1920 are Kurdish territories. These areas are now called ‘disputed areas’ 
between the Kurds and Arabs, in other words between the KRG and the IFG. 
The return of these areas to Kurdish territories has always been one of the 
Kurdish demands during negotiations with Iraq governments to settle the long-
standing political conflict between Kurds and Arabs. During the peace 
negotiation between the Kurds and central government in the 1960s, the Kurds 
demanded to take 33% of Iraq’s oil revenues. It is now agreed and confirmed 
by the Constitution that the Kurds’ share of Iraq’s oil and gas revenue is 17%. 
The request of 33% of Iraq’s oil revenues by Kurds at that time was based on 
the Kurdish population within the current KRG’s territories and disputed areas 
of Kirkuk, Mosul, Diyala and Salah-al-Din. The disputed areas are now 
administrated and funded by the IFG. Ownership of the province or Vilayet of 
Mosul, including the city of Kirkuk, which is rich with oil and it is estimated to 
                                                          
347 Federal Supreme Court delays hearing on KRG oil exports. NTR. 
http://www.nrttv.com/EN/News.aspx?id=11518&MapID=2  
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have 17% of Iraq’s proven oil reserves, has been disputed between the British 
and French after the WWI and between the Turkey Government and Iraqi 
Government since the formation of Iraqi state in 1920, and now between the 
Kurds and Arabs in Iraq. It seems that oil has always been a primary factor in 
the ownership dispute over this area.348 The map below shows the disputed 
areas between the IFG and the KRG. 
 
This map was produced by the International Crisis Group. The location of all features is approximate.
349   
                                                          
348 Crisis Group. Iraq and the Kurds: The brewing battle over Kirkuk. Report 56/ 
Middle East & North Africa 2006. Full Report is available at 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/iraq/iraq-and-kurds-brewing-battle-over-kirkuk  
349 International Crisis Group (Crisis Group). Oil for Soil: Toward a grand bargain on 
Iraq and the Kurds. Middle East Report No80. 20 October 2008.  
. 
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Following the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition Force in 2003, the Kurds and Arab 
agreed to resolve the ownership of the disputed areas in accordance with Article 
140 of the Constitution.350 The current dispute between the IFG and the KRG is 
mainly over the city of Kirkuk. Kurds are struggling to take control over Kirkuk’s 
vast oil revenues. In accordance with Article 140, the city of Kirkuk and other 
disputed areas should have been determined through a census by the end of 
December 2007. The census has not yet taken place and the disputed areas 
remain under the control of the IFG, with the exception of the period 2014 until 
16 October 2017. The KRG was in control of most of the disputed areas. In 
October 2017 the Iraqi forces regained control of these areas in a military 
offence on the Kurdish forces Peshmarga. The disputed areas are now under the 
administration of the IFG. 
(b) Article 140 of the Constitution and the disputed areas 
Before the Constitution came into effect, the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL)351 of 2004 was in force in Iraq. The TAL contains two articles regarding 
the disputed territories between the KRG and the IFG, Article 53 (A) and Article 
58. TAL was valid for a short period until the Constitution was approved by the 
Iraqi people. Article 140 of the Constitution was designed to settle the conflict 
between the Kurds and Arabs over the disputed areas. Article 143 of the 
Constitution is designed to complete the link between the TAL and the 
Constitution regarding the disputed territories. Article 143 states that “The 
Transitional Administrative Law and its Annex shall be annulled on the seating 
of the new government, except for the stipulations of Article 53(A) and Article 
58 of the Transitional Administrative Law”. Article 143 confirms that Article 53 
(A) and Article 58 of the TAL are still in effect even after the enforcement of the 
Constitution. The boundary of the KRG in accordance with Article 53 (A) of TAL 
is very practically important in relation to the management of oil and gas under 
                                                          
350 Constitution of Iraq 2005. Article 140: Second: The responsibility placed upon 
the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 
of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive 
authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it 
accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their 
citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. 
351 The English version of the Transition Administrative Law is available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/iraq/tal.htm  
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Article 112 of the Constitution. Article 53(A) of the TAL limits the KRG’s 
participation in oil and gas management only within the Kurdish provinces of 
Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniya, the three disputed Kurdish territories of Kirkuk, Diala 
and Ninewa, within areas under Kurdish control on 19 March 2003. The disputed 
Kurdish territories in the other two provinces of Salaheddin and Wasit were out 
of Article 112’s jurisdiction.  
The TAL legal regime for oil and gas granted the IFG the exclusive authority to 
manage petroleum operations within the disputed areas that were out of the 
KRG’s control as of March 2003. The management of petroleum operations 
within the disputed territories is part of the wider dispute between these two 
governments over the management of oil and gas across Iraq. The unanswered 
question here is in what manner oil and gas operations within the disputed areas 
will be managed, given that the timeframe provided in Article 140 has lapsed 
and no census took place. Even the validity of Article 140 is arguable.  
(c) Kurdistan’s Oil and Gas Law 2007 and oil and gas within the disputed areas 
 
Article 19 Fourth of the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 2007 states that “the Federal 
Government must not practise any new Petroleum Operations in the disputed 
territories without the approval of the Regional Government until such time as 
the referendum required by Article 140 of the Federal Constitution is 
conducted.” 
The KRG confirmed that any petroleum operations within the disputed areas 
must be done in cooperation between the two governments. The IFG should not 
unliterally manage petroleum operations within the disputed areas. Article 19 
confirms that any unilateral management of petroleum operations within the 
disputed territories by the IFG must be dealt with in accordance with Article 112 
(2) of the Constitution.352  
                                                          
352 Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law. No 22-2007. Article 19: Fifth: any activities in the 
disputed territories related to Petroleum Operations carried out in contradiction to 
Paragraph Fourth of this Article shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this 
Law and Article 112(2) of the Federal Constitution once the decision is made to re-join 
these territories to the Region under the provisions of Article 140 of the Federal 
Constitution  
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The KRG simply tries to prevent the IFG from managing oil and gas alone within 
the disputed areas. The IFG must cooperate with the KRG in managing oil and 
gas within these areas, and any acts from the central government concerning 
oil and gas within the disputed areas must be approved by the KRG. The KRG’s 
stance regarding the management of oil and gas under Article 19 of the 
Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 2007 was criticised by the IFG and academics 
because the disputed areas are still administered by the IFG and they are still 
under its jurisdiction. Prior to the enactment of the Kurdistan Oil and Gas law 
2007, the IFG granted the MoO permission to develop most of the oilfields within 
the disputed areas without consultation with nor approval from the KRG. It 
seems that Article 19 of the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law 2007 was passed in 
reaction to the IFG’s act of carrying out the development works to the oil fields 
within the disputed areas.353 The management of oil and gas operations within 
the disputed areas must be shared between the IFG and the KRG in accordance 
with the Constitution, and the TAL prior to the enforcement of the Constitution. 
The situation concerning the management of oil and gas within the disputed 
areas remained unchanged.  
5.8 Summary of the relevant Constitutional Provisions in this Dispute 
Article 1 of the Constitution defines Iraq as a federal state with full sovereignty. 
Article 4 recognises the KRG as a regional government within Iraq. These two 
recognitions did not exist in the previous constitution. Prior to the Constitution, 
the Transitional Administrative Law recognised the KRG as an autonomous 
region. This has been confirmed once again by Article 117 of the Constitution, 
which states:  
First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of 
Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance 
with its provisions. 
The Constitution is the supreme law in Iraq as is confirmed by article 13 of the 
Constitution. Therefore, it is the first source of legal authority for any other 
federal and regional laws. All federal and regional legislation must not contradict 
                                                          
353 Tina Susman. “Iraqis resist US pressure to enact oil law”. The Los Angeles Times. 
2007. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0705/S00301.htm  
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the Constitution. The Constitution confirms all KRG’s laws, legislations, court’s 
decision issued, and contracts concluded by the KRG from 1992 are valid and 
remain in force if they do not contradict with the Constitution.  
Article 141 states that:  
 
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall 
remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the 
region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be 
considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to 
the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the 
region, provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution.” 
The Constitution provides the matters that are in the exclusive authorities of 
each government and the matters, which authorities are shared between them. 
Article 110 of the Constitution confirms that the following matters are in the 
exclusive authority of the IFG: “foreign policy; national security and defence 
policy; fiscal and customs policy; standards, weights and measures; citizenship 
and immigration; broadcasting and postal policies; budget; planning of waters 
flowing to Iraq; census and statistics”. On the other hand, Article 114 provides 
all matters which authorities are shared between the federal and regional 
government. Article 114 states: 
First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, 
except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of 
the federal government. 
… 
Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share 
of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities 
and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the 
percentage of their population.  
… 
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Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the 
administrative requirements of the region, particularly the 
establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the 
region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region. 
While Article 115 provides that the regional government has exclusive authority 
in the matters which are not in the exclusive authority of the IFG. The matters 
which are the authorities are shared between the federal and regional 
governments under Article 114, the regional government is given priority in 
case of dispute and contradiction. Article 121 also grants priority to the regional 
power in case of contradiction between federal and regional power. The regional 
laws and power are given priority in matters which are not in the exclusive 
authority of the IFG under article 110, or any other matters which the 
constitution provides how to be handled. In all other matters identified by 
Articles114, 115 and 121, the priority is for the regional power.  
 
Article 114 provides: 
The following competencies shall be shared between the federal 
authorities and regional authorities:  
First: To manage customs, in coordination with the 
governments of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region, and this shall be regulated by a law.  
Second: To regulate the main sources of electric energy and its 
distribution.  
Third: To formulate environmental policy to ensure the 
protection of the environment from pollution and to preserve its 
cleanliness, in cooperation with the regions and governorates 
that are not organized in a region.  
Fourth: To formulate development and general planning 
policies.  
Fifth: To formulate public health policy, in cooperation with the 
regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.  
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Sixth: To formulate the public educational and instructional 
policy, in consultation with the regions and governorates that 
are not organized in a region.  
Seventh: To formulate and regulate the internal water resources 
policy in a way that guarantees their just distribution, and this 
shall be regulated by a law.  
   
Article 115 provides:  
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal 
government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates 
that are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared 
between the federal government and the regional government, 
priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not 
organized in a region in case of dispute.” 
Article 121, Second, provides:  
In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in 
respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal 
government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the 
application of the national legislation within that region. 
It is clear that the above Articles 110, 114, 115 and 121 have not categorised 
oil and gas as one of the matters over which the IFG or the regional government 
has exclusive authority, or one of the shared powers between the federal and 
regional governments. in fact, the constitution deals with oil and gas separately 
in two separate articles, Article 111 and 112. Article 111 of the Constitution 
deals with oil and gas ownership in Iraq. Article 112 deals with the management 
of oil and gas extracted from the “present fields” and with revenue distribution.  
  
5.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examined the ongoing dispute between the IFG and the KRG over 
the management of oil and gas operations within the KRG and the disputed 
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areas. It demonstrated that the dispute concentrates on the core constitutional 
issues for oil and gas operations and the adoption of the KRG of the PSC as the 
preferred model contract in managing oil and gas operations in the region. The 
dispute is generally associated with the long-standing political and ethnical 
conflict between the Kurds and Arabs over independence and land ownership 
within the region. The disputing parties (central and regional governments) 
have attempted to use different methods to settle their differences in this 
ongoing dispute, ranging from direct and indirect negotiations, proposals of a 
new oil and gas federal law, and military confrontation.  
This analysis shows that there is no definite constitutional provision granting 
either party absolute authority over the management of oil and gas operations 
within the KRG’s territories. The primary legal authority for oil and gas 
operations remain Articles 111 and 112. This chapter shows that these two key 
articles are vague and do not give a clear vision/guidance over who has the 
exclusive right to manage oil and gas within the KRG territory. It is therefore 
obvious that the absence of a unified interpretation of these relevant articles of 
the Constitution and the lack of a universally accepted Federal Oil and Gas Law 
are highlighted as major stumbling issues in this ongoing dispute.   
Finally, this chapter concludes that in any potential settlement between the KRG 
and IFG, it is vital that the KRG’s PSC must be recognised for the following 
reason: The KRG has concluded over 50 PSCs with IOCs. The KRG has always 
argued that its PSCs are consistent with the Constitution. Therefore, the 
implications of any potential settlement on the KRG’s PSC must be carefully 
considered to avoid potentially catastrophic legal claims against the KRG or the 
IFG from IOCs. Accordingly, the KRG’s PSC will constitute a large part of any 
future settlement on oil and gas management. This would require prior 
negotiation and agreement with IOCs regarding the practical implication of any 
potential settlement on the KRG’s PSC.  
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CHAPTER 6       RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMONDATION AND 
                         CONCLUSION    
 
  
6.1  Research Findings 
 
6.1.1 Brief Overview  
In the previous chapters, specifically chapters three and four, the history of the 
oil and gas dispute between the KRG and the IFG was discussed. An examination 
and analysis of the legal arguments forwarded by both governments over their 
interpretation of the relevant articles of the Constitution concerning oil and gas 
ownership and management in Iraq and in the Kurdistan region were provided. 
the arguments are supported by the available literatures and the data collected 
from the interviews with the individuals who were directly or indirectly involved 
in this dispute. Almost all sources, primary and secondary, have been explored, 
examined, and analysed to conclude the following findings and 
recommendations.  
 
The KRG started managing oil and gas operation from 1994 and concluded a 
number of PSC before the formation of the IFG in 2004 and the enactment of 
the Constitution in 2005. Despite strong opposition from the IFG, the KRG has 
so far concluded more than 50 PSCs with IOCs under the Kurdistan Oil and Gas 
Law No. 22 of 2007, which was passed following the enforcement of the 
Constitution in 2006. The KRG made it clear that its Oil and Gas Law of 2007 is 
based on the Constitution and it is consistent with the constitutional provisions. 
Article 121 of the Constitution grants the KRG power to enact laws and 
legislation concerning the KRG in respect of any matters which are not in the 
exclusive authority of the IFG. The KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 regulates oil and 
gas operations within the KRG’s territories, including signing PSCs. Therefore, 
the KRG argues that its PSC is compatible with the Constitution. The KRG’s 
position over the legality or constitutionality of its PSCs has been disputed by 
the IFG for various reasons. The IFG argues that the KRG’s PSC grants 
petroleum ownership to IOCs, while the Constitution prohibits foreign ownership 
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of the national oil and gas. The IFG further argues that the KRG’s PSCs violate 
Iraqi sovereignty and does not achieve the highest benefit for the people of Iraq 
as is stipulated by Article 112 of the Constitution. The IFG refers to the PSC’s 
terms and clauses which are so favourable to IOCs to the extent that they violate 
the Constitution. The KRG has constantly rejected the IFG’s arguments and has 
always confirmed that its PSCs are constitutional354. The KRG has always 
referred to the constitutional provision in rejecting the IFG’s arguments and as 
evidence that its PSCs are constitutional.  
The major constitutional dispute between the KRG and the IFG is over the KRG’s 
right to manage oil and gas operations within the KRG’s territory. The KRG has 
always claimed that its PSCs are consistent with Articles 111 and 112 of the 
Constitution. This has been disputed by the IFG, arguing that Article 111 does 
not vest oil and gas ownership in the KRG, and Article 112 does not grant the 
exclusive right to the KRG to manage the petroleum operations within its 
territories.  
The following findings have been identified in this research:  
6.1.2. Kurdistan Regional Government’s insistence on the operational management of 
all oil and gas resources in the region 
The research established that the KRG primarily relies on the following legal 
authorities in managing oil and gas operations, including concluding PSCs with 
IOCs: 
1. Article 110, 111, 112,114, 115 and 121 of the Constitution. 
2. Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region- Iraq Law No. (22)-2007. 
The legal opinion of Professor James Crawford over the KRG’s authority over oil 
and gas under the Iraqi Constitution.355 These sources have been examined in 
the previous chapters.  
6.1.3 The Constitutional dispute between KRG and IFG and the status of KRG’s PSC 
The Constitution is the supreme law in Iraq, including the Kurdistan region. 
It is not disputed by the KRG and IFG that there must be no federal and 
                                                          
354 Interview with Dr Yusef Mohammed Sadiq available at Annex 2. 
355 Professor James Crawford. The authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
over oil and gas under the Constitution of Iraq, 2008. The full text is available at 
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/publications/57-the-crawford-opinion.  
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regional laws and legislation in contradiction of the Constitution. Article 13 
of the Constitution provides that:  
First: This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq and 
shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception.  
Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. Any 
text in any regional constitutions or any other legal text that contradicts 
this Constitution shall be considered void. 
Article 13 makes clear that any regional and federal legal text that contradicts 
the Constitution is considered void. A distinction should be made between Article 
13 and Articles 115 and 121, which grant priority to the regional laws and 
legislations in the event of contradiction with the federal laws and legislations. 
Article 13 concerns the contradiction between the regional and federal laws and 
legislation with the Constitution as the supreme law of the country, while Articles 
115 and 121 concerns the contradiction between the regional and federal laws 
and legislations. The starting point of the oil and gas dispute between the KRG 
and the IFG are the constitutional provisions.  
Article 110 of the Constitution provides all matters which are in the exclusive 
authority of the federal power. Oil and gas are not categorised as one of these 
matters. Article 114 provides all the matters in which the authority is shared 
between the federal and regional governments. Oil and gas are not among these 
matters. Article 115 provides that the regional government has exclusive 
authority over the matters outside Article 110 and 114 jurisdictions. The above 
three articles do not mention, directly or indirectly, oil and gas management. 
However, the Constitution deals with the matter of oil and gas in two separate 
articles, articles 111 and 112. Therefore, categorising oil and gas under articles 
110, 114 and 115 as one of the federal and regional exclusive authorities is not 
correct. Article 111 vests the ownership of oil and gas in people of Iraq in all 
regions and governorates. The ownership of oil and gas in Iraq was thoroughly 
discussed in detail in chapter three. It seems that the legal dispute over the 
ownership of oil and gas emanates from the dispute over the management of 
oil and gas under Article 112. The KRG refers to Article 111 only when its right 
to manage oil and gas within its territories is denied under Article 112 by the 
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IFG. Therefore, Article 112 is most relevant constitutional provision to oil and 
gas dispute between the KRG and the IFG.  
(a) Management of oil and gas under Article 112 of the Constitution  
 
Article 112 provides:  
“The federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues 
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts 
of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the 
damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former 
regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that 
ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and 
this shall be regulated by a law.  
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and 
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary 
strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques 
of the market principles and encouraging investment”.  
The Article clearly confirms the cooperation between the federal, regional and 
governorate government in managing oil and gas extracted from the “present 
fields”, and there must be cooperation between these governments in 
formulating the necessary strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a 
way achieves the highest benefit for the Iraqi people. The KRG does not dispute 
the cooperation with the IFG over the management of oil and gas, but only in 
respect of the “present fields” and providing that oil and gas revenues are 
distributed in all parts of Iraq in a fair manner. The issue here is the Constitution 
came into effect on the 15 April 2006. Article 112 only concerns those oil fields 
present on the 15 April 2006. Any other fields discovered and developed after 
the enforcement of the Constitution is not in the jurisdiction of Article 112. The 
KRG distinguishes between the “present fields” and the “future fields”. The point 
the KRG makes regarding the “present fields” and “future fields” is valid. There 
is no constitutional provision or federal law regarding the management of oil 
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and gas from the “future fields”. It is not clear why the Constitution does not 
make any reference, either in Article 112 or any other constitutional provision, 
to the future fields, considering that Iraq is a country where exploration and 
development of oil and gas are constantly in process. The same question could 
be asked in a different way, why Article 112 only refers to the “present fields”, 
but not the “future fields”. Another issue with Article 112 is the “management 
of oil and gas extracted from present fields”. Management here only concerns 
the extracted oil and gas. Therefore, the management under Article 112 does 
not extend to the exploration and development of oil and gas. This is a crucial 
issue that makes the dispute more complicated, as the dispute over the 
management of oil and gas primarily emanates from Article 112.  
Article 112 is about the management of the extracted oil and gas, while the 
dispute between the KRG and the IFG is about the management of oil and gas 
operations from the exploration point to selling it in the international market, 
including concluding PSCs with IOCs. The boundary of the dispute between the 
KRG and the IFG over oil and gas management is much wider than mere 
management of the extracted oil and gas from the present fields. The second 
part of Article 112 is about formulating necessary strategic policies to develop 
oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit for the Iraqi people.  
The point here is that the disputing parties, legal scholars, academics, and all 
literature on this subject consider Article 112 as the core of the dispute, while it 
is not clear that Article 112 covers the whole dispute between the KRG and the 
IFG. What the KRG has done so far is conclude PSCs with IOCs and manage oil 
and gas operations within its territories unliterally, without prior approval from, 
or cooperation with the IFG. Article 112 concerns only the cooperation between 
the KRG and IFG in managing oil and gas extracted from the present fields, and 
the cooperation between the IFG and the KRG over formulating necessary 
strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest 
benefit for the Iraqi people. The first part covers only the management of oil 
and gas extracted from the present fields to 15 April 2006. It does not refer 
explicitly or impliedly to the KRG’s right to conclude PSCs for the exploration of 
oil and gas, which is a phase prior to the extraction of oil and gas. Secondly, it 
only covers the fields within the KRG territories until 15 April 2006. Article 112 
does not refer to the specific type of model contract to be used for oil and gas 
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operations and it does not say PSC cannot be used356. All PSCs concluded by the 
KRG to date are provided in Chapter four. The following PSCs would be covered 
by Article 112:  
• Taq Taq  
o PSA - Genel Enerji - 20/01/2004 
o Taq Taq: PSA Attachments - Genel Enerji - 2002  
o Taq Taq: PSA - Genel Enerji - 2002 
• Tawke  
o PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004 
• Shakal  
o PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
• Pulkhana  
o PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
• Erbil  
o PSA Annex A – DNO – 25/06/2004 
o PSA Annex C – DNO – 25/06/2004 
o PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004 
All other PSCs were concluded after the enforcement of the Constitution and 
therefore are not covered by Article 112. Article 112 is not precisely drafted, nor 
does it give a definite framework regarding the management of oil and gas in 
Iraq. There is not a clear line of Article 112’s jurisdiction over the management 
of oil and gas. Therefore, Article 112 would not be a perfect legal means to 
assist the disputing parties to come up with a unified interpretation of how oil 
and gas should be managed. However, the Constitution provides only the 
general framework of how oil and gas should be managed. A federal and regional 
law is required to regulate the petroleum operations in greater detail. It seems 
that the Federal Oil and Gas Law of 2006 and subsequent amendments of 2007 
and 2011 was prepared based on the necessity of such a federal law. However, 
passing a Federal Oil and Gas Law to regulate the management of oil and gas 
operations in Iraq and KRG would be extremely difficult in the absence of a clear 
                                                          
356 Interview with Dr Sherko Jawdat available at Annex 2. 
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and definite constitutional provision over the management of oil and gas. In 
addition to the legal challenges caused by the constitutional issues, political and 
security factors have always played a negative role in this dispute. Withholding 
the KRG’s share of the federal budget since 2014, the Kurdish referendum for 
independence in 2017, and the subsequent military attack on Kirkuk has made 
the relationship between the IFG and the KRG worse ever and adversely 
impacted the oil and gas dispute. The legal, political, and economic difficulties 
the disputed parties have had during the last 15 years in reaching an agreement 
confirms that a comprehensive federal oil and gas law is required to regulate all 
petroleum operations across Iraq, including KRG. In the interim, the relevant 
constitutional provisions concerning the management of oil and gas should be 
amended to remove the legal defects in the Constitution. Moreover, corruption 
and lack of transparency in oil and gas operations is also a significant obstacle 
on the road toward an oil and gas settlement.357 There are major concerns 
regarding the transparency of the KRG’s management over oil and gas 
operations and petroleum revenues.358 There is no clear data regarding the 
KRG’s oil and gas revenue.359  
Article 112 encourages both the IFG and the KRG to work together over the 
management of oil and gas extracted from the present fields, but the contrary 
has been practised. The draft Federal Oil and Gas Law of 2007 was an attempt 
to unify the management of oil and gas in Iraq. However, due to strong positions 
from the KRG and criticism from academics and relevant organisations, the law 
has not been ratified by the Iraqi Parliament up to the time of writing this thesis. 
In summary, neither the KRG nor the IFG could rely on Article 112 as a legal 
authority for an exclusive right to manage oil and gas operations. The IFG cannot 
rely on Article 112 to deny the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas from the 
“future fields” within its territories. Article 112 does not provide an adequate 
                                                          
357 U4 Expert Answer. Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Iraq: overview of corruption 
and anti-corruption. 2013. https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-
corruption-and-anti-corruption.pdf  
358 Interview with Dr Yousif Mohammed Sadiq. Annex 2. 
359 Cameron, Peter Duncanson; Stanley, Michael C. 2017. Oil, gas, and mining: A 
sourcebook for understanding the extractive industries (English). Washington, D.C: 
World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/222451496911224999/Oil-gas-and-
mining-a-sourcebook-for-understanding-the-extractive-industries  
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legal framework for the management of oil and gas operations in Iraq. A national 
law or federal oil and gas law is required to regulate the management of oil and 
gas operations. 
(b) Ownership of oil and gas under Article 111 of the Constitution  
 
Article 111 vests oil and gas ownership in the people of Iraq in all regions and 
governorates. The KRG relies on Article 111 as a legal authority for its right to 
manage oil and gas operations within its territories as a representative of the 
Kurdish people in the Kurdistan region. Article 3 of the Oil and Gas Law of the 
Kurdistan Region 2007 states that Article 111 of the Constitution grants the KRG 
ownership of oil and gas within the KRG’s territories. The ownership and its legal 
implication have been discussed in great detail in chapter two under the Iraqi 
Civil Code No 40 of 1951. The Iraqi Civil Code does not contain specific 
provisions over the ownership of oil and gas but has dealt with the scope of 
ownership in general, which applies to oil and gas ownership. The Civil Code 
does not limit the ownership right to the surface of the land, but it extends to 
what is above the land and what is beneath it, to the extent the landowner could 
fully enjoy the benefit of the land. Article 1049 of the Civil Code provides the 
scope of land ownership in three sections. Section (1) stated that “The owner of 
a thing also owns everything which is deemed by usage to constitute an 
essential element thereof such as it cannot be separated therefrom without the 
thing owned perishing, deteriorating or changing”. This section deals with the 
ownership in general, the owner of the thing, whether the thing is movable or 
immovable and tangible or intangible. That essential element cannot be 
separated from that thing without perishing, deteriorating or changing. Under 
this section, the owner of land owns the dust, the stones, the plant and trees. 
The ownership right is not limited on the thing itself and the core elements that 
are part of its composition, but also extends to things which could be taken 
away from it and its accessories. 
Section (2) of the same article states that “The ownership of land includes that 
which is above and below as far as can be usefully enjoyed in height and in 
depth”. The ownership right of a landowner is not limited to the surface of the 
land, but it is extended to what is above it to the sky and under the land to the 
depth of the earth. The landowner owns the space above it and is entitled to 
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use the space above the land for planting, construction or laying of wires. The 
owner of the land also owns the layers beneath it. The landowner has a right to 
dig wells or extend pipes or extract stones and others. The landowner’s right is 
protected by law and others are not allowed to use or benefit from the space 
above the land and the depth under the land without landowner’s permission.  
A further section of the same article states that “The ownership of the surface 
of the land may by agreement be separated from that which is above it and that 
which is below it”. Section (3) permits that the ownership of the land could be 
separated from what is above or below it by agreement. It is permissible to 
agree to the possession of above the surface of the earth, the space above and 
the construction above the land could be owned by others as in the flat. The 
owner of the land can sell the underground to the other, the ownership of the 
underground could be separated from the ownership of the surface such as the 
tunnels and warehouses.  
Article 1050 of the Civil Code states that “No one can be deprived of his 
ownership except in the cases and in the manner provided for by law and in 
consideration of a fair compensation payable in advance”. This article prevents 
the owner from being deprived of his property except by law in exchange for a 
fair compensation paid in advance. It confirms that the property cannot be 
expropriated except in the cases and manner prescribed by law. 
The issue with Article 111 of the Constitution is that it provides general 
ownership of oil and gas in Iraq. The article does not grant a clear mandate to 
the KRG to exercise its ownership rights over oil and gas operations within the 
KRG territories. therefore, the KRG’s reliance on Article 111 as a legal basis, for 
its right to manage oil and gas operations within its territories, lacks clear legal 
authority. Article 3 of the KRG Oil and Gas Law refers to Article 111 of the 
Constitution as a legal basis for its right to manage oil and gas operations. Article 
3 also refers to Article 112 as a constitutional authority by which the KRG should 
receive a fair share of oil and gas revenues and also to co-operate with the IFG 
in managing the extracted oil and gas from the present fields. The KRG’s reliance 
on Article 111 of the Constitution as a legal basis of its right to manage oil and 
gas operation within the KRG’s territories is based on its own interpretation of 
Article 111, supported by the legal opinion of Prof Crawford. The legal issue here 
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is that the KRG does not have constitutional authority to interpret the 
Constitution and the KRG’s interpretation of Article 111 lacks legal authority.  
(c) KRG’s Oil and Gas Law (Law No. 22of 2007) 
 
Article 115 of the Constitution grants the KRG authority to enact laws and 
legislation over any matter which is not in the exclusive authority of the IFG. 
Although, Article 112 provides that oil and gas extracted from the present fields 
must be managed by the IFG and the KRG together. The co-operation between 
these two governments is limited over oil and gas extracted from the present 
fields. There is no federal oil and gas law superseding the KRG Oil and Gas Law 
of 2007. Therefore, the provisions of the KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 are only 
subject to the Constitution. Under Article 13 of the Constitution, any regional or 
federal laws and legislation that contradict the Constitution are void. The KRG 
Oil and Gas Law seems to be consistent with the Constitution with the exception 
of Article 43 and 50. Articles 43 and 50 provide IOCs with significant legal 
protection in the case of a dispute between the KRG and IOC. If the dispute 
cannot be settled internally, it should be referred to arbitration outside Iraq. 
Secondly, the Minister of Natural Resources, on behalf of the KRG, may waive 
sovereign immunity in the legal proceedings and enforcement of judgements in 
petroleum contract.360 In the event of a dispute between the KRG and the IOC 
over the interpretation and application of any terms or clauses of the PSC, Article 
50 provides that the parties should resolve the dispute through negotiation. If 
an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, the dispute should be 
referred to international arbitration361. Article 43 grants the KRG Minter of 
Natural Resources significant power to waive sovereign immunity in relation to 
“legal proceedings and the enforcement of judgment” in petroleum contracts.362 
                                                          
360 Kelly, Michael J., “The Kurdish regional constitution within the framework of the 
Iraqi federal constitution: a struggle for sovereignty, oil, ethnic identity, and the 
prospects for a reverse supremacy clause” (May 15, 2010). Penn State Law Review, 
Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 707-808, 2010. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1608334  
361 Interview with Dr Sherko Jawdat available at Annex 2. 
362 Article 43 states “The Minister may, in a Petroleum Contract, waive on behalf of the 
Region any claim on to sovereign immunity with regard to legal proceedings and the 
enforcement of judgments.”  
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Therefore, it the KRG Oil and Gas Law No. (22) -2007 grants excessive powers 
to the Minister of Natural Resources in regulating the PSC and its terms and 
clauses363 to the extent undermine the Iraqi sovereignty. Waiving sovereign 
immunity by the KRG’s Minister of Natural Resources is not consistent with 
Article 109 of the Constitution.364 Sovereignty is reserved to the federal 
authority. Implementing Article 43 of the KRG Oil and Gas Law will constitute a 
clear breach of Article 109 of the Constitution.  
(d) The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law (2007)  
 
The Federal Oil and Gas Law (2007) was an amended version of the Federal Oil 
and Gas Law (2006). The Federal Oil and Gas Law (2007) was originally 
prepared and drafted by a committee of three Iraqi oil and gas experts.365 The 
2006 version was modified by the Federal Oil and Energy Committee of the 
Council of Ministers and was submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval in 
February 2007. The 2007 draft could not get through Parliament due to the 
strong disagreement between Shai, Kurds and Sunni.366 The 2007 draft was, 
therefore, further amended in 2011 to cure the criticism from the oppositions. 
The 2011 amendments did not bring major changes to the 2007 draft. The 
Federal Oil and Gas Law seeks to provide a legal framework for oil and gas 
operations in Iraq, including KRG, and at the same time to provide a legal 
solution for the constitutional dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the 
management of oil and gas. The Draft Oil and Gas Law has been with the federal 
parliament since February 2007 but has not yet been enacted367 because it 
seeks to maximise federal control over oil and gas operations. The drafters 
primarily relied on legislation enacted by the former Iraqi regimes, with little 
regard to the relevant provisions of the current Constitution. This was confirmed 
                                                          
363 Rex J Zedalis, “Remedial actions against oil sourced from the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq: issues of concern for companies claiming breach of a PSC”, The Journal of World 
Energy Law & Business, Volume 10, Issue 6, December 2017, Pages 505–519, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwx029 
364 Article 109: “The federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, 
independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system”. 
365 The three Iraqi experts were Tariq Shafiq, Thamir Al-Ghadban and Farouk al-
Qassem 
366 Interview with Dr Bayazid Hassan. Annex 2. 
367 Republic of Iraq, Oil and Energy Committee, Council of Ministers, Draft Oil and Gas 
Law (15 February 2007). I rely on an English translation provided by the KRG.  
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at the preamble of the 2006 version. The Draft Oil and Gas Law seeks to 
establish a Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC), with full legal authority to 
manage oil and gas operations in Iraq. All oil and gas operations, including the 
KRG’s PSCs, are subject to FOGC’s approval. The regional government has 
representatives in the FOGC. Under the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law the Iraqi 
National Oil Company would be established to manage oil and gas operations 
from the so-called present fields. The Draft Oil and Gas Law allows the KRG to 
manage oil and gas operations only from fields located in Annex 3, including 
signing contracts subject to the FOGC approval. The Draft Oil and Gas Law 
divided the location of the oil fields in Iraq into Annex 1, Annex 2, Annex 3 and 
Annex 4. The fields within Annex 3 is about 05% of Iraqi oilfields. The Draft Oil 
and Gas Law does not make a distinction between oil and gas operations from 
present fields, under Article 112 of the Constitution, as opposed to the future 
fields. It is heavily in favour of the centralisation of oil and gas management 
with little involvement of the regional governorates. Management of oil 
operations of present fields and future fields is a major issue in the long-
standing dispute between the KRG and IFG. The Draft Oil and Gas Law should 
have provided a substantial solution to oil and gas operations from future fields 
as the this is totally absent in the Constitution.  
The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law failed to fill up the gap caused by the 
inadequately drafted Constitution over oil and gas management within the KRG. 
Therefore, it did not change the direction of the ongoing dispute between these 
two governments over oil and gas management. The ultimate aim of the draft 
was to curb the regional government’s authority over oil and gas management. 
The Draft Oil and Gas Law only granted the regional government the right to 
manage oil and gas operations regulated by the federal law for the “discovered 
but undeveloped Fields mentioned in Annex No. 3”. The Draft Oil and Gas Law 
limited the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas operations prior to the extraction 
phase. Formulating policies and carrying out major tasks are reserved to the 
FOGC. The KRG does not have a substantial role in managing oil and gas from 
present and future fields within the KRG. In addition, all the KRG’s PSC 
concluded prior to the enforcement of the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law must 
be reviewed by a panel of independent advisors. Article 40(A) of the Draft 
Federal Oil and Gas Law provides:  
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The Designated Authority in the Kurdistan Region will take 
responsibility to review all existing Exploration and Production 
contracts with any entity before this law enters into force to ensure 
harmony with the objectives and general provisions of this law to 
obtain maximum economic returns to the people of Iraq, taking into 
consideration the prevailing circumstances at the time at which 
those contracts were agreed, and in a period not exceeding three 
(3) months from the date of entry into force of this law. The Panel 
of Independent Advisors will take responsibility to assess the 
contracts referred to in this Article, and their opinion shall be binding 
in relation to these contracts. 
 
The legality and constitutionality of the KRG’s exiting PSC will be reviewed in 
accordance with the above article of the Draft Federal Oi and Gas Law. It seems 
that insufficient weight has been given to Articles 110, 111, 112, 114, and 115 
of the Constitution in drafting the Federal Oil and Gas Law. There is no clear 
and direct constitutional provision to support the Draft Federal Oil and Gas 
Law’s approach to manage oil and gas in Iraq and KRG. The Draft Oil and Gas 
Law could not provide an acceptable legal framework for oil and gas 
management consistent with the Constitution. The Draft Oil and Gas Law has 
not been ratified since 2007 and there is no indication that it will be with the 
current concerns from the Kurds and Sunni unless it is substantially amended. 
The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law is subject to further development based on 
any future amendments to it and any future agreement between the disputed 
parties over oil and gas management.  
(e) KRG’s existing oil and gas contracts with the IOC’s  
 
The KRG has concluded over 50 PSCs with IOCs since 2002, most of which 
were concluded after the enforcement of the Constitution (only 11 were not). 
The legality of these contracts has been disputed by the IFG for their 
inconsistency with the Constitution. The KRG rejects the IFG’s argument 
regarding the illegality of its PSCs and confirmed that all its PSCs are consistent 
with the Constitution.  
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The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law seeks to review all the KRG existing contracts 
to assess consistency with the Constitution. Assessing the legality or 
consistency of the KRG’s PSC with the Constitution would be extremely difficult 
in the absence of a clear agreement between the KRG and IFG over the 
interpretation of Article 111 and 112 of the Constitution over oil and gas 
management in Iraq. Careful consideration must be given to the KRG’s existing 
oil and gas contracts in any potential future settlement between the KRG and 
IFG over oil and gas management. The KRG and IOCs have been extracting 
and exporting oil and gas from the KRG’s area based on those contracts and 
will continue to do so for at least next two or three decades. Any alteration, 
amendments or annulment of the KRG’s existing contract may cause IOCs 
financial loss. The potential issue here is how to deal with an existing PSC that 
is established to be unconstitutional, whether they will they be amended or 
nulled, who will be responsible for any potential claim by IOCs for any potential 
financial loss the IOC sustains as a result of any amendments to the terms of 
the KRG’s PSC, or the annulment of the contract. It is unclear whether IOCs 
can seek remedies from the IFG for any financial loss they suffer if the KRG’s 
PSC is found to be unconstitutional, given that those contracts were concluded 
by the KRG without any involvement and approval from the IFG and as the IFG 
has repeatedly denied the KRG’s constitutional authority over the existing oil 
and gas contracts with IOCs. Therefore, thorough consideration must be given 
to any IOC’s potential claim deriving from the amendments or annulment of 
the KRG’s existing oil and gas contracts before any decision to review the KRG’s 
existing contracts could be taken. Perhaps an advanced agreement between 
the KRG, IFG, and IOCs over the KRG’s existing oil and gas contracts may 
mitigate the legal and economic consequences resulting from reviewing the 
KRG’s existing contracts. 
However, the future of the KRG’s existing oil and gas contracts is a subject for 
further research and discussion based on the future development between the 
disputed parties. Following the KRG referendum for independence in 
September 2017 and the IFG’s attack on Kirkuk in October 2017, the KRG and 
IFG are now working on normalising their relationship. The IFG has resumed 
sending the KRG its share of the federal budget, which has been withheld since 
2014 as the dispute over oil and gas escalated.  
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(f) IOC’s perspective on the oil and gas dispute  
 
The position of both the KRG and IFG over the KRG’s right to manage oil and 
gas operations and its PRG is clear. What is unknown and unclear is the stance 
of IOCs, the contracting parties to the KRG’s PSC who practically manage oil 
and gas under the PSC. The existing literature is silent on this issue. There are 
serious legal issues over the management of oil and gas operations and 
uncertainty about the future of the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas. However, 
there is no information or evidence that the IOC has any hesitation in 
participating in the KRG’s PSC. Despite serious threats from the IFG to the IOCs 
to withdraw from, or not to engage in the KRG’s oil and gas operations, IOCs 
are actively participating in the KRG’s oil and gas business. This may explain 
the IOCs’ position over the ongoing legal and constitutional dispute between 
the KRG and IFG on petroleum operations. However, IOCs have not officially 
expressed their position over the ongoing dispute between the KRG and IFG on 
the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas operations. The researcher also found it 
difficult to obtain interviews with the IOCs operating in the country, however 
the view of the IOC’s could be extracted from the following statement of one 
of the well-known oil and gas experts in Iraq.   
Dr Ashti Hawrami, who has been a Minister of Natural Resources of KRG for the 
last 12 years and prior to that he worked as a consultant for oil and gas 
companies for many years, confirmed that IOCs would not risk their funds in 
investing in the KRG’s oil and gas sector if they were not sure about the legality 
and constitutionality of the KRG’s right in managing oil and gas operations and 
the KRG’s PSC. In his interview with the Iraq Oil Forum in August 2010, he 
confirmed that IOCs understand the Constitution and the laws of the country.  
The following is a quote from the interview:  
“Q. Were you surprised that Baghdad signed up that many contracts at a time 
when you were describing them as failures? 
A. Well the story goes like this: Iraq spent two to three years talking about 
technical service (support) agreements which were actually consulting jobs. We 
wasted so much time talking about someone giving you advice on how you 
produce 100,000 b/d, and I kept saying major companies are not consulting 
firms. At the end of the day, they found out the hard way that the oil companies 
175 
 
were not interested. Then they went to the second tier of negotiations that 
miserably failed again. At the end, it was time for the end of government and 
parliament, and they panicked, so they rushed and signed a dozen contracts left 
and centre without any real checks and balances. I’m still happy they signed 
some contracts, don’t get me wrong. It’s still better that Iraq made some 
movement somehow. But actually, there is no legal cover to those contracts, 
because they neither go with the constitution which requires local authorities 
and others to be on board, nor did they go to parliament should you want to rely 
on the old law. That’s a problem I have with those contracts. So, the contractors 
are smart people, they have legal counsel, they understand the constitution and 
they understand our laws. You can’t fool them. They are not going to put their 
precious big money there and that’s why they are now being called upon to 
hurry. They’re not going to hurry up. You can take a horse to the water; you can’t 
make it drink. The contracts have been signed, but the contractors are waiting 
for clarity: does my contract pay, does my contract stand the scrutiny of the next 
parliament, does it have legal cover? These are all hard questions and I’m quite 
certain after the formation of the government they will be asked. And we have 
to clarify them. I think the contractors deserve clarity in order to rush and spend 
their money. This is what I want”.368 
However, it is not clear on what basis Dr Hawrami provided the above 
statement.  
6.2 Recommendations  
 
The dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the management of oil and gas 
operations primarily emanates from Article 111 and 112 of the Constitution.369 
Although the political background of the dispute is undeniable, the constitutional 
arguments and illegality of the KRG’s management of oil and gas operations as 
claimed by the IFG dominated the relationship crises between Baghdad and 
Erbil. Therefore, any future settlement over the management of oil and gas will 
not be sustainable without a robust legal solution. Article 111 concerns the 
ownership of oil and gas in Iraq, while Article 112 regulates the management of 
oil and gas operations and distribution of oil and gas revenues among all regions 
and governorates in a fair manner. These two articles have been repeatedly 
referred to by both governments in their arguments as a constitutional authority 
                                                          
368 Interview with Dr Ashti Hawrami conducted by Ruba Husari in August 2010. The 
full text of the interview is available at https://www.iraqoilforum.com/?p=1979  
369 Pinar Ipek (2017) “Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub-state actors 
and challenges for Turkey's energy security”, Middle Eastern Studies, 53:3, 406-419, 
DOI. https://www.tandfonline.com  
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to support their position. It is now clear these two articles are drafted vaguely. 
They are not definite and subject to different interpretations. The political 
system in Iraq is different than before. Iraq is now a federal state, which is 
confirmed in the Constitution. The Constitution is clear on the matters in the 
IFG’s exclusive authority and those in the KRG’s exclusive authority and the 
matters shared between them. Ownership and management of oil and gas are 
not clear in the Constitution. Article 111 provides that oil and gas are owned by 
people of Iraq in all regions and governorates. The Iraqi people are now 
represented by the IFG and regional government. The article should have made 
it clear who represents the people of Iraq in terms of oil and gas ownership, as 
it is in respect of the matters are in the exclusive authority of the IFG. In relation 
to the management of oil and gas, the phrase or the wording order “extracted 
from present field” should not have been used in Article 112, or the article should 
refer to the “future fields” together with “present fields”, and all oil and gas 
operations, including exploration and development. The co-operation between 
the IFG and the regional government over oil and gas management should not 
be limited or restricted to certain times, area and operations. 
Therefore, substantial amendments are required to Articles 111 and 112. 
Amendments to these two articles are the starting point towards a 
comprehensive federal oil and gas law to regularise oil and gas management in 
Iraq and KRG. However, amending constitutional provisions is a complicated and 
difficult process. Article 126 of the constitution provides the amendment 
process. Section three of Article 126 stipulates that any amendments to the 
general issues of the constitution requires the approval of the two-thirds of 
members of the Council of Representatives, the amendment must also be 
approved by the people in a general referendum, and ratified by the President 
of the Republic within seven days.370 
Under Section four of the same article, any amendments concerning the 
limitation of the regional powers over the matters that are not within the IFG’s 
exclusive authorities are not allowed, except with the approval of the legislative 
                                                          
370 Article 126. Third: Other articles not stipulated in clause “Second” of this Article 
may not be amended, except with the approval of two-thirds of the members of 
the Council of Representatives, the approval of the people in a general referendum, 
and the ratification by the President of the Republic within seven days.  
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authority of the region concerned and by the majority of its citizens in a general 
referendum.371 The process of the constitutional amendment is lengthy and 
complicated. Hence, without an advance and clear agreement between the 
disputed parties over the constitutional amendment, it will be impossible to 
amend Articles 111 and 112. Given that the Constitution is the supreme law in 
the country, Articles 111 and 112 are the most powerful constitutional provisions 
in the formation of energy policy and the management of natural resources in 
Iraq, including the KRG. As the amendment of the constitutional provisions is a 
difficult and complicated process, the disputed parties should also have 
alternative solutions to the constitutional amendment. In the event the dispute 
parties could not agree on amending Articles 111 and 112, the whole dispute 
should be referred to the Federal Constitutional Court for settlement, specifically 
the interpretation of Article 111 and 112 of the Constitution. A unified or definite 
interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 will assist the disputed parties to come up 
with a new Federal Oil and Gas Law, and a new KRG’s Oil and Gas Law acceptable 
to both the federal and regional government consistent with the Constitution. 
The KRG may not need to enact a new oil and gas law. Instead, amending its 
Oil and Gas Law of 2007 to remove any inconsistencies with the Constitution will 
be sufficient.  
Selecting the most appropriate solution for the current oil and gas dispute or 
choosing the preferred option should be left for the disputed parties to decide. 
This is because the dispute over the management of oil and gas is subject to 
further escalation developments depends on the stability of the security and 
political situation in Iraq.  The disputed parties should choose the option which 
is most appropriate for the current situation of Iraq. Legal experts in this area 
of law should be consulted to ensure any future settlement over the 
management of oil and gas will be free of legal errors and legal challenges.  
6.2.1  Amendment of the oil and gas law of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
The Constitution is silent on the KRG’s right to develop and manage future fields 
within its territories, and the current oil and gas legislation of the Kurdistan 
                                                          
371 Article 126. Fourth: Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such 
amendment takes away from the powers of the regions that are not within the 
exclusive powers of the federal authorities, except by the approval of the legislative 
authority of the concerned region and the approval of the majority of its citizens in a 
general referendum. 
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Region is not free of criticism in terms of inconsistency with the Constitution as 
claimed by the IFG. Amending the KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 to remove the 
inconsistencies with the Constitution will effectively assist the disputed parties 
to minimise their difference regarding the constitutional dispute over oil and gas 
management.  
The KRG’s Oil and Gas Law of 2007 is considered inconsistent with the 
Constitution for the following reasons: (a) The KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 grants 
the Minister of Natural Resources huge power, including negotiation and signing 
oil contracts on behalf of the KRG. Articles 6 to 9 of the KRG Oil and Gas Law 
provide full details of the authorities the Minister of Natural Resources enjoys in 
managing oil and gas operations. the power of the Minister of Natural Resource 
in managing oil and gas is excessive, they should be reduced and transferred to 
other institutions involved in oil and gas operations within the KRG. This would 
help the KRG to move towards the decentralisation of the KRG's energy policy 
and institutionalising the petroleum policy in the KRG. The decentralisation and 
institutionalisation of the oil and gas sector in the KRG is crucial and an effective 
method of reducing corruption in petroleum operations in the KRG. After the 
constitutional disagreement, corruption is the major barrier preventing the 
disputed parties from reaching a settlement. Therefore, any action reducing the 
level of corruption within oil and gas management will reduce the tension 
between the disputed parties and subsequently take the settlement process a 
step forward. In doing so, the KRG may benefit from the Norwegian model, in 
which the power to manage oil and gas have been split between a national oil 
company, the ministry, and a regulatory body.372 It is accepted that there are 
other institutions in the KRG involved in oil and gas management and policy 
formulation, but the power exercised by the Ministry of Natural Resources under 
the current oil and gas law is excessive and can be exploited and abused for 
personal gains.373 
(b) It is argued by the IFG that the KRG’s PSC are so favourable to IOCs that 
they do not achieve “the highest benefit for the people of Iraq” as stipulated by 
                                                          
372 Thurber, Mark C. & Hults, David R. & Heller, Patrick R.P., 2011. "Exporting the 
"Norwegian Model": The effect of administrative design on oil sector performance," 
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pp. 5366-5378, September. 
373 Chraxan Rafiq, the ex-wife of the Ashti Hawrami the Minister of Natural Resources 
in Kurdistan.  
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the Constitution. New articles should be added to the KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 
to establish an independent commission comprising of oil and gas experts to 
review the KRG’s existing contracts to ensure that “the highest benefit” is 
achieved. If reviewing the KRG’s existing oil and gas contracts triggers potential 
claims by IOCs against the KRG and make the reviewing of the existing contracts 
impossible, then the independent commission should oversee any future 
contract to ensure oil and gas contracts “achieve the highest benefit for people 
of Iraq”. This would positively impact on resolving the dispute. 
 
(c) Article 43 of the KRG Oil and Gas Law 2007 grants the Minister of Natural 
Resources power to waive sovereign immunity in legal proceedings and the 
enforcement of judgments. Sovereignty is reserved for the IFG. Therefore, 
Article 43 should be removed so it does not contradict the constitutional 
provisions. 
The above recommendations are effective factors to reduce the tension and 
disputed points between the KRG and the IFG over the constitutional 
inconsistencies and would assist them to resolve this long and complicated 
dispute.  
6.2.2 Enactment of the Federal Oil and Gas Draft Law  
co-operation between the IFG and KRG is a cornerstone for a strong petroleum 
policy and to manage oil and gas effectively to achieve “the highest benefit” for 
people of Iraq as stipulated by the Constitution. The dispute over oil and gas 
has continued for more than 15 years and contributed to corruption, lack of 
transparency in oil and gas contracts and revenues, and mismanagement of 
revenue. For a strong management system for oil and gas operations consistent 
with the Constitution, the dispute must be settled between the parties and a 
federal oil and gas law must be enacted. Iraq does not have legislation to 
manage oil and gas, which has created legal challenges for the IFG to effectively 
manage oil and gas. A federal oil and gas law will close the current gup in oil 
and gas law in Iraq. The disputed parties should agree on amending the current 
Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law or draft a new Federal Oil and Gas Law reflecting 
the current political, economic, and social developments in Iraq, while 
consideration must be given to the fact that the KRG has been running oil and 
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gas operations on its own for the last 20 years. Therefore, in any future 
settlement over oil and gas management or in any potential federal oil and gas 
law in Iraq, the KRG must actively participate in oil and gas management. This 
will persuade the KRG to co-operate with the IFG over oil and gas management.  
 
 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion  
6.3.1 Brief Overview 
 
This research examined the extent to which the Iraqi Federal Constitution 
grants exclusive rights to KRG to manage the oil and gas operations 
within KRG’s territory. It examined both positions of KRG and the 
Federal Government over the oil and gas activities in the region. Clarity 
on this question is needed for both parties and also investors in this 
strategically important sector in the country. This chapter provides the 
main conclusions this research has achieved. It starts with an overview of the 
historical background of the oil and gas dispute between the IFG and the KRG 
and how the dispute has developed, ending in a military confrontation between 
Baghdad and Erbil in 2017. The chapter then provides the examination of the 
constitutional issues that have dominated the legal arguments in this long-
standing dispute between the Iraqi IFG and the KRG over the management of 
oil and gas. The thesis has examined a number of primary sources and first-
hand legal documents to answer the research questions and achieving its 
objectives. The chapter further analyses the legal and non-legal barriers 
preventing the disputed parties from reaching an agreement over the 
management of oil and gas operations in Iraq. The chapter outlines the 
contribution the research makes to the literature in this area of law, particularly 
as the thesis touches some legal issues in this dispute which have not been 
covered by any previous studies. It finally provides the recommendations for 
the disputed parties to follow to resolve this complicated legal dispute. The 
chapter provides areas for further research.  
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6.3.2  Historical significance of the oil and gas dispute in Iraq  
 
The chapter two highlighted the history of oil and gas operations in Iraq and 
how they have been managed from when oil was first discovered to the present 
day as an important part of this study, enabling the reader to understand the 
current conflict between the Kurds, represented by the KRG, and Arabs, 
represented by the IFG. It showed that oil has always played a crucial role in 
Iraq’s economy and is the main source of the country’s income. It demonstrated 
that since the establishment of Iraq in 1920, Kurds have struggled for self-
determination or/and independence. They have always claimed that they have 
been stuck to Iraq by force. Before 1991, the city of Kirkuk was known as a city 
of oil and most of the Iraqi oil comes from Kirkuk. There has been a long-
standing dispute between Kurds and Arab over the identity of Kirkuk. The Kurds 
have always claimed that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and therefore it has to be part 
of the Kurdish territories, which has always been one of the primary demands 
by the Kurds in all negotiations regarding the Kurd’s self-determination or 
independence and always rejected by Baghdad. Kirkuk has been the most 
complicated political issue between the Arab and Kurds throughout the ongoing 
ethnic conflict and remains unresolved. The primary reason for both Baghdad 
and Erbil not to compromise on Kirkuk is petroleum. Petroleum revenues makes 
up over 80% of the country’s income.374 The country’s reliance on oil and gas 
revenue may explain why it is so difficult for the disputed parties to reach an 
agreement on oil and gas management. During the peace negotiations in the 
1960s, the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani demanded 33% of the Iraqi oil 
revenue for Kurdistan. This figure was based on the percentage of the Kurdish 
population at that time and that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city and its oil revenue 
should be returned to them.375 Article 140 of the Constitution provides that the 
dispute over Kirkuk and other disputed territories between KRG and the IFG 
                                                          
374 Trtworld, Iraqi parliament approves 2018 budget of $88 billion. May 2018. The full 
text is available at https://www.trtworld.com/mea/iraqi-parliament-approves-2018-
budget-of-88-billion-15646  
375 Majid Khadduri. Republican Iraq “A study in Iraqi politics since the revolution of 
1958”. Published by Oxford University Press, 1969.  
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should have been resolved through a referendum by 31 December 2007.376 The 
timeframe lapsed but the dispute over Kirkuk remains unresolved.  
6.3.3  The Kurdistan Regional Government and oil and gas management between 
1992 and 2003 
 
Following the First Gulf War in 1991, the Kurds gained control over large areas 
in Iraq populated by Kurdish people for the first time. The KRG was established 
in 1992 as a semi-autonomous government. The KRG had no national or 
international recognition and there was no formal relationship between the KRG 
and the former Iraqi regime. Following the war in 1991, the UN imposed 
economic sanctions on Iraq, including Kurdistan. The KRG began searching for 
oil and gas within the territories under its control and developing the fields that 
were found but undeveloped before. In 1994, the KRG declared extracting oil 
from Taq Taq oil field.377 The extracted oil was for local use until 2003 and then 
exported to outside through the neighbouring countries of Iran and Turkey.378 
This was the first time in the history of Iraq that Kurds began managing oil 
operations independently without any direct or indirect involvement of the 
central government. Further searches for oil were made and more oil fields were 
developed. Between 1994 and 2003, the extracted oil was exported to 
neighbouring countries by tankers. The KRG managed to persuade a few IOCs 
to get involved in the KRG’s petroleum operations during that time. The KRG 
concluded the following oil and gas contracts: 
(e) Taq Taq  
a. PSA - Genel Enerji - 20/01/2004 
b. Taq Taq: PSA Attachments - Genel Enerji - 2002  
c. Taq Taq: PSA - Genel Enerji - 2002 
(f) Tawke  
a. PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004 
                                                          
376 Ofra Bengio. “Jerusalem of the Kurds: Kirkuk and the Kurdish strategy for 
independence”. Tel Aviv Notes. Vol 11, No 11. 29 June 2017. The text is available at 
https://dayan.org/content/jerusalem-kurds-kirkuk-and-kurdish-strategy-independence   
377 Robin Mills. “Under the mountains: Kurdish oil and regional politics”. The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies. January 2016. The full text is available at 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kurdish-Oil-and-
Regional-Politics-WPM-63.pdf  
378 Ibid 
183 
 
(g) Shakal  
a. PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
(h) Pulkhana  
a. PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
The former Iraqi regime was aware of the KRG’s oil and gas activities, but issued 
no formal or informal objections, even against the neighbouring countries for 
purchasing the KRG’s oil and gas. In 2004, following the formation of the new 
Iraqi government, the KRG was confronted by the newly formed Iraqi 
government that it did not have a right to manage oil and gas operations within 
its territories, oil and gas operations must be managed in co-operation with the 
central government. The KRG’s PSC with Norway’s company DNO on 25 June 
2004 heated the tension between the IFG and the KRG over the management 
of oil and gas. The IFG publicly expressed its opposition to the KRG’s right to 
manage oil and gas.379 Despite the opposition from the IFG the KRG continued 
managing oil and gas operations and it increased its efforts to persuade IOCs to 
invest in the KRG’s oil and gas operations. The dispute and tension over the 
management of oil and gas between the KRG and IFG continued until the 
enforcement of the Constitution in 2006 when the dispute entered in a new 
phase of the so-called constitutional war, where constitutional provisions have 
dominated the dispute. Chapter two of this thesis provides a detailed history of 
oil and gas dispute between Baghdad and Erbil and how the disputed has 
developed over the last 15 years.  
 
6.3.4  The dispute over the key constitutional articles over the management of oil 
and gas in Iraq  
Following the enforcement of the Constitution, in 2006 the dispute between the 
KRG and IFG over the management of oil and gas triggered a constitutional 
battle. Chapters three and four of this research provide a critical examination of 
the constitutional arguments forwarded by both governments over the KRG’s 
                                                          
379 David l. Phillips. The Kurdish Spring: A new map of the Middle East. 2017. The full 
text is available at https://books.google.co.uk/books  
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right to manage oil and gas operations and analysing the legality of the KRG’s 
PSC under the constitutional provisions.  
The constitution deals with oil and gas in two separate articles, Article 111 and 
112. Article 111 of the Constitution deals with oil and gas ownership in Iraq. 
Article 112 deals with the management of oil and gas extracted from the 
“present fields” and with revenue distribution.  
 
6.3.4.1. Ownership of oil and gas under the Constitution 
Article 111 provides that: “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all 
the regions and governorates.” The issues with oil and gas ownership have been 
discussed in Chapter three in detail. Article 111 is unclear as to whether the IFG 
has the exclusive ownership right over oil and gas operations as a sole 
representative of the people of Iraq.  
The KRG argues that under Article 111 of the Constitution the KRG as a 
representative of the Kurdish people, who are part of the Iraqi people, is 
entitled to exercise the ownership right over oil and gas within the KRG’s 
territories. The IFG opposed the KRG’s interpretation of Article 111. The KRG 
mainly relies on the Legal Opinion from Professor Crawford who argues that  
First, there is the stipulation of Article 111, that “Oil and gas are owned 
by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates”. This must 
be read in the context of Article 112: the “ownership” of the people of 
Iraq is without prejudice to the “management” of oil and gas, either by 
the federal government “with” the relevant producing region in the case 
of oil and gas extracted from “present fields”, or by the producing 
regional government in the case of oil and gas, pre- or post-extraction, 
from all other fields, including those currently (i.e., at the time of the 
entry into force of the Constitution) not producing.380  
The opinion of professor Crawford lacks legal authority and therefore, it is not 
binding on the disputed parties. It is his own interpretation of Article 111 of the 
Constitution, providing that the Iraqi Federal Court of Constitution is the only 
                                                          
380 Professor James Crawford. The authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
over oil and gas under the Constitution of Iraq, 2008. The full text is available at 
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/publications/57-the-crawford-opinion.  
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competent authority to interpret the Constitution.381 Article 111 is vaguely 
drafted and accordingly it would be difficult for the disputed parties to rely on 
this article as a confirmation of ownership rights over oil and gas. This is for 
two reasons, first there is no formal interpretation of this article from the 
Federal Constitutional Court and secondly, there is no constitutional provision 
on who could act on behalf of people of Iraq in managing oil and gas operations. 
Practically, the IFG has been exercising ownership rights over oil and gas since 
the 1920s, with an exception to oil and gas within the KRG for the period from 
1992 until the present. The KRG have been exercising ownership rights over oil 
and gas within its territories since 1992.  
The concept of ownership under the Iraqi Civil Code No.41 of 1951 and in Sharia 
Law is provided in Chapter three of this thesis. Sharia Law is a foundation source 
of legislation and no law may be enacted contradicts the establishment of 
provision of Islam. Article 2. First (A) provides “Islam is the official religion of 
the State and is a foundation source of legislation: A. No law may be enacted 
that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.”  
Therefore, the concept of natural resource ownership in Sharia Law is relevant 
in examining the constitutional dispute between the IFG and KRG over oil and 
gas ownership. However, Article 112 of the Constitution provides that the IFG 
in co-operation with the regional government and producing governments 
manage oil and gas operations. Article 112 provides how oil and gas operations 
should be managed. This will explain how the ownership rights over oil and gas 
could be exercised. Therefore, Article 111 and 112 are strongly connected to 
each other on the management of oil and gas operations in Iraq. Nevertheless, 
like Article 111, Article 112 is not free of legal issues. 
 
6.3.4.2. Management of oil and gas under Article 112 of the Constitution 
Article 112 and its implications on oil and gas management has been critically 
examined in great details in Chapters four and five. The concept of the 
management of oil and gas under Article 112 is vague and confusing. Article 
                                                          
381 Article 93: The Federal Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the following:  
  Second: Interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.  
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112 refers to the extracted oil and gas from the present fields. It does not cover 
oil and gas operations at the exploration and development phase, and it does 
not refer to oil and gas operations from the future fields, the fields which have 
been discovered and/or developed after the enforcement of the Constitution in 
2006. There are three primary issues with Article 112. First, the present fields 
mean the fields in operation at the date of the constitution came into force. 
Second, it only covers the extracted oil and gas. Third, the management of the 
extracted oil and gas from the present fields must be in co-operation with the 
regional government and the producing governorates. The point needs to be 
noted here that the dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the management 
of oil and gas is only over the management of oil and gas operations within the 
KRG’s territories.  
In addition to the management of oil and gas operations, the IFG argues that 
the KRG’s PSCs are not consistent with the Constitution. The IFG’s concerns 
about the terms of PSC which are so generous to IOCs that it does not meet the 
requirement of “to achieve the highest benefit for the people of Iraq” as is 
stipulated by Article 112, and under PSC the IOC acquires ownership of oil and 
gas. The Constitution does not allow foreign ownership of oil and gas. Article 
111 provides that oil and gas are owned by the people of Iraq. The previous 
Iraqi constitution clearly prohibited the foreign ownership of oil and gas. 
Following the invasion of Iraq, the Order 39 of the Coalition Provision Authority 
(CPA) provided a friendly investment to the foreign company,382 but did not 
allow the foreign ownership in petroleum, banking and insurance. The 2006 
Investment Law of Iraq provides the same treatment to the foreign companies 
that the national companies enjoy, excluding petroleum.383 
Investing in petroleum operations within the KRG’s territories requires huge 
capital, technology, and technical expertise, moreover, exploration and 
development of oil and gas from the area within the KRG is considerably new 
compared to those within the IFG’s territories. There was no accurate data about 
oil and gas reserves within the KRG. Therefore, IOCs would not invest in the 
                                                          
382 The full text of the CPA is available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20031220_CPAORD_39_Foreign_Investment_.pdf 
383 International Trade Administration. Legal Guide to Investing in Iraq. Prepared by 
the Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 2008. It was last updated on 25 August 2015. 
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KRG oil and gas if the terms of its PSC were not generous. IOCs must gain some 
benefits in return for the risk they take in investing in the KRG’s oil and gas, 
especially the risk of losing their contracts with the IFG. The IFG threatened 
IOCs with losing their contracts with the IFG if they did not abandon their 
contracts with the KRG.384  
The dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the KRG’s right to manage 
oil and gas within its territories and model contract has been going on for 
about 15 years. Despite many meetings, negotiations, or even the military 
confrontation, the dispute has not been resolved. The Federal Oil and Gas 
Law has been drafted and sent to Iraqi parliament for ratification. The 
purpose of the Federal Oil and Gas Law was for one law to regulate the 
management of oil and gas across Iraq. The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law 
has been criticised by Kurds, Sunni, Academics and others over the power 
the Law grants to the IFG in managing oil and gas. The Draft Federal Oil 
and Gas Law grants great power to the IFG while the power of the regional 
authorities is limited. Under the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law, all oil and 
gas contracts concluded by the federal authority and the KRG must be 
approved by the Federal Oil and Gas Council within 30 days from the date 
the contract was initially signed. In Chapter four and five the concerns and 
criticism over the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law were evaluated against 
the principle of decentralisation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution.  
The Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law was first prepared in 2006. It was 
modified by Maliki’s government before sending it to parliament for 
ratification in February 2007. It faced strong criticism by the Kurds and 
Sunni, which forced the IFG to make further amendments in 2011. The 
amendments made to the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law in 2011 did not 
bring substantial changes to the previous draft, therefore, the 
disagreement between the disputed parties over the Draft Federal Oil and 
Gas Law continues. The IFG does not have a new oil and gas law. Oil and 
gas operations are still managed under the former Iraqi government’s 
petroleum regime.  
                                                          
384 ExxonMobil blows Iraqi oil politics apart. PERTOLEUM ECONOMIST. 
https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-
east/2011/exxonmobil-blows-iraqi-oil-politics-apart  
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6.3.4.3 Significance of the results of the dispute  
The legal dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the management of oil and 
gas and the legality of the KRG’s PSC is politically motivated. The political 
conflict between the Kurds and the IFG over a century made the current legal 
dispute difficult to resolve. The IFG must understand the structure of new Iraq 
is different from Iraq before 2003. The legal system in Iraq must be a reflection 
of the politically developed system. The IFG must work towards the 
decentralisation of power, including the power to manage oil and gas operations. 
However, the decentralisation of oil and gas management must not undermine 
the sovereignty of Iraq nor promote corruption in oil and gas operations. 
Decentralisation must not be exploited for personal gains.   
6.3.5  Contribution to literature 
 
As far as the author is aware, this study is the first PhD regarding the legal 
dispute between the IFG and the KRG over the management of oil and gas and 
the legality of the KRG’s PSC. This study has filled the gaps left by previous 
literature in this area of law. The legal issues in this dispute are relatively new. 
Therefore, there was little knowledge and expertise in this area of law when the 
dispute started. The disputed parties mostly relied on foreign expertise as a 
legal authority to support their interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution. This study will benefit the disputed parties in understanding the 
legality of the dispute and the possible resolution over the management of oil 
and gas and the future of the KRG’s PSC. The study made the following 
contribution to the relevant areas of the literature.  
6.3.5.1 Historical background of Iraq’s oil and gas regime  
This study is the first research to provide a detailed historical background of the 
petroleum regime in Iraq. The knowledge of the history of petroleum regimes 
in Iraq is crucial to understand the legal aspect of the current dispute between 
the IFG and the KRG. The current textbooks by Rex J. Zedalis, The Legal 
Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq 2009, Claims against Iraqi Oil and Gas Legal 
Considerations and Lessons Learned 2010, Oil and Gas in the Disputed Kurdish 
Territories 2012, and the other works referred to in this study have not covered 
the history of oil and gas operation to the extent that this study has. Chapter 
three of this study provides how oil and gas agreements were first made in Iraq, 
189 
 
and then how oil and gas contracts and oil and gas regimes developed between 
the 1920s and now. Analysing the terms and clauses of oil and gas contracts in 
Iraq shows that the terms and clause of the contracts reflected the political, 
economic, and legal situation of that period. This explains the effect of the 
current political, economic, and legal situation of the KRG in shaping the KRG’s 
oil and gas policy and why its PSCs are so generous to IOCs.  
6.3.5.2 The constitutional issues of the oil and gas dispute  
The study provides a thorough examination of the relevant constitutional 
provisions concerning oil and gas operations in Iraq, particularly the 
implementation of Articles 111 and 112 on oil and gas management from 
different dimensions. For the first time, this study considered the position of the 
Iraqi Civil Code No. 40 of 1951 and the stance of Sharia Law in analysing the 
concept of oil and gas ownership in Iraq as is referred to by Article 111. Previous 
literature limited the examination of these two articles to the disputed parties’ 
interpretation or their own understanding of these two articles. This study is the 
only literature that provides that the Federal Constitutional Court is the only 
authority to interpret the constitution and its decision is binding. Any other 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions is not binding and lacks legal 
authority. This study further provides that the Constitution provides only general 
guidelines on oil and gas management, therefore, further federal legislation is 
required to regulate oil and gas operations in line with the Constitution.   
 6.3.5.3 Contribution to the disputed parties  
Chapter five of the thesis provides findings and recommendations to benefit the 
disputed parties by providing them with different dimensions from which to view 
the dispute and to have a neutral understanding of the legal issues associated 
with the dispute over the management of oil and gas operations. The disputed 
parties must accept that the constitutional provisions, i.e. Articles 111 and 112, 
are drafted vaguely. The ambiguity over the ownership and the management of 
oil and gas has made the legal issues in this dispute more complicated. Articles 
111 and 112 are the most controversial issues in this dispute. It is recommended 
in Chapter five that the disputed parties must agree on a definitive interpretation 
of Articles 111 and 112. Alternatively, these two articles either must be 
amended to remove the ambiguity over oil and gas ownership and management, 
or the matter should be referred to the Federal Constitution Court for a legally 
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binding interpretation of these two articles. The Federal Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of these two articles should be the starting point for any future 
agreement between the parties or for the potential Federal Oil and Gas Law. As 
the KRG has concluded more than 50 PSCs  and these contracts have managed 
oil and gas for over 15 years and will continue for the next few decades, it is 
recommended that any attempt to void these contracts or amend them for 
reasons of inconsistency with the Constitution must be considered carefully 
against the potential claims from IOCs against the KRG or IFG for financial 
remedies. Unless the KRG’s PSC contradict serious constitutional provisions such 
as state sovereignty, amending the KRG’s PSC for not achieving “the highest 
benefit for people of Iraq” may trigger potential claims from IOCs for 
compensation. Accordingly, the gain and loss must be considered properly in 
advance.    
6.3.6  Areas for further research 
 
There are many areas which this study cannot cover, especially new legal, 
regional and constitutional developments which may occur in the future. There 
may be new developments in the IFG and the KRG’s relationship which will 
impact the direction of the current dispute over oil and gas management. Future 
legal and constitutional developments are subjects for further research. The 
possible future developments in the oil and gas dispute would be the role of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in this dispute. It is possible for the disputed parties 
to engage with the court in seeking a formal interpretation of the relevant 
articles of the Constitution, or the full determination over the management of 
oil and gas operations. Another development is possible amendments to the 
Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law in order to have it passed by the Iraqi parliament. 
These possible developments will require proper investigation to identify their 
implication on the management of oil and gas operations in Iraq.  
The recent attack on the city of Kirkuk and most disputed areas in October 2017 
caused the dispute over oil and gas management to enter a new era. There have 
been recent meetings and negotiations between the KRG and the IFG in respect 
of oil and gas management. It is not clear how long the new negotiations will 
take and what the possible outcome would be. It would be difficult to expect the 
terms of any future settlement between the KRG and IFG over the long-standing 
191 
 
dispute and its impact on normalising their relationship, given that negotiations 
have been going on for the last 15 years between these two governments 
without any substantial progress. Therefore, further research is required 
regarding the possible outcome of the new round of negotiations and their 
impact on the oil and gas regime in Iraq as a whole, and the KRG’s PSC in 
particular.  
 
 
6.3.7 Final Conclusion  
 
Chapter Two demonstrated the legal frameworks for oil and gas operations 
throughout its history in Iraq. This is specifically from the 1920s, when oil was 
first discovered, until 1972 when oil was fully nationalised by the Iraq 
government. During that time petroleum operations were regulated under the 
concession agreements.  The terms of those concession agreements were more 
favourable to the IOCs than those under the KRG’s PSC. Under the concession 
agreement petroleum operations were fully controlled by the IOCs. The Iraqi 
government did not have any management control over the petroleum 
operations during the first three decades of oil production. In 1950s the Iraqi 
government demanded an amendment to the concession agreement terms 
through which Iraq could have more management control over oil operations 
and to gain more profit from oil revenue. The Iraqi government’s request for re-
negotiation of the concession agreements was due to pressures from the 
nationalist groups in Iraq at that time, otherwise, the Iraqi government was 
relaxed about the fact the IOCs were in full control of the management of 
petroleum operations in Iraq. The current management powers the IOC’s 
exercise in managing the oil and gas operations under the KRG’s PSC, are far 
less than those the IOCs exercised under the concession agreements. The 
question here is why the Iraqi government was so relaxed about the IOC’s 
management of petroleum under the concession agreements but is now so 
concerned about the KRG’s management of oil and gas operations under the 
current Federal Constitution. This is while KRG is formally recognised by the 
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Federal Constitution of 2005 as a regional government, and the KRG only 
manages the oil and gas operations within its territories.  
 
The interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution, specifically the phrase 
“present fields” has been translated by the KRG and other experts and 
academics to mean the fields that were discovered and were in operation at the 
date of enforcement of the new Iraqi Constitution. This is literally correct, but 
the Federal Constitutional Court may have a different view of the ‘present fields’, 
as it had regarding the interpretation of Article 140 of the Constitution. Article 
140 concerns the disputed territories between the IFG and the KRG. The second 
part of Article 140 provides that “The responsibility placed upon the executive 
branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the 
Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive 
authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it 
accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their 
citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007”. Under this article 
the disputed territories should have been resolved through a referendum by 31 
December 2007. There have been arguments among the Iraqi political parties 
especially between the Kurds and Arabs, regarding the validity of Article 140 
over the status of the disputed territories between the KRG and IFG since it 
passed its implementation deadline of 31 December 2007. The Iraqi Parliament 
made a request to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court to interpret Article 140 of 
the Constitution and whether it is still valid. In July 2019, the Federal Supreme 
Court ruled that the Article should remain in effect until the implementation of 
its provision385, despite the implementation deadline of the Article expired, but 
its validity remains in effect. “The Court affirmed that the date specified in the 
implementation of Article 140 does not affect its essence.”.386 Therefore, it is 
possible the Federal Supreme Court may have a different interpretation of the 
terms “present field” from those of the disputed parties.  
                                                          
385 Sangar Ali. Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court: Article 140 on disputed areas “remains 
in effect”. Kurdistan 24. 2019. the news is available at 
https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/226048ed-a0b6-4374-8001-62358c319f52  
386https://ekurd.net/article-140-disputed-areas-2019-07-30  
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Giving the unpleasant and inhuman treatment of the former Ba’athist regime 
towards Iraqi people, especially, Kurds and Shai, it would be very difficult for 
the Kurds to accept transferring oil and gas authorities to the IFG. The new 
Constitution is carefully drafted to ensure the decentralisation of power in Iraq. 
The power must be shared between central government, regional government 
and all governorates, especially the economic powers, to prevent the creation 
of another dictatorship in Iraq. That was agreed between all political parties 
from the Kurds, Shia and Sunni during the process of drafting the Constitution 
of 2005 with effective presence of the Coalition force, especially the USA played 
effective roles in that regards387.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
387 Michael F. Fitzsimmons. Centralization or Decentralization in Iraq? In Search of the 
Elusive Sweet Spot. INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. December 2008. Full text is 
available at https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/c/ce/centralization-or-
decentralization-in-iraq-in-search-of-the-elusive-sweet-spot/d-3702.ashx  
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Annex 1 Interview Questions  
 
Questions for the individuals in the IFG 
Key Questions 
• Do you think the KRG’s PSC is legal in accordance with the Iraqi 
constitution?  
• What is the legal basis for the central government’s arguments in respect 
of the KRG’s right to manage oil and gas within its territories? 
• What is the core of this dispute between the central government and the 
KRG over oil and gas contracts? 
• Since this dispute over oil and gas is a legal one, why has this legal matter 
not been referred to a competent Iraqi court, the Federal Constitutional 
Court? 
• Who has the right to receive the oil revenue and re-distribute it between 
the Iraqi people in accordance with the law?  
Follow-up questions  
• What is the current position of the Iraqi government towards the KRG’s 
PSCs signed with the International Oil Companies? 
• What is the legal framework the KRG should adhere to in dealing with oil 
and gas activities, including signing contracts with IOCs, within its 
territories in accordance with the federal constitution? 
• You may be aware that the draft of the Hydrocarbon Law was completed 
in 2007, which has been adopted as a solution to the dispute between 
the KRG and the Iraqi government over oil and gas issues. The 
Hydrocarbon Law has not been enacted since then. Do you know why this 
law has not been enacted during the last nine years? 
• Does the current political situation in Iraq have any impact on the way 
this matter has been dealt with by the central government, if so how? 
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• Does the Iraqi government have any plan to bring this matter to the end?  
 
Bonus questions  
• As you know, the KRG has signed over 50 PSCs with IOCs and this has 
been going on during the last decade. In the event the Iraqi government 
and the KRG have reached an agreement on this matter what will happen 
to those contracts, in terms of their legalities?  
• Can the terms and clauses of the KRG’s PSC be amended or modified to 
make them compatible with the Iraqi constitution? 
• As far as you know, what is the IOC’s legal basis to sign PSCs with the 
KRG? Is it due to the favourable clauses in the PSCs or is there legal 
basis? 
 
Questions for the individuals in the Kurdistan Regional Government 
• Do you think the KRG’s PSCs are legal, or constitutional? 
• If you believe they are constitutional, can you explain how and what are 
the relevant law and regulation to support this? 
• Why the Iraqi government states the KRG PSCs with IOCs are not 
constitutional? What are their legal arguments? 
• What law or regulation regulates or governs oil and gas activities, 
contracts, selling and exporting, in the KRG? 
• Does the current KRG oil and gas law consistent, or compatible with the 
relevant Articles of the Iraqi constitution, (i.e. Article 111, 112, 115)? 
Follow up questions 
• What is the relationship between the KRG and the Iraqi government? 
• What law regulates the relationship between the KRG and the Iraqi 
government? 
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• What are the devolved powers to the KRG in accordance with the federal 
constitution? 
• How did the KRG come to the decision to carry out oil and gas business 
on its own without approval from the central government? 
• The KRG has signed nearly 50 PSCs with IOCs, what is the legal basis for 
these contracts in accordance with the Iraqi and KRG law? 
• Why there are two different interpretations for the same articles of the 
federal constitution, the articles concerning oil and gas? 
• Who has the right to interpret the law and constitution in Iraq? Does the 
KRG have the right to interpret the Iraqi constitution? 
Bonus questions 
• If you believe that the KRG has acted in accordance with the Iraqi 
constitution in dealing with oil and gas within its territories, what is/are 
the legal authorities for this? 
• The dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi government has been going 
on for a decade and no settlement has been reached on this matter. Why 
this dispute has not been referred to an Iraqi court, who has jurisdiction 
in this matter, or an international court? 
• What are the law and regulations regulating oil and gas revenue? 
• We understand that it has been for a decade that the KRG has been 
exporting the oil and recently gas to the international markets. What has 
happened to oil and gas revenue? Does the KRG return oil and gas 
revenue to the central government? If not, why not? 
• What is your suggestion to resolve the current dispute between the KGR 
and Iraqi government over the KRG PSCs?  
Questions for the individuals in political parties 
• Are you familiar with the controversial dispute between the KRG and Iraqi 
government over the legality of the KRG’s PSCs with IOCs? 
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• Do you think this is a legal problem, or it is a political problem, but the 
legal issue is presented as a tool of this fight between the parties? 
• What is the core of the problem? 
• What deters the parties for not referring this matter to a legally 
competent authority, i.e. Iraqi national court or international court, for 
settlement? 
• Do you think the KRG PSCs are constitutional? If yes how, if not, why 
not? 
• Do you think the KRG’s interpretation of Article 112 is right, or the Iraqi 
government’s interpretation is right? Or none of them?   
 
Questions for academics  
• Do you think the PSC is compatible with the current, or previous Iraqi oil 
and gas law, or current/ former Iraqi constitution? 
• Has ever this type of oil and gas contract provided to IOCs in Iraq, prior 
to those of the KRG? 
• Are the clauses of the KRG’s PSCs compatible with the Iraqi constitution, 
the KRG’s constitution, the Iraqi oil and gas law, the KRG oil and gas law, 
the Iraqi Investment Law and the KRG Investment Law? 
• Do you think the KRG PSCs are constitutional? If yes how, if not, why 
not? 
• What are the legal authorities in support of your answer? 
Follow up questions 
• Is there any academic research so far on this topic? 
• Was there any national or international conference on the legal dispute 
between the KRG and Iraqi government over the KRG PSCs with IOCs? 
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• You may note that there is not much national, or even international 
literature on this topic? Why do you think that is?  
• What has been noticed during the last decade in respect of this dispute is 
the lack of the national and international courts’ involvement in this 
matter. Why do you think the parties do not want to refer this matter to 
the courts for settlement? 
• Is there a similar dispute anywhere else in the world? If there is any, 
what are the similarities with the situation in Iraq 
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Annex 2 Interviews 
 
Interview with Dr. Bayazid. who had been a member of oil and gas 
Committee of the Iraqi Parliament for two terms, from 2006 to 2014. 
The interview was recorded with Dr Bayazid’s consent. 
There are different types of questions and some of the questions are for the 
individual from the Federal Authorities. Because you are from the Iraqi 
Parliament, I will ask the questions for the Federal Government. 
Questions. Do you think the KRG’s PSCs are legal under the Iraqi Constitution? 
Answer: Because Iraq does not have an Oil and Gas Law. The Iraqi people voted 
for the Constitution in 2005. The separation of powers is confirmed in the 
Constitution. The Parliament, Executive and Judiciary are separated. The Iraqi 
Constitution recognised the Kurdistan Region and its authorities. Therefore, the 
authority for managing Oil and Gas must be separated.   
The first part of Article 112 of the Constitution provides that the federal 
government, with the producing governorates and regional governments should 
manage oil and gas from the current fields. provided that its revenue is 
distributed in a fair manner and a specified portion the revenue should be for 
the regions damaged by the former regime.  
So, do you think the KRG’s contracts are legal.? 
I think it is Article 130 of the Constitution provides that all existing laws should 
be remain in force unless they are annulled or amended in accordance with the 
Constitution. I think it is Article 117 of the Constitution recognises the KRG as 
a federal region. I also think that Article 141 of the Constitution states that all 
the legislations enacted by the KRG and contracts signed from 1992 until 2005, 
are valid. Therefore, the KRG’s PSC are legal under the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law.  
 
Question 2: What is the legal basis for the IFG claims that the KRG’s Oil and 
Gas contracts are illegal.  
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Answer: Not legality, because there is not Oil and Gas Law in Iraq. Iraq has 
constitution and Article 112 of the Constitution provides that the IFG, with the 
producing governorates and regional governments should manage oil and gas 
from the current fields. The authority to manage oil and gas must be shared 
between the IFG and the KRG. Accordingly, the IFG has some authority and the 
KRG should be given some authority to manage oil and gas.  
Question 3: What is the centre of the dispute between the IFG and the KRG over 
the KRG Oil and Gas Contracts? 
Answer: There are two model oil and gas contracts in Iraq. The type of the 
model contract will differ based on the place for searching oil, if it is easy and 
cheap to find oil or not, if the host country has enough funds and technical 
expertise to develop oilfields. Iraq so far help four rounds of bidding. the first 
round was for the developed oilfields were producing oil, the second round was 
for the developed oilfields and were about producing oil, the third rounds was 
for the fields for Gas, the field of Sibay near Basra, Majnoon field near Dyallah 
and Ukaz field near Rumdia, and the fourth round was for 12 Blocks only 4 of 
them were contracted out. these contracts were heavy contracts. The IFG uses 
Service Contract because extracting oil from the Federal oilfields are easy and 
cheap, while the KRG uses the PSC. the essence of the Service Contract is the 
host country pays fixed rate pbr to the IOC. The IOC gets $1.39 pbr for 
extracting oil from Majnoon oilfield and $1.93 pdr from Rumila oilfield and in 
addition to that the IOC will recover the expenditure for developing the oilfield 
from the oil revenue. While the under the KRG oil contract the IOC will spend 
all cost for searching oil and if the oil was not discovered the IOC will not recover 
the funds spent for searching oil, but if the oil was found then the IOC will 
recover the cost for searching oil from the produced oil.  
There are 189 financial system for oil contracts. I have a book which in English 
confirms that there are 189 financial systems for oil contracts. In the Kurdistan 
10% of the oil revenue goes for Royalty payment. the remainder is 90%. 40% 
of the that 90% will go to the IOC to repay the cost of the oil, the money the 
IOC spent for searching and developing oil. The rest of the revenue will be 
divided between the IOC and the KRG on the basis of the R factor. 30% for the 
IOC and 70% for the KRG if the R factor is 0-1. 15% for the IOC and the 85% 
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for the KRG if the R factor is 2. the R factor is the oil revenue divides the 
expenditure. In addition to that the KRG will get the profit for the its 25% in the 
produced oil. The KRG have 25% with the IOC.  
 
Question 4: The dispute between the IFG and the KRG is a legal dispute ( Dr. 
Bayazid it is a constitutional dispute) Why this dispute so far has not been 
referred to a competent court when settlement has not been reached by the 
disputing parties.  
Answer: There is a Federal Constitutional Court which was established at the 
time of the Bremer.388 Following the Establishment of the Iraqi Parliament, the 
Federal Constitution Court should have been rearranged. The draft law for re-
arranging was prepared and first reading for that law was done in Parliament, 
the barrier for processing this law was the members staff of this court. There is 
a suggestion that the court should consist of 7 Judges, one Sharia exert and one 
legal expert. There is another suggestion that there should be 9 Judges, 2 Sharia 
experts and 2 legal experts. The Shia wants to have a voice in the Court and 
the Kurds as well wants to be protected, because they are minorities so they 
want to have a like veto vote to be able to block any potential law which would 
put Kurdish interest at risk. The Court established at the time of Bremer and it 
is under the influence of a specific side in Iraq.  
 
(Brzoom: that means the Kurds think the Court is not independent).  
Dr Bayazid: Yes, Kurds do not think the Court is independent. The problem is 
there is no trust between the Iraqis. Kurds do not trust others, Shia and Sunni, 
and they also do not trust Kurds. There is an Iraqi politician says the Shia is 
afraid of the past because they were deprived of everything in the past and they 
do not want that to be repeated, Sunnis afraid of the future because the rules 
Iraq from 1920 until 2003 and they do not know what will happen to them in 
the future, but Kurds afraid of both, the past and the future, because they did 
                                                          
388 Lewis Paul Bremer (born September 30, 1941) is an American diplomat. He is best known for leading the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, from May 
2003 until June 2004 
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not have anything in the past and they afraid if they be deprived of the things 
they have now.  
Question 5: Who has the right to receive oil and gas revenue in accordance of 
the law? 
Answer: Not law, the Iraqi Constitution states that oil and gas revenues from 
regions and governates should go to the Central government and from there it 
should be redistributed in a fair manner.  
اد 
Question 6: What is the current Iraqi government’s stance towards the KRG’s 
oil and gas contracts with the IOC. 
Answer: During the first terms of the Iraqi Parliament when Shahrstani was the 
Minister of Oil, he was always against the KRG Oil and Gas contract and did not 
recognise them. However, during the second terms from 2010 to 2014, the IFG 
demanded the KRG to return oil and gas revenues to the IFG in Baghdad. That 
means impliedly recognised the KRG’s contracts  
Brzoom: but there is not any officially documents or decision from the IFG 
confirming that it recognises the KRG’s contracts.  
Dr. Bayazid: There is nothing to confirm that, there are verbal agreement in 
2010 and in 2015. they agreed on that that the KRG’s oil and gas revenue must 
be returned to the IFG in Baghdad. That was an implied recognition of the KRG’s 
Oil and Gas contracts, but the problem was the IFG wanted all KRG oil and gas 
revenues to be returned to the Central government, but it did not pay the IOC’s 
funds. The IOC payments paid from the Federal Budget, but the IFG said the 
KRG must pay the IOC’s payments from the its share of 17%.  
.  
Questions 7: Is There a Federal Oil and Gas Law. 
Answer: No, there are three Federal Oil and Gas Law. The First was is called the 
Law of February 2007 which was agreed by the KRG and IFG and was sent to 
the Council of Ministers for review. The Council instead of reviewing the law, it 
made substantial changes by which more power was given to the IFG. Because 
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of the amendments the KRG does not accept amended Law. the second one was 
the Kurds and Sunni agreed on new draft of the Federal Oil and Gas Law. Oil 
and gas Committee are 16 members, 11 members participated in the meeting. 
Nine members voted for the draft to be passed for its first reading in Parliament. 
I was reading the said law and I reached Article 26 the Shias said they were not 
aware of the draft and therefore, the reading of the draft should be postponed 
for one week to allow them to go through the draft. The Speaker of the 
Parliament was Osama Nujayfi, he postponed the meeting for one week. A few 
weeks passed then the Shia returned to Parliament with a new draft which was 
prepared by them. They said the one prepared by them should be reading 
Parliament. The Problem with draft prepared by Shai was that it gave too much 
power to the IFG and reduced the KRG’s authority in managing oil and gas. 
There the Kurds and some of the Sunnis did not agree with the Shai’s draft. 
Therefore, there are three different draft of the Federal Oil and Gas Law in the 
Iraqi Parliament. The parties have not been agreed on one draft.  
Questions8: Does the Iraqi government has a plan to settle this problem? 
Answer: The Iraqi government wants to pass a law which gives more power to 
the central government and reduce the KRG’s authority and that is against the 
Iraqi Constitution. The Shai and Sunni they think like before the 2003 and that 
does not work.  
(Kurdish version of interview) 
 یڵاس ەل لوخ وود یەوام ۆب قرێع ینامەلرەپ ەل زاغ و توەن یەنژيل یمادنەئ ديزەياب .د ڵەگەل نتوەکێپواچ ن٢٠٠٦  ات٢٠١٤  
ەنتوەکێپواچ مەئ یندرکرامۆت ۆب ەوترگرەو مديزەياب .د یدنەمازەڕ. 
 ەو نکێشەب دنەچ مناکەرايسرپ ديزەياب .د زێڕەب ەل کێدنەـه یەوەئرەبەل تشيبانەج .یدنەوان یتەموکح ەب نتەبيات ناکەرايسرپ
یدنەوان یتەموکح ەبنتەبيات ەکمەکەئ ەنارايسرپ وەئ تيقارێع ینامەلرەپ یمادنەئ ەک. 
١.  یتەموکح یناکەيتوەن ەتسەبێرگ ەک ەياوتێپناتسدروک یمێرەـه قارێع یروتسەد یێپ ەب نياساي  
 :مڵاەو یەوەئ رەبەل اتشێـه ەل ەو ،ەووچەنرەد زاگ و توەن یاساي٢٠٠٥ روتسەد یێپ ەب ەو اردێپ یگنەد قارێع یروتسەد
 ەو .ەوەتەوارکايج یرەوداد و ندرکێجەبێج ،ناناداساي یناکەتڵاەتسەدەورەـه ەب ەوانيناد یمسەڕەب یقارێع یروتسەد اـه یمێرەـه
ب تەبيات یتڵاەتسەد ەو ادڵارديف یکێقاريع ەل ادناتسدروکیيۆخ ە ەوەتێرکبايج شيزاگ و توەن یتڵاەتسەد تێبەد ەوەئ رەبەل .ەوادێپ  
 یەدام ەل مەکەي یشەب١٢  اتسێئ ەک یەناتوەنەريب وەل زاگ و توەن یندربەوێڕەب تێڵەد یقارێع یروتسەد ی یشەبوگەب تێبەد نەـه
 یتەموکح و ڵارديف یتەموکح ناوێنەل تێيبەناگزێراپ وەئ ودناتسدروک یمێرەـهاد ەک یەجرەم وەب ەيادێت نايتوەن ەک ی یتاـه
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هـاتی نەوت و گاز تەرخان بکرێت بۆ ئەو نەوت و گاز بە يەکسانی بەسەر دانيشتوانی عێراقدا دابەش بکرێت وە بڕێک لە دا
 .پارێزگانەی کە لە جەنگدا زەرەرۆمەند بوون
 . ن ياسايی بنهـەرێمی کوردستاکەواتە پێتوايە گرێبەستە نەوتيەکانی حکومەتی 
هـەرێمی کوردستان کە پێش دەستوری نوێی عێراق دارچوون س دەستورە کە دانی بەوەدا ناوە کە ياساکانی ٠٣١پێموابێت مادەی 
هـەرێمی کوردستاندا ناوە وەک ی دەستور دانی بە ٧١١هـەڵدەوەشێنەوە. وە مادەی هـەموار دەکرێنەوە يان تا کاريان پێدەکرێت تا 
 . مێکی فيدراڵهـەرێ
 ٥٠٠٢تا ساڵی  ٢٩٩١هـەموو ئەو ياساو گرێبەستانەی کە لە ساڵی ی دەستورە کە دەڵێت  ١٤١هـا پێموابيت مادەی هـەروەوە 
هـەرێمی کوردستان بە پێی ياسای نەوت و دەرچوون لە ڕوی ياسايەوە تەواون وە لەبەر ئەوە گرێبەستە نەوتيەکانی حکومەتی 
 . ـەرێمی کوردستان ياساينهگازی حکومەتی 
 . هـەرێمی کوردستان ناياساينپرسياری دووەم; ئەساسی قانونی حکومەتی ناوەندی چيە کە دەڵێت گرێبەستە نەوتيەکانی حکومەتی 
دەڵێت بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و  ٢١هـەيە. دەستريش مادەی وەڵام: ياسايی نە، چونکە لە عێراقدا ياسای نەوت و گاز نيە. دەستور 
هـەرێم و ئەو پارێزگانەی هـاوبەشی بەێت لە نێوان حکومەتی ناوەندی و حکومەتی هـەنە دەبێت بە ز لەو کێڵگانەی کە ئستا گا
هـاوبەش بێت يانی دەستەڵاتەکە دەبێت دابەش بکرێت. هگاز دەبێت کە نەوتيان تێدايە. يانی دەستەڵاتی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و 
  . هـەرێمهـەندێکيش لای حکومەتی ی حکومەتی ناوەندی بەێت وە هـەندێک لە دەستەڵات لا
 
 . هـەرێم چيەهـەرێم و حکومەتی ناوەندی لەسەر گرێبەستيە نەوتيەکانی حکومەتی پرسياری سێيەم: ناوەرۆکی کێشەی حکومەتی 
 
و زۆری نەوت لە شوێنەکە وە توانای هـەيە لە عێراقدا. جۆری گرێبەست بە پێی کەمی وەڵام: دوو جۆر گرێبەستی نەوتيمان 
مادی و تەکنيکی دەگۆڕێت. عێراق تا ئێستا چوار دەورەی گرێبەستی کردوە. يەکەميان تايبەت بوو بەو کێڵگانەی کە نەوت 
ن بوو، هـێنانەوە. خوولی سێيەم بۆ کێڵگە گازيەکاهـەم هـەم دێنن. خوولی دووەم تايبەت بوو بەو کێڵگانەی کە نزيکن لە بەربەر
کێڵگەی گازی سيبەی کە لە بەسرە نزيکە وە کێڵگەی گازی مەنسوريە لە ديالە وە کێڵگەی گازی عەکز لە ڕوماديە. خوولی 
بلۆکيان درا بە کۆمپانيا نەوتيەکان چونکە گرێبەستەکان قورس بوون. عێراق  ٤هـا بلۆک وە تەن ٢١چوارەم تايبەت بوو بە 
هـەرێم گرەبەستی شەيرين کۆنتراکت، لەبەر ئەوەی لە عێرقدا نەوتەکە بە بەڵام حکومەتی  گرەبەستی سێرڤس کۆنتراکت دەدات،
هـەر هـەمدێنێت وە بۆ ئاسانی دەردێت. ئەساسی گرێبەستی سێرڤس کۆنتراکت ئەوەيە کە کۆمپانيايەکی بێگانە دێت نەوت بەر
هـەر بەرميلێک هـێنەر بۆ هـەم مەجنون کۆمپانيای بەربەرميلێک بڕێکی دياری کراو کرێ وەردەگرێت. بۆ نمونە لە کێڵگەی 
 ٣٩.١هـاتو هـەن هـەر بەرميلێک نەوتی بەردۆلار وەردەگرێت، وە لە کێڵگەی ڕومێلەی شيمالی بۆ  ٩٣.١هـاتو هـەمنەوتی بەر
نەوتيەکەدا لە حکومەتی عێراقی  دۆلار وەردەگرێت وە لەسەرو ئەوەشەوە ئەو پارەی خەرجی کردوە لە بەرەو پێشبردنی کێڵگە
هـەرێمی کوردستان ئەگەر نەوتی هـەرێمی کوردستان کە کۆمپانيايەک دێت بۆ نەوت دەگەرێت لە وەردەگرێتەوە. بەڵام لە 
می هـەرێهـيچ وەرناگرێتەە لە حکومەتی هـەموو ئەوە پارەی خەرجی کردوە لەگەڕان بە دوای نەتدا دەڕوات و نەدۆزيەوە ئەوا 
هـەموو ئەو پارەی خەرجی هـەرێمی کوردستان پارەی نيە بيداتەوە، بەڵامئەگەر نەوتی دۆزيەوە ئەوا کوردستان چۆنکە حکومەتی 
  هـەمووی وەردەگرێتەوە لە بەهـێنانی نەوتدا هـەم کردوە لە گەڕان بە دوای نەوت و بەر
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 ٩٨١ئەوە کتێبێکم لايە بە زمانی ئينگليزيە کە باسی ئەوەدەکات کە  هـەيە بۆ گرێبەستی نەوتی.سيستەمی مالی  ٩٨١تەبعەن 
% ی پێيدەوترێت ڕۆياڵتی واتە حقوقی ٠١هـێنرێت لە هـەيە بۆ گرێبەستی نەوتی. لە کوردستان ئەو نەوتەی دەردەسيستەمی مالی 
هـاتووی نەوت کۆمپانياکە هـەم بەر % ی پارەی٦٣% بۆ کۆست ۆف ۆيەڵە يانی ٠٤% لە ٠٩مولکيە ئەوەی دەمێنێتەوە، ئەو لە 
% ٠٣%، لە ٤٥هـێنانی نەوت. چەندی دەمێنێتەوە لە هـەم هـەڵی دەگرێتەوە بۆ ئەو پارەی کە سەرفی کردوە بۆ دۆزينەوەە بەر
ر. ڕ فاکتەر هـەرێم. ئەمە پێيدەوترێت ڕ فاکتە% شی بۆ حکومەتی ٠٧هـێنەر وە لە % دەچێت بۆ کۆمپانيای وەبەر٤٥ئەوە لە 
هـاتووی نەوت لەسەر کۆی پارەی سەرفکراو. ئەگەر بێت و ئەو ڕ فاکتەرە لە سفرەوە بۆ يەک بێت هـەمواتە کۆی پارەی بەر
% بۆ کۆمپانياکە وە ٠٣هـەرمێدا هـەمی نەوەت دابەشدەکرێت لە بەينی کۆمپانياکەو حکومەتی % ی پارەی ماوەی بەر٤٥ئەو 
% بۆ ٥١% دابەشکردنەکەی دەگۆڕێت بۆ لە ٤٥ئەوا  ٢هـەرێم. بەڵام ئەگەر ڕ فاکتەرەکە گەيشتە شی بۆ حکومەتی ٠٧لە 
% لەگەڵ کۆمپانياکە بەشدار ٥٢هـەرێم بە ڕێژەی هـەرێم. بێجگەلەوەش حکومەت % ی بۆ حکومەتی ٥٨کۆمپانياکە وە لە 
 . هـەندەێک پارەی تری بەردەکەوێتدەبێتواتە لەوێش 
 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی ناوەندی ناکۆکيەکی ياسايە ( د. بايەزيد ناکۆکيەکی دەستوريە). دکتۆر ئەم ناکۆکيەی نێوان پرسيار: کاک 
  . هـەبێت لەم بابەتەدا، کاتێک خۆيان ناتوانن ڕێکبکەونبۆچی تا ئێستا نەيان بردوەتە بەردەم دادگايەک کە ئيختيساسی 
ە تايبەتە بە کێشەدەستوريەکان. ئەم دادگايە لە سەردەمی بريمەردا دروستکرا، لە دوای هـەيە کوەڵام: لە عێراقدا دادگای فيدراڵی 
دروستبوونی پەرلەمان دەبوايە سەر لەنوێ تەشکيل بکرايەتەوە ، مسوەدەی قانونی دانراوە وە خوێندنەوەی يەکەميش بۆ کراوە 
هـێکی بن فەقی ٩هـەيە دەڵيت ستافح مەحکەمە دەبێت نێک لە پەرلەمان بەڵام ئەوەی بوەتە کێشە لەسەر ستافی مەحکەمەکەيە. بۆچو
هـی قانونی وە لايەنی فەقی ٢هـی شەريعەو فەقی ٢ئەندامبن  ٣١هـەندێکی تر دەڵێن دەبێت هـەبەت. هـێکی قانونی شەريعەو فەقی
هـەبێت ێت ئێمە دەبێت جۆرێک لە ڤيتۆمان هـەبێت. ئەوە لەلايەک لە لايەکی تر کورديش دەڵشيعە دەڵێن دەبێت ئێمەش دەنگمان 
لە بڕيارێک لە مەحکەمەی فيدراڵی دەرنەچێت دژ بە بەرژەوەنديەکانی کورد بێت. ئێستا ئەم مەحکەمە لەسەردەمی بريمەر 
  هـەتێکی سياسی بەڕێوەدەچێتدروست بووە مەحکەمەيەکی موسەيەسە بە گوێرەی ڕاکانی جی
حکەمەکە بێلايەن بێت)، (د. بەيەزيد، بەڵێ کورد پێی وانيە بێلايەن بێت). کێشەکە ئەوەيە کە (برزوم: يانی کورد پێی وانيە مە
هـەيە. کابرايەکی سيسی قسەيەکی جوان دەکات دەڵێت شيعە لە متمانەنيە، نە کورد متمانە بەئەوان دەکات نە ئەوانيشمتمانەيان 
هـيچيان بەدەست نەبووە، سونە لە وکيان. چونکە بۆ شيعە لە ڕابردوو هـەردهـاتوو کورديش لە ڕابردوو دەترسێت، سونە لە دا
هـاتووش هـيچی بەدەست بووە وە دەشترسێت لە داڕابروو بەدەستياب بووە بەڵاملەدەستيان چوو، وە کورديش نەلەڕابردوو 
  .وايلێبکرێتەوە
  يت؟هـەيە کە ڕڤينيۆی نەوت وەربگرپرسيار: بە پێی ياسا کێ مافی ئەوەی 
هـەرێم و پارێزگاکان بچيتەوە مەرکەز، هـەموو هـاتی وەڵام:ياسا نيە، بە پێی دەستورە. دەستوری عێراق دەڵێت دەبێت دا
 .مەرکەزيش بە پێی ژمارەی دانيشتوانی پارێزگاکان دابەش بکرێتەە
 . هـەرێم لەگەڵ کۆمپانيا بيانيەکانی پرسيار: مەوقيفی ئێستای حکومەتی عێراقی چيە دەربارەی گرێبەستە نەوتيەکانی حکومەت
هـرستانی وەزيری نەوتی عێراقی بوو دائيمەن دانی بە گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی وەڵام: لە خوولی يەکەمی پەرلەمان کە شە
 هـەرێمبوو حکومەتی عێراق دەيگووت دەبيت حکومەتی  ٤١٠٢تا  ٠١٠٢هـەرێمدا نەدەنا. بەڵام لە خوولی دووەمدا  کە لە 
  هـەرێمهـاتی نەوت تەسليمی حکومەتی ناوەند بکات تەقريبەن ئيعترافێکی زمنی بوو بە گرێبەستەکانی دا
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هـيچ شتێکی ڕەسمی نيە، وەرەقەيەکی ڕەسمی نيە لەلايەن حکومەتی عێراقيەوە کە بڵيت ئێمە ئيعتراف ئەکەين بە برزوم: بەڵام 
  . هـەرێمداگرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
هـەرێم هـاتی نەوت و گازی حکومەتی کە دەڵيت دا ٥١٠٢، ئەو ئيتيفاقەی ٠١٠٢هـەيە، ئيتيفاقی : نەڵيت، بەڵام ئيتيفاق د. بايەزی
هـەيە حکومەتی هـەرێم. بەڵام يەک شت دەبيت بێتەوە حکومەتی ناوەند ئەمە ئيحترافێکی زمنيە بە گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
هـەرێم دەکات بەڵام ئامادەنيە پارەی ئەو کۆمپايانە بدات کە نوەت دەردێنن لە ی حکومەتی عێراقی داوای پارەی نەوت و گاز
هـەموو ساڵێک بڕێک پارەلە بوجەی عێراق تەرخان دەکريت بۆ ئەو کۆمپانيايانەی کە نەوت دەردێنن لە عێراق، کوردستان. 
% ی کە ٧١رەی کۆمپانيا نەوتيەکان بدات، واتە لەو لە هـەرێم دەبێت لەبوجی خۆی پابەڵامی حکمەتی عێراق دەڵێت حکمەتی 
  .بۆی دياری کراوە بيدات
 . هـەيەپرسيار: کاک دکتۆر ياسايەک 
هـەرێم و بەغدا لەسەر ئەو ياسايە ڕێکەوتن بەڵام دوای حکمەتی  ٧٠٠٢وەڵام: نا سێ ياسايە، ياسايەک پێی دەڵين ياسای شوباتی 
ەنی شورا، ئەنجوومەنی شورا لەجياتی ئەوەی سەيری لايەنی قانونی بکات جووە دەستکاری حکمەتی عيراقی ناردی بۆ ئەنجووم
هـەرێم دەڵيت ئيعتراف بەو نەسخەناکەم.  ئەوە هـەرێمی کەمکردوەتەوە لەبەر ئەوە حکمەتی جوملەکانی کردوەو دەستەڵاتەکانی 
کان ڕێکەوتن لەسەر مسوەدەی قانونی نەوت و گاز، لەپەرلامانی عيراق کوردەکان و سنە ٢١٠٢يەک، دوای وابزانم ساڵی 
کەس دەنگی بۆدا لە خوێندنەوەی يەکەمی بۆ  ٩کەس کۆبونەوەکەمان کرد ١١کەسە  ٦١کەسە لەو  ٦١ژوری نەوت و گاز 
شيعەکان ووتيان کەوا ئەوان  ٦٢بکرێت. خوێندنەوەی يەکەمان بۆ کرد من دەمخوێندەوە لەکاتی خوێندنەوەی گەشتمە مادەی 
هـەيە لە ليژنەی نەوت و گاز وە ئاگايان لێی بوو، بەڵام ووتيان ئاگامان ليينيە ئەنداميان ٩بۆ ٨گايان لەێی نيە، تەبعەن شيعەکان ئا
هـەفتەيەک دوابخرێت بۆ ئەوەی شيعەکانيش ئاگاداربن. دوای جژنی وە سەرۆکی پەرلەمانيش ئوسامە نوجەيفی بوو ڕێگەی دا کە 
هـێنا ووتيان دەبێتئەو قانونە هـەفتەی ڕۆشت پاشان شيعەکان قانونێکی تازەياب  ٣ات دوا جەژنی قوربانيش هـقوربانی بەسەردا 
بخوێنرێتەوە. ئەو قانونەش دەسەڵاتی حکمەتی ناوەندی زۆر کردبوو وە دەسەڵاتی کوردی کەمکردبوەوە لەبەر ئەوە کورد و تا 
هـەيە بۆ نەوت و گاز وە تا ئيستا ڕێکەوتن نەکراوە ئێستا لە پەرلەمان سێ ياسا رادەيەکيش سونە بەو قانونە تازە ڕازی نەبون.  
 کە کام ياساين خوەندنەوەی ياک و دووی بۆ بکريت و بخريتە دەنگدانەوە
 . هـايا چارەسەری ام کێشە بکاتپرسيار: کاک دکتۆر حکمەتی عێراقی پلانی 
ئەو دەرچيت کە دەسەڵاتەکانی حکمەتی ناوەند زياد بکات وە دەسەڵاتی وەڵام:  حکمەتی عيراقی دەيەوێت ياسايەک بە دلی 
 ٥٠٠٢هـەرێمکامبکاتەوە ئەوەش دژ بە دەستورە. لايەنی عێراقی لە شيعە و سونەن زۆربەيان بە عقڵيەتی پيش حکمەتی 
 .بيردەکەنەوە وە ئەوەشنابيت
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 eht fo rekaepS ehT ,qidaS demmahoM fesuY .rD htiW 2 weivretnI
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Answer: Well, some of the KRG’s Oil and Gas contracts have not been 
announced therefore, I cannot comment on them and there are some problem 
which I will come to that, however, principally, in accordance with the 
permanent constitution of Iraq the KRG has a right to manage oil and gas from 
the fields have been discovered, or will be discovered, after the enforcement of 
the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. The management will cover all oil and gas 
operations, including the contracts for exploration, development and exporting 
to the International market for sale. In accordance to the Iraqi Constitution, I 
think Article 108, 109 and 110 the management of the developed and producing 
fields prior to the enforcement of the Constitution must be shared between the 
IFG and KRG. (Brzoom, under Article 112 of the Constitution, yes that is right), 
and the management of Oil and Gas is not one of the exclusive authorities of 
the IFG. therefore, the KRG has a right to manage oil and gas operations from 
the fields which have been discovered after 2005.  
Question 2. Dr Yousif, the Iraqi Government states the KRG’s Oil and Gas 
contracts are not legal and constitutional. What is the legal basis for the Iraqi 
Government’s claim that the KRG’s Oil and Gas Contract are illegal and 
unconstitutional? 
Answer: I do not know really what their legal basis is, you need to ask them 
that question, but they are talking about some issues in their writings, they 
compare their Oil and Gas contract, which is a Service Contract, to those of the 
KRG, which is PSC, they are talking about those things, but from the legal point 
of view, the KRG’s Oil and Gas contract in general are legal. However, there are 
problems with the transparency about the way the KRG contracts concluded and 
the revenues and there are problems with some contracts for example the 
contract with the Dana Gas which was signed and concluded in April 2004. The 
problem is about the area of the contract which is the field of Kormor. The 
Kormor field was discovered by the former Iraqi regimes before 2003 and 
accordingly this field was discovered prior to the enforcement of the Constitution 
of 2005. The KRG is in constitutional crises if it signed the contract with Dana 
Gas without the co-operation with the IFG. Therefore, in exceptional 
circumstances there are problem with the KRG’s Oil and Gas contract and there 
are problems with management of oil and gas revenues, but generally the KRG 
208 
 
has a right to manage oil and gas operations from the fields discovered after 
the enforcement of the 2005 Constitution.  
Question 3: Does the law oblige the KRG to get approval from the IFG before 
signing the contract. I mean the KRG could negotiate and agree on the terms 
and clauses of oil and gas contract, but it must obtain the IFG’s approval before 
signing the contract.  
Answer: First, Iraq does not have oil and gas law, the KRG has an oil and gas 
law. What regulate the relationship between the KRG and IFG over oil and gas 
management is the Iraqi Constitution. The Constitution regulates the 
management of oil and gas as I said above. The KRG must co-operate with the 
IFG in managing oil and gas from the fields discovered prior to 2005, for 
example the oilfields in Kirkuk like Baba Gurgur, Havan and Bai Hassan, which 
were discovered by the former Iraqi remiges (before 2003) the KRG or the 
Kirkuk governorate must co-operate with the IFG in managing these fields, but 
a field which has been recently discovered such as Niran field or Kurdamir field 
or Taqtaq or others which have been discovered after the enactment of the 
Constitution of 2005, the KRG has right to manage them alone in accordance 
with the Constitution. These newly discovered fields are regulated by the 
Constitution, there is no Federal Oil and Gas law. The newly discovered fields 
within the KRG are regulated by the Iraqi Constitution and the KRG’s Oil and 
Gas Law. There are some problem with enforcing the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law, 
because the Law requires the establishment of a number of the state companies 
like a state company for marketing oil and gas and a state company for 
managing oil and gas revenues and a company which is responsible for the oil 
refinery and oil infrastructures, we manage to pass a law concerning oil and gas 
revenue, but unfortunately due to the suspension of the Parliament the law was 
not enforced. The draft of two laws were ready for COMO and CODO, but they 
were not completed due to the suspension of the Parliament. It is right that 
there are problems with enforcing the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law, but there are no 
issues with the KRG towards the IFG over the management of oil and gas 
operation from the fields discovered after 2005 except the circumstances I 
referred to before.  
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Question 4: Dr Yousif, the KRG states that under Article 112 of the Constitution 
the KRG has a right to manage oil and gas in accordance with the regional law. 
What is the KRG law to manage oil and gas? 
answer: It is the KRG Oil and Gas Law of 2007. Oil and gas Revenue Law is also 
passed, but the box has not been set up yet.  
Brzoom: Is the KRG Oil and Gas Law consistent with the Federal Constitution? 
Dr Yousif: I think and also some International experts in Oil and Gas law believe 
the KRG Oil and Gas Law is consistent with the Constitution, there is not a 
serious issue. The PSC, which I am not personally with it, is more consistent 
with investment policy provided by the Constitution, I cannot remember the 
article, which was designed by the Americans. I may not personally agree with 
the PSC, but it is more consistent with the Constitution than the TSC. 
Question 5: Under the PSC the IOC will gain ownership of the extracted oil. Does 
the Constitution allow the foreign ownership? 
Answer: I will read that text for you from the Federal Constitution with is about 
the management of oil and gas. Article 112 Second: The federal government, 
with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together 
formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a way 
that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced 
techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment.  
The IOC prefer the PSC, as I said before I am personally not with PSC and as a 
researcher during my PhD I criticised this type of contract that the PSC provides 
more profits to the IOC while extracting oil in the Kurdistan is more easier than 
the place the PSC is generally signed for like offshore oil and gas where 
searching and extracting oil and gas is difficult and expensive, while in the 
Kurdistan is much easier and cheaper to have a commercial discovery. Legally 
and Constitutionally there is no problem with the PSC, but in term of profits and 
revenue, they are good for IOCs and provide less profit and revenue for the host 
country. I explained in my PhD thesis that the model contracts the KRG used 
will gradually, like dominos, enforce the neighbouring countries to follow the 
KRG to use the same model of contract. I think it was in the four rounds for 
biding the Iraqi Government was under pressure to grant IOC more favourable 
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clauses in order to compete the KRG and Golf countries will gradually follow the 
same route in the future. therefore, the issue in term of the Constitutional is 
different from public interest point of view.  
Brzoom: The Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) attempted to use the PSC in 
Iraq after the invasion with the intention to persuade the IOC to come and invest 
in Iraq, but the Iraqis did not accept that on the basis that the PSC is against 
the Constitution. The former Constitution of Iraq did not allow the foreign 
ownership in property, natural resource, Insurance and Banking. I do not know 
if the current Iraqi Constitution allows the foreign ownership in those things, 
and after the invasion the Iraqi government did not allow the PSC to be used in 
Iraq. 
Dr Yousif, as I said before the Constitution drafted during the CPA, sorry the 
TALL was drafted and valid during the CPA but this matter wad fully 
considered.in addition to that the American expert played crucial role in drafting 
the new Iraqi Constitution. The Constitution drafted in a way allows the IOC to 
invest in Iraq. Therefore, the spiritual of the Constitution is not inconsistent with 
that type of the contract, the PSC, but there is a nationalist movement in Iraq 
from the day oil nationalised in Iraq and that movement still continue and these 
people believe that there should not be PSC and they only support the TSC.  
Question 6: Why there is difference in interpreting the Constitution between the 
IFG and the KRG?  
Answer: I said that I said that was related to the way of thinking. the Iraqis 
think the PSC is not in the best interest of the Iraqis, but in the KRG’s view, if 
we do not have PSC, this is what the KRG Minister of Natural  confirmed, if the 
KRG do not use PSC it cannot persuade the IOC to invest in the Kurdistan. 
Despite the Central Government’s objection, IOCs still invest in the KRG’s oil 
and gas sector because of the PSC.  
Question 7: Who has the right to interpret the Constitution in Iraq? 
Answer: The Federal Court has jurisdiction to look at the lawsuits concerning 
constitutional issues, but the Federal Court has not been re-established under 
the new law, in order to interpret the Constitution or even to settle lawsuits 
concerning constitutional matters.  
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Question 8: In every dispute over the civil matters the dispute parties will first 
attempt if they could settle the dispute, if the dispute could not be settled 
between the parties then it has to be referred to a competent authority for 
determination. The dispute between the KRG and IFG over the management of 
the oil and gas operation has been going on for more than 10 years without 
settlement, In Iraq as you said the Federal Court is the right authority settle 
this matter. Why the disputed parties have not referred this dispute to the 
Federal Court yet.  
Answer: This means that the IFG is not certain if they could win the case 
otherwise, they would have taken this matter to the Federal Court. They are not 
sure if the KRG’s PSC is illegal or unconstitutional. therefore, they are not sure 
if they win the case. It is not only us believe the KRG’ has a right to manage oil 
and gas, there are international experts who believe the KRG has a right to 
manage oil and gas unilaterally. I mentioned that in my PhD thesis. Professor 
James Crawford is one of the International Law experts, who believes the KRG 
has a right to manage oil and gas from the fields discovered after 2005 without 
co-operation with the Federal Government.  
Question 8: Do not you think the unwillingness of the KRG to take this dispute 
to the Federal Constitutional Court is because the KRG concerns about the 
impartiality of the Court due to its establishment in terms of the its members.  
Answer: The KRG does not need to take this dispute to the Court, because it is 
now exporting its oil to the outside, The IFG is the complainer in this matter, 
they should take the dispute to the Court. The IFG has now cut the KRG share 
of the budget and has not sent the KRG’s share from the budget.  
Question 9: If there is hesitation to take the dispute to the Federal Constitutional 
Court in Iraq, why they disputed parties have not taken this dispute to the 
independent international court outside Iraq? 
Answer: The dispute parties play politics over this matter. The IFG has exploited 
the dispute over oil and gas and used it a s reason for cutting the KRG’s share 
from the federal budget. At the same time the KRG has exploited the situation, 
as the IFG has not taken any further action against the KRG, to export oil and 
gas as by its own and deals with the revenue as it wants. Both sides of the 
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dispute do not have intention to settle and they do see their interest in 
settlement. it is not in the KRG to settle this dispute, because KRG does not 
want to export its oil and gas through SOMO under the IFG’s control. It is not in 
the IFG’s interest to allow KRG to export its oil and gas and to give the KRG the 
17% share of the Federal budget. therefore, they do want a mediator to help 
them to settle the dispute.  
Question 10: What law regulates the relationship between the KRG and IFG? 
Answer: There is no law, it is the Constitution. the Constitution regulates the 
relationship between them.   
Question 10: Can the KRG do something inconsistent with the Federal Law or 
the Federal Constitution?  
Answer: No, it cannot do something contrary to the Federal Constitution. in 
respect of the Federal Law, Article 121 of the Constitution state that, I will 
read the text for you. “First: The regional powers shall have the right to 
exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this 
Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive 
authorities of the federal government.”  
That is first and second Article 115 of the Constitution state that “ All powers 
not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to 
the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a 
region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government 
and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions 
and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.”. Under Article 
115 if there is contradiction between the regional law and the Federal law 
the priority is for the regional law, if the contradiction is not in matters in the 
exclusive authorities of the IFG, but if the contradiction occurred in the 
matters in the IFG’s exclusive authorities then the priority if for the Federal 
law. 
Question 11:  Article 112 of the Constitution allows the KRG to manage oil 
and gas, but it has to be in co-operation with the IFG. 
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Answer: I will read Article 112 for you. It state “First: The federal 
government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, 
shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, 
provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the 
population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for 
a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of 
them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards 
in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, 
and this shall be regulated by a law.”  
Under this article managing oil and gas from the fields discovered up to the 
date of the enforcement of the Constitution must be shared between the KRG 
and the IFG, but the Constitution is silent on the fields discovered after the 
enforcement of the Constitution. Therefore, there is nothing in the Article 
112 to oblige the KRG to co-operate with the IFG in managing oil and gas 
from a field discovered after the enforcement of the Constitution.  
 
Question: There is a Federal Oil and Gas Law at the Iraqi Parliament since 
2007. That law has been drafted with the aim to resolve the problem between 
the KRG and IFG over the Oi and Gas management. The Federal Oil and Gas 
Law has been with the Parliament for over 10 years, but it has not been 
ratified yet. Why the Federal Oil and Gas Law has not been ratified so far? 
Answer: Because there is disagreement between the Kurds and Arab over 
that Law. Agreement reached a few times, but sometimes the KRG changed 
its mind and sometime Arab changed their mind, therefore, final agreement 
has not been reached so far.  
Question 12: Another problem between the KRG and the IFG is over oil and 
gas revenues. Before I ask my question. Can I ask who is the owner of oil 
and gas within the KRG’s territories? The Constitution vested oil and gas 
ownership in the Iraqi people. The Iraqi government represent the Iraqi 
people, is not it?  
Answer: It is Article 111 of the Constitution which states that “ Oil and gas 
are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”. 
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Based on that it could be interpreted that oil and gas revenues should be 
returned to the IFG and then re-distributed between all governorates.  
Question 12: Does the KRG return oil and gas revenue to the IFG? 
Answer: Not just it does not return oil and gas revenues to the IFG, even in 
the KRG there is not transparency in oil and gas revenues.  
Question 13: Based on the non-transparency in oil and gas revenues in the 
KRG, does not the Iraqi government, as a representative of all Iraqi people, 
has a right to interfere in stopping the KRG to export its oil and gas and 
suspending all KRG’s oil and gas contract? 
Answer: It does not have right to suspend the KRG oil and gas contract, but 
it has right to get the KRG’s oil and gas revenues and in return the IFG must 
pay the KRG’s 17% share from the federal budget. Article 112 states that 
“provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the 
population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for 
a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of 
them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards 
in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, 
and this shall be regulated by a law.” 
  
Accordingly, oil and gas revenues must be returned to the IFG, and the IFG has 
a right to demand oil and gas revenues from the KRG, and the IFG must re-
distribute the revenues in accordance to Article 112 and must pay “specifying 
an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly 
deprived of them by the former regime”, these areas are mostly in Kurdistan. 
In exercising that right, the IFG cut the KRG’s share of the 17% from the Federal 
budget for not getting oil and gas revenues from KRG. The KRG’s share of 17% 
is more than the KRG’s oil and gas revenues. 
 
Question 14: The IFG has not recognised or accepted the KRG’s oil and gas 
contract legal or constitutional. 
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Answer: It has not recognised the KRG’s oil and gas contract as legal, but 
impliedly it recognised them as legal. How it impliedly recognised them as legal 
is when the IFG Federal budget law demanded the KRG to give 450000-barrel 
oil per day from the KRG territories and 150000 from Kirkuk oilfields to the IFG. 
These 600000 bpd must be exported through SOMO. That means it impliedly 
recognised the KRG’s oil and gas contract as a legal.  
Brzoom: impliedly is different from officially recognise them. Can not the IFG in 
the future argue that the KRG’s oil and gas contracts are illegal? The current 
political and security situation may not be helpful for the IFG to do so, but in 
the future if Iraq become more stabilised politically, may be able to argue that 
the KRG’s oil and gas contracts are not legal especially there is not official 
recognition from the IFG, or decision from national or international court 
confirming the KRG’s oil and gas contracts are legal .   
Dr Youfi: Yes the Federal Government can do that inside Iraq, but on the 
international level what the Federal Government can do, for example what it 
can do to stop KRG’s exporting oil and gas, it may send the plane and strike the 
KRG’s pipelines to stop the KRG’s oil exporting, or what the federal Government 
can do, when the KRG has agreed with the Turkey to send its oil to Turkey 
through KRG’s pipelines. Or it may raise a legal action against the KRG in the 
Turkish court and in that case the legality and illegality of the KRG’s oil and gas 
contract would be considered by the Turkish court, and the fact that the Federal 
Government impliedly recognised the KRG’s oil and gas contract in the Federal 
Budget Law would be used against the Federal Government and the 
constitutional issues and the International experts views would be used against 
the Federal Government. Yes, the Federal Government could do something, as 
it cut the KRG’s share of the Federal budget and can do more. in addition to that 
the Federal Government can also use the disputed territories as a reason to 
attack the KRG and return the Iraqi’s troops to the disputed area. The Federal 
government at the moment cannot more than it has already done.  
Question 14: I do not know if I could ask this question. As far as you are aware, 
the Federal Government has threatened IOCs on different occasions not to sign 
oil and gas contract with the KRG because the KRG’s oil and gas contract are 
illegal, it has threatened IOCs that it would not renew their contracts with 
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 . ٨١٠٢تا  ٤١٠٢چاووپێکەوتن لەگەڵ د.يوسف محمد سەرۆکی پەرلەمانی کوردستان لە ساڵی  
 . هـەرمی کوردستان ياسايی يان دەستوری بنحکومەتی پرسييار: ئايا پێتوايە کە گرێبەستە نەوتيەکانی 
هـەيە کەدوای دێمە هـەندێک کێشە هـەندێک لە گرێبەستەکان ئاشکرا نەکراون لەبەر ئەوە ناتوانم لەسەر ئەوانە قسە بکەم. وەڵام: 
ی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی هـەميشەيی عێراق مافهـەرێمی کوردستان بە پێی دەستوری سەری، بەڵام بە گشتی حکومەتی 
 . دۆزراونەتەوە ٥١٠٢هـەيە لەو بيرە نەوتانەی کە دوای جێبەجێکردنی دەستور لە 
هـێنان وە فرۆشتنی. پێموابێت هـەتا وەبەرهـەر لەگەڕان بەدوای بەوت و غاز هـەموو بوارەکان بەڕيەوەبردنی نەوت وغاز 
دۆزراونەتەوەو  ٥٠٠٢ن بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غاز لەو بيرانەی کە پێش لە دەستور کە دەڵێ ٠١١و  ٩٠١، ٨٠١مادەی 
 ٢١١هـەرێم و حکونەتی فيدراڵيدا. (برزومپێموابێت مادەی حکونەتی هـاوبەشی بيت لە نێوان هـێنانيان تەدا کراوە دەبێت بە وەبەر
هـا لەدەستەڵاتی حکومەتی ناوەنديدا تانەی کە تەنيە. د يوسف بەڵێ ڕاستە) وە بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غاس يەکێک نيە لەو بابە
  . دۆزراونەتەوە ٥٠٠٢هـەيە لەو کێڵگانەی کەلەدوای هـەرێم مافی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوەت و غازی بێت. لەبەر ئەوە حکومەتی 
  دەستورين؟هـەرێمنا ياسين يان نا پرسيار: د.يوسف، حکومەتی فيدراڵی دەڵيت گرێبەستەکانی نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
 
من نازانم ئەساسی ياسايی ئەوان چيە بۆ ئەوە دەبێت ئەو پرسيارە لەئەوان بکەيت. بەڵام ئەوان لە  نوسينەکانياندا ئەوان بەراوردی 
  هـەرێم  دەکەننێوان گرێبەستی سێرڤز کۆنترات و ئەوانەی حکومەتی 
ی ياسايەوە گرێبەستەکانی کوردستان بە شێوەيەکی گشتی کە گرێبەستی شەراکەتە. ئەوان باسی ئەم شتانە  ئەکەن بەڵام لە ڕو
هـەندێکلە هـاتی نەوتو غازدا، وە هـەيە دەربارەی شەفافيات لە چۆنيەتی کردنی گرێبەستەکاندا وە لە داهـەنێک کێشەياسايين، 
کێشەکە لەسەر شوێنی  ٤٠٠٢اڵی ی س ٤هـەيە وەک ئەوە گرێبەستەی کەلەگەڵ دانەگاس کراوە لە مانگی گرێبەستەکان کێشەيان 
لەبەرئەوە ئەوە  ٣٠٠٢گرێبەستەکەيە کە کورمورە. کێڵگەی کورمور لەسەردەمی ڕژێمی پێشوو دۆزراوەتەوە لە پێش ساڵی 
هـەرێمی . لەبەرئەوە ئەگەر حکومەتی ٥٠٠٢دۆزراوەتەوە واتە پێش جێبەجێکردنی دەستوری  ٥٠٠٢کێڵگە لەپێش ساڵی
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دانەگاسی بەبێ ئاگاداری حکومەتی فيدراڵ کردبێت ئەوە بەپێی دەستور تەواو نيە،لەبەرئەوە لە کوردستان گرێبەستەکەی 
هـەيە، هـاتداتی نەوت و غاز هـەندێک گرێبەست کێشەی تێدابێت وە کێشەش لە چۆنيەتی ادارەی داهـەنەدێک حاڵەتی تايبەتدا 
هـەيە کەلە دوای افی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوەت و غازی لەو کێڵگانەيە هـەرێمی کوردستان مبەڵام بەشێوەيەکی گشتی حکمومەتی 
  دۆزراونەتەوە ٥٠٠٢ساڵی 
هـەرێم پێويستە کە ڕەزامەندی حکومەتی فيدراڵی وەربگرێت پێش ئيمزاکردنی گرێبەستە : بەپێی ياسا حکومەتی ٣پرسيار  
ەگەڵ کۆمپانيا نەوتيەکان پێويستە ڕەزامەندی حکموەتی هـەرێم کەگرێبەست دەکات لنەوتيەکان. مەبەستم ئەوەيە کە حکومەتی 
 .فيدراڵ وەربگرێت پێش ئيمزاکردنی گرێبەستەکان
 
هـەيە. ئەوەی کە ووەڵام: سەرەتا عێراق ياسای نەوت و غاز نيە، بەڵامکوردستان ياسای نەوت و غازی تايبەت بە کوردستان   
هـا دەستووری فيدراڵە وەک لە سەرەوە باسمکرد. بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازدا تەنهـەرێم و ناوەند ڕێکدەخات لە پەيوەندی نێوان 
دۆزراونەتەوە وەک ٥٠٠٢هـاوکاری حکومەتی فيدراڵی ئەوە کێڵگانە بەڕێوە ببات کە پێش هـەرێم پێويستە بە حکومەتی 
هـاوبەشی بەڕێوەی هـەرێمو حکومەت فيدراڵ بەهـاڤانە ئەم کێڵگانە دەبێت حکومەتی کێڵگەکانی بابە گوڕ گوڕ ، بای حەسەن و 
دۆزراونەتەوە ٥٠٠٢بەرن، بەڵام ئەو کێلگانەی کە تازە دۆزراونەتەوە وەک کێڵگەکانی نيران، کوردەمير و تەق تەق کە لە دوای 
کێڵگانەی تازە  هـا خۆی بەڕێوەی بەرێت بەبێ گەڕانەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ. ئەوهـەيە کە بە تەنهـەرێم مافی حکومەت 
لە کوردستان  ٥٠٠٢دۆزراونەتەوە بەپێی دەستور ڕێکدەخرێن. ياسای نەوت و غاز نيە لە عێراقدا. ئەو کێڵگانەی کە دوای 
هـەرێم ڕێکدەخرێن. کێشە لە ياسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی دۆزراونەتەوە بە پێی دەستور و ياسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
هـەيە. بە پێێ ياساکە دەبێت چەند کۆمپانيايەکی نيشتمانی تايبەت بە شە لە جێبەجێکردنی ياساکەدا هـەرێمدا نيە، بەڵام کێ
هـاتی نەوت دروست بکرێن. ئەم دەزگايانە تائێستا دروست نەکراون. بازاڕيکردنی نەوت و فرۆشتنی نەوت و وە تايبەت بە دا
هـۆی پەکخستنی پەرلەمانەوە ياساکە نەوت و غاز دەرکەين بەڵام بەداخەوە بە هـاتیئێمە توانيمان لە پەرلەمان ياسای تايبەت بە دا
هـۆی هـەنەردەکردنی نەوت و غاز ئامادەکرا بەڵام بەجێبەجێ نەکرا. وە ڕەشنوسی دوو ياسايی تايبەت بە فرۆشتنی نەوت و 
هـيچ کێشەيەک نی ياسای نەوت و غاز دا بەڵام هـەيە لە جێبەچيکردپەکخستنی پەرلەمانەوە ياساکان دەرنەچوون. ڕاستە کێشە 
هـەندێک هـا لەدۆزراونەتوە تەن ٥٠٠٢ڵگانەی کەدوای  U هـەرێمەوە لەو کنيە لە بەڕيوەبردنی نەوت و غاز لەلايەن حکومەتی 
 .حاڵەتی تايبەتدا نەبێت کە لەسەرەوە باسمان کرد
 
هـا هـەيە کە بەتەنهـەرێم مافی ئەوەی ە پێی دەستوری عێراق حکومەت هـەرێمی کوردستان دەڵێت بپرسيار: د.يوسف، حکومەت 
دۆزراونەتەوە.  ٥٠٠٢ڵگانە بەڕيوە ببات کە لەدوای  U هـەرێم نەوت و غازی ئەو کو بەپێێ ياسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
  هـەرێم چيە؟ێاسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
هـاتی نەوت و غازيش دەرچوو بەڵام . وە ياسای تايبەت بە دا٧٠٠٢رێم ساڵی هـەووەڵام: ياسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
  . هـۆی پەکخستنی پەرلەمانەوەهـاتەکە دروست نەکرا بەی دا Qسندو
  هـيچ شتێکی نادەستوری تێدانيە؟ئايا ئەوە ياسايە 
هـيچ ن وايە کەياساکە يەکانگيرە لەگەڵ دەستورو هـا شارەزايانی نێودەوڵەتی بواری نەوت و غازيش پێياهـەروەمن پێم وايە وە 
هـاوبەشدا نيم، بەڵام بيرم نيە چ مادەيەکی دەستورە کە ئەمريکيەکان نادەستوريەکی تێدا نيە. من خۆم شەخسی لەگەڵ گرێبەستی 
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ونجێت تا گرێبەستی خزمەت هـەم لەگەڵ دەستوری عێراقدا زياتر دەگهـاوبەش لە بەرلە دەستور جێگيريان کردوە، کە گرێبەستی 
 .گوزاری حکومەتی عێراقی
 
هـەيە لە کوردستاندا. ئايا هـەرێم کۆمپانيان بيانيەکان مافی موڵدارێتی نەوت و غازيان پرسيار: بە پێی گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
  هـەبێت؟دەستوری فيدراڵ ڕێگەدەدات کە کۆمپانيای بيانی موڵدارێتی نەوت و غازی 
 
بەشی يەکەمی  ٢١١ا ئەو مادەی کەلە دەستوردايە تايبەت بە بەڕيوەبردنی نەوت و غاز بۆت بخێنمەوە.د يوسف مادەی ووەڵام: ب
هـەمدا پێباشترە ئەوە جۆرە لە گرێبەست هـاوبەش لە بەربە عەرەبی خوێندەوە."................". کۆمپانيان بيانيەکان گرێبەستی 
وەک ووتم من خۆمولەگەڵ ئەم جۆرە گرێبەستە، وە لە نامەی دکتۆراکەمدا ڕەخنەم لەم جۆرە  زياتر لەگەڵ دەستوردا دەگونجێت.
گرێبەستانە گرتوە چوونکە قازانجی زياتر بۆ کۆمپانی بيانيەکان دەستەبەردە. لەکوردستاندا نەوت بە ئاسانی و بە تێچووی کەم 
هـێنانی نەوت و غاز تياندا ئەسان نيە وە تێچووی هـەم ە بەرهـەم دێت، ئەم جۆرانە لە گرێبەست بۆ ئەو شوێنانە دەبيت کبەر
هـەمدای حکومەتی هـاوبەش لە بەرهـێنانی نەوت و غاز لە دەرياکاندا. لەبەر ئەوە گرێبەستەکانی هـەمزۆريشی دەوەێت وەک بەر
زانچی زۆر دەدەن بە کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان. پێموابێت هـيچ کێشەيەکی نيە، بەڵام قاهـەرێمی کوردستان لە ڕوی ياسايی و دەستوريەوە 
هـێنانی ئەم جۆرە گرێبەستە . حکومەتی عێراقی پێموابێت لە دەورەی چواردا بوو دەوڵەتانی دراوسێش لە دواڕۆژدا بەرەو بەکار
وەيەک کە ئيمتيزاتی هـەرێمدا ناچار بوو کە بەندی گرێبەستەکانی بگۆڕيت بەشێکەلەژێر کاريگەری گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
هـاتوودا دەوڵەتانی ناوچەکەو دورگەی عەرەبی وردە وردە بە پێی کات بەرەو زياتر بدات بە کۆمپانيان بيانيەکان، وە لەدا
  . هـێنانی ئەم جۆرە لە گرێبەست دەچن. لەبەر ئەوە کێشەی دەستوری بوون شتێکە و بەرژەوەندی گشتيش شتێکی ترەبەکار
 
هـەوڵيدا کە حکومەتی عێراقی گرێبەستی  ٣٠٠٢هـاوپەيمانان لەدوای داگيرکردنی عێراق لە ساڵی ی کاتی پرسيار: دەسەڵات
هـێنان لە عێرقدا وە بەشدار هـانی کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان بدات بەشدار بن لە وەبەرهـابەش بەکاربێنێت بەو مەبەستەی کە شەراکەتی 
عێراقيەکان بەمە ڕازی نەبوون لەبەرئەوەی ئەم جۆرانە لە گرێبەست دژ بە دەستوری عيراقن. لە ئاوەدانکردنەوەی عێراقدا، بەڵام 
دەستوری پێشووی عێراق ڕێگەی نەدەدا بە خاوەندارێتی لە بوارەکانی موڵکدارێتيدا، سامانی سروشتی، بيمە وە بانک، بەڵام 
 .نازانم ئەگەر دەستوری تازە ڕيگەی بە خاوەندارێت
هـاوپەيماناندا لەکاتی نوسينەوەی ياسی بەڕێوەبردنی کاتيدا ئەمبابەتە باسکرا، وە لەسەردەمی دەستەلاتی کاتی  وەڵام; وەک ووتم
هـەبوو لە نوسينەوەی. لەبەر ئەوە دەستوری عيراقی بەشێوەيەکە لەکاتی نوسينەوەی دەستوردا ئەمريکيەکان دەورێکی زۆريان 
هـەندێک هـاوبەش نيە، بەڵام وەرۆکی دەستوری عێراقی دژ بە گرێبەستەکانی شەراکەتی کەلەبەرژەوەندی کۆمپانيا بيانيەکانە. نا
 لەتەياری نەتەوەيی لە عيراقدا دژ بەو جۆرەن لە گرێبەست. تەنگا پشتگيری گرێبەستی خزمەت گوزاری دەکەن
 
  ۆدەستوری فيدراڵی؟هـەيە بهـەرێم وحکومەتی فيدراڵی دوو تەفسيری جياوازيان پرسيار: بۆچی حکومەتی 
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هـەيە.  ئەوانەی حکومەتی فيدراڵی پێيان وايە کە گرێبەستەکانی وەڵام: پێشوتر ئاماژەم پێکرد کە ئەوە پەيوندی بە بيرکرنەوەوە
هـەرێم، وەزيری سامانە سروشتيەکان دەڵيت ئەگەر حکومەتی هـاوبەش لە بەرژەوەندی عێراقدانيە،بەڵام حکومەتی شەراکەتی 
هـانی کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان بدات کەسەرمايەگوزری بکەن لە هـاوبەش بەکار نەگێنێت ئەوا ناتوانێت رێم گرێبەستی شەراکەتی هـە
هـەر هـەرێمی کوردستاندا بکەن. بەڵام ئێستا لەگەڵ ناڕەزايی حکومەتی فيدراڵی کەچی کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان نەوت و غازی 
هـەرێمی کوردستاندا لەبەر ئەوەی کە کوردستان گرێبەستی ە نەوت و غازی حکومەتی بەردەوامن لە سەرمايەگوزاری ل
 . هـەيەهـاوبەشی شەراکەتی 
 
  هـەيە؟پرسيار: کێ مافی تەفسيرکردنی دەستوری فيدراڵی عێراقی 
 
ێ بەپێی ياسای نوێ وەڵام: تەفسيرکردنی دەستور دەستەڵاتی دادگای فيدراڵيە، بەڵام دادگای فيدراڵی دەبوايە سەرلەنو
 .دابمەزرايەتەوە، بۆ ئەوەی بتوانێت تەفسيری دەستور و سکاڵای دەستوری ببينێت
 
هـەوڵدەدەن کە کێشەکە لە ڕێگەی دانوستانەوە چارەسەر هـەموو کێسەيەکی مەدەنيدا يەکەم جار لايەنەکانی کێشەکە پرسيار: لە 
يان توانی کێشەکە لا نێوان خۆياندا چارەسەر بکان ئەوا دەبێت کێشەکە ببەنە بکەن، بەڵام ئەگەر لايەنەکان گەشتنە بنبەست و نە
ساڵە ئەم کێسەيە  ٠١هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵی ئەوە بۆماوەی بەردەم لايەبی ياسای تايبەتمەند بۆ بڕياردان لەسەری. حکومەت 
هـەيە کە ئەم جۆرە کێشە يان سکاڵايە داوەری تێدا تی لەنێوانياندا بەردەوامە بەبێ چارەسەر. لە عێراقدا دادگای فيدراڵی دەسەلا
  هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵی ئەم کێشەيەيان نەبردوەتە بەردەم دادگای فيدراڵی بۆ داوەری؟بکات،. بۆچی تائێستا حکومەتی 
 
تی فيدراڵی دڵنيا نيە کەگرێبەستی هـەگينا دەيبرد. حکومەوەڵام: لەبەر ئەوەی کە حکومەتی فيدراڵی دڵنيانيە کە کەيسەکە دەباتەوە 
هـا ئێمە نين کە پێمان وايە هـاوبەش نا ياساييە يان نا دەستوريە.لەبەر ئەوەی دڵنيانين کە کەيسەکا دەبەنەوە. تەنشەراکەتی 
انە پڕۆفيسۆر جەيمس هـەيە، لەوهـەمان بۆچونيانهـەرێم ياسايين، شارەزايانی نێودەوڵەتيش پێيان وايە و گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
  . دۆزراونەتەوە ٥٠٠٢هـەيە لەو کێڵگانەی کەلە دوای هـەرێم مافی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی کرۆفۆرد کەپێيوايە حکمەتی 
 
هـەرێم بۆ بەرزکردنەوەی کێشەی نەوت و غاز لەگەڵ حکومەتی فيدراڵی لەبەر ئەوەيە پرسيار: پێتوانيە کە نەويستنی حکومەتی 
هـاتەی دادگای هـۆی چۆنيەتی پێکهـەرێم دەترسيت لەوەی کە دادگای فيدراڵی بێلايەنانە بڕيار لە کەيسەکە بدات بەی کە حکومە
 .فيدراڵی
 
هـەرێم نەوت و غاز هـەرێم پيوەيستی بەوەنيە کە ئەم کێشەيە بەرزبکاتەوە بۆ دادگای فيدراڵی،چونکە حکومەتی وەڵام;حکومەتی 
ەناردەی دەرەوە دەکات بەبێ کێشە. حکومەتی فيدرالی خاوەن سکاڵايە لەم کێشەيەدا ئەوان دەبێت کێشەکە ببەنە هـبەبەردەوامی 
  . هـەرێمی بڕيوە لەسەر کێسەی نەوت و غازدادگای فيدراڵی. حکومەتی فيدراڵيش ئێستا بەشە بوجەی 
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تی فيدراڵيەوە بۆ بردنی ئەمکێسەيە بۆ دادگای فيدراڵی، هـەرێم وحکومەهـەبێت لەلايەن حکومەتی پرسيار: ئەگەر دوو دڵيەک 
   هـەوڵ نەدراوە کە ئەمکێشە ببرێتە بەردەم دادگايەکی نێودەوڵەتی بێلايەن لە دەرەوەی عێراق؟ئەی بۆ تائێستا 
 
ەوە و بەکاری وەڵام:لايەنەکانی ئەم کێشەيە سياسيەن مامەڵە لەگەڵ ئەم کێشە دەکەن. حکومەتی فيدراڵی ئەم کێشەی قواستوەت
هـەرێمی کوردستانيش بەوەی کە حکومەتی فيدراڵی هـەرێم کوردستان. حکومەتی هـێناوە وەک سەبەبێک بۆ بڕينی بەشە بوجەی 
هـەناردەکردنی نەوت و غاز بۆ دەرەوە هـەرێمی کوردستان، بەردەوامە لە هـيچ ڕێکارێکی تر ناگرێتەبەر دژ بەحکومەتی 
هـەردوولا نيەتی چارەسەری کێشەکەيان نيە، هـاتی نەوت و غاز دا دەکات. هـا خۆی مامەڵە لەگەڵ دابەتەنبەبەردەوامی وە 
هـەناردەی دەرەوە بکات. وە لە بەرژەوەندی حکومتی هـەرێم نايەوێت نەوت و غاز لەڕێگەی سۆمۆوە لەبەر ئەوەی حکەمتی 
% بەشە بوجەی بداتێ. لەبەرئەوە ٧١هـەناردە بکات و وە حکمەتی فيدراڵيش هـەرێم نەوت و غاز فيدراڵدا نيە کە حکومەتی 
  . هـەبێت يارمەتيان بدات تابگەنە چارەسەرپێويستە نێوانگير 
 
  هـەرێمو حکومەتی فيدراڵی ڕێکدەخات؟پرسيار: چ ياسايەک نێونی حکومەتی 
 
 .وەلام: ياسا نيە. دەستوری فيدراڵی نێونيان ڕێکدەخات
 
   هـەرێم دەتوانێت شتێکبکات کە پێچەوانەی ياسای فيدراڵی يەن دەستوری فيدراڵی بێت؟: ئايا حکومەتی پرسيار
 
ی دەستور  دەڵێت. ١٢١وەڵام: نەخير ناتوانێت پێچەوانەی دەستوری فيدراڵی بکات، بە نيسن=بەتی ياسای فيدراڵيشەوە مادەی 
دەتوانێت لە بواری ياسادانان، دەسەڵاتی جێبەچێکردن و دادوەريدا سەربەخۆبێت هـەرێم بەبۆت بخوێنمەوە.............. حکومەتی 
ی دەستور  ٥١١هـەموو ئەو بابەتانەی کەلەدەسەڵاتی حکومەتی فيدراڵدا نين.  ئەوە يەکەم، دووەم مادەی بە پێی دەستور لە
هـەرێمو ياسای حکومەتی فيدراڵی ئەگەر ياسای  ١٥١ێی مادەی  P دەڵێت...................................................، بە
هـەرێم.بەڵام ئەگەر دژايەتيەکە هـەبوو،لەو بابەتانەی کەدەسەلاتی حکومەتی فيدراڵ نەبوون، ئەوا ئەلەويەت بۆ ياسای دژيايەتيان 
  . ەلەو بابەتانەدابوو کە لە دەسەڵاتی حکومەتی فيدراڵدا بوو ئەوە ئەولەويەت بۆ حکومەتی فيدرال
 
هـاوبەشی هـەرێمکە نەوت و غاز بەڕێوە ببات بەڵام بە يس دەستور ڕێگەی داوە بە حکومەتی  ٢١١پرسيار: مادەی 
 .لەگەڵحکومەتی فيدراڵدا
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 ......................................................... بۆ بخوێنمەوە. مادەکە دەڵێت ٢١١وەلام: با مادەی 
هـاتوەتە جێبەجێکردن بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غاز لەو کێڵگانەی کە دۆزراونەتەوە تا ئەو  بەروارەی کە دەستور يی ئەم مادەيە  Pبە
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵدا، بەڵام دەستور بێدەگە لەسەر بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غاز هـاوبەشی بێت لەنێوان حکومەتی دەبێت بە 
هـيچ شتێکلە هـاتودا دەدۆزرێنەوە. لەبەرئەوە دنی دەستور دۆزراونەتەوە  وە لە دالەو کێڵگانەی کە دوای دەرواری جێبەجێکر
هـەرێم ناچار بکات يان ئيجباری بکات کە نەوت و غازی ئەو کێڵگانەی کە لەدوای بەرواری دا نيە کە حکومەتی  ٢١١مادەی 
  اڵيدا بەڕێوە بباتهـاوبەشی لەگەڵحکومەتی فيدرجێبەجێکردنی دەستورەوە دۆزراونەتەوە بە
ەوە لە پەرلەمانە. ئامانج لە  ٧٠٠٢لە پەرلەمانی عێراقە. ياساکە لە ساڵی  ٧٠٠٢پرسيار: ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدراڵی ساڵی 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدرالئەوە بوو کە بتوانێت چارەسەرێک بێت بۆ کێشەی نێوان حکومەتی 
ساڵ زياترە لە پەرلەمانی عێراقە بەڵام تا ئێستا لە پەرلامان پەسەند  ٠١نەوت و غاز. ياساکە بۆماوەی لەسەر بەڕيوەبردنی 
  نەکراوە. بۆچی تا ئێستا ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدراڵ پەسەند نەکراوە؟
 
بەڵام جارێک کورد  هـەيە لە نێوان کورد و عەربدا لەسەر ياساکە. چەند جارێک ڕێکەوتن کراوەڵام: لەبەرئەوەی کە ناکۆکی 
 .پەشيمان بوەوە ،وە جارێکيش عەرەب پەشيمان بونەوە. لەبەرئەوە تا ئێستا رێکەوتنی کۆتای نەکراوە لەسەر ياساکە
 
هـاتی نەوتو غازە. پێس ئەوەی پرسيارەکەم هـەرێم و حکومەتی عێراقی لەسەر داپرسيار: يەکێکيتر لەکێسەکانی نێوان حکومەتی 
هـەيە لە عێراقدا؟ دەستور دەڵيت نەوتو غاز موڵکی خەڵکی عێراقە، سم کە کێ خاوەدارێتی نەوتو غازی بکەم ئەتوانم بپر
 حکومەتی فيدراڵيش نوێنەرايەتی خەڵکی عێراق دەکات. ئەمە وايە؟
 
................... يە لەدەستور کەدەڵيت نەوت و غاز موڵکی خەڵکی عێراقە. مادەکەدەڵێت....................... ١١١وەڵام: مادەی 
هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەبێت بگەڕێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ، وە لەسەرئەم ئەساسە دەتوانێريت مادەکەوا تەفسيربکرێت کە دا
  . هـەرێمەکان و پارێزگاکانداجارێکی تر لەوێوە بەشێوەيەکی دادپەروەرانە دابەشبکرێتەوە بەسەر 
 
  هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەگێڕێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ؟دستان داهـەرێمی کورپرسيار: ئايا حکومەتی 
 
هـاتی نەوت و غاز و وە کەس هـەيە لە داهـەر نايگەرێنێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ، بەڵکو نا شەفەفيەت و ناڕونی وەلام: نەک
 .ئاگادار نيە کە چۆن ئيدارە دەکرێت
هـەبێت لە ڕێگەبگرێت لە هـاتی نەوت و غاز مافی ئەوەی نا شەفافيەت لە دا پرسيار: ئايا حکومەتی فيدراڵ دەتوانێت بە بيانوی
 . هـەڵبەسێرێتهـەرێم هـەمووگرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی هـەرێم بۆ دەرەوە وە هـەناردەکردنی نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
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هـاتی هـەيە کە داوای داڵبەسێرێت. بەلاممافی ئەوەی هـەهـەرێم وەڵام: مافی ئەوەی نيە کە گرێبەستەکانی نەوت و غازی حکەمتی 
لە  ٢١١%. مادەی ٧١هـەرێم بدات کە لە هـەرێم وە لە بەرامبەردا بەشەبوجەی حکومەتی نەوت و غاز بکات لەعکەمەتی 
 ..................................................دەستور دەڵێت،مادەی خوێندەوە
هـاتی نەوت هـەيە کە داوی داتی نەوت و غاز دەبێتبگەڕێتەوە بۆحکومەتی فيدراڵ.وە حکومەتی فيدراڵمافی ئەوەی هـالەبەرئەوە دا
هـاتی نەوت و گاز بە شێوەيەکی داد پەروەرانە دابەشبکاتەوە بە سەر خەڵکی و گاز بکات. وە حکومەتی فيدراڵی دەبێت دا
ێکی تايبەت بۆ ماوەيەکی دياريکراو بدرێت بەو شێنانەی کەلەلايەن حکومەتی پێشووی هـەرێمەکان و پارێزگاکاندا. وە دەبێت بەش
هـەرێمەوە.  حکومەتی فيدراڵ عێراقەوە زەرەرۆماند بوون.  ئەو شوێنانەش زۆربەيدەکەوێتەسنوری حکومەتی 
فيدراڵە، حکموەت فيدراڵ % بوجەی حکومەتی ٧١هـەرێمی بڕيوە کەلەوەکمومارەسەکردنی مافی خۆی بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی 
% نانێڕيت تا ٧١هـەرێن کە لە هـەرێم وە دەڵێت بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەکات لە حکومەتی داوای دا
هـاتەی کە هـەرێم لە حکومەتی فيدراڵ زياترە لەو دا% بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی ٧١هـاتی نەوت و غازی تەسليم نەکرێت. لە دا
  . هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەستی دەکەوێتهـەرێم لە دا حکومەتی
 
 . هـەرێمی بە قانونی يان دەستوری نەناساندوەپرسيار: حکومەی فيدراڵی تا ئێستا گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
 
تی اعترافی پێنەکردون بەڵام بە شێوەيەکی زمنی اعترفی پێکردون. چۆن بە شێوەيەکی زمنی اعترافی کردوە، حکومەوەڵام: 
بەرميلنەوت لە ڕێگەی کۆمپانيانی سۆمۆی حکومەتی  ٠٠٠٠٥٤هـەرێم دەکات کە ڕۆژانە فيدراڵی ئێستا داوا لە حکومەتی 
هـەرێم دەنێرێت.  ئەمە اعترافی زمنيە بەگرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی هـەناردە بکات لەبەرامبەردا بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی فيدراڵەوە 
 .هـەرێم
ەوە لە پەرلەمانە. ئامانج  ٧٠٠٢لە پەرلەمانی عێراقە. ياساکە لە ساڵی  ٧٠٠٢ەوت و غازی فيدراڵی ساڵی پرسيار: ياسای ن  
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ لە ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدرالئەوە بوو کە بتوانێت چارەسەرێک بێت بۆ کێشەی نێوان حکومەتی 
زياترە لە پەرلەمانی عێراقە بەڵام تا ئێستا لە پەرلامان پەسەند  ساڵ ٠١لەسەر بەڕيوەبردنی نەوت و غاز. ياساکە بۆماوەی 
  نەکراوە. بۆچی تا ئێستا ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدراڵ پەسەند نەکراوە؟
 
هـەيە لە نێوان کورد و عەربدا لەسەر ياساکە. چەند جارێک ڕێکەوتن کرا بەڵام جارێک کورد وەڵام: لەبەرئەوەی کە ناکۆکی 
 . وە جارێکيش عەرەب پەشيمان بونەوە. لەبەرئەوە تا ئێستا رێکەوتنی کۆتای نەکراوە لەسەر ياساکەپەشيمان بوەوە ،
 
هـاتی نەوتو غازە. پێس ئەوەی پرسيارەکەم هـەرێم و حکومەتی عێراقی لەسەر داپرسيار: يەکێکيتر لەکێسەکانی نێوان حکومەتی 
هـەيە لە عێراقدا؟ دەستور دەڵيت نەوتو غاز موڵکی خەڵکی عێراقە، بکەم ئەتوانم بپرسم کە کێ خاوەدارێتی نەوتو غازی 
 حکومەتی فيدراڵيش نوێنەرايەتی خەڵکی عێراق دەکات. ئەمە وايە؟
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يە لەدەستور کەدەڵيت نەوت و غاز موڵکی خەڵکی عێراقە. مادەکەدەڵێت..........................................  ١١١وەڵام: مادەی 
هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەبێت بگەڕێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ، وە ساسە دەتوانێريت مادەکەوا تەفسيربکرێت کە دالەسەرئەم ئە
  . هـەرێمەکان و پارێزگاکانداجارێکی تر لەوێوە بەشێوەيەکی دادپەروەرانە دابەشبکرێتەوە بەسەر 
 
  ڕێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ؟هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەگێهـەرێمی کوردستان داپرسيار: ئايا حکومەتی 
 
هـاتی نەوت و غاز و وە کەس هـەيە لە داهـەر نايگەرێنێتەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵ، بەڵکو نا شەفەفيەت و ناڕونی وەلام: نەک
 .ئاگادار نيە کە چۆن ئيدارە دەکرێت
هـەبێت لە ڕێگەبگرێت لە و غاز مافی ئەوەی هـاتی نەوت پرسيار: ئايا حکومەتی فيدراڵ دەتوانێت بە بيانوی نا شەفافيەت لە دا
 . هـەڵبەسێرێتهـەرێم هـەمووگرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی هـەرێم بۆ دەرەوە وە هـەناردەکردنی نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
 
هـاتی يە کە داوای داهـەهـەڵبەسێرێت. بەلاممافی ئەوەی هـەرێم وەڵام: مافی ئەوەی نيە کە گرێبەستەکانی نەوت و غازی حکەمتی 
لە  ٢١١%. مادەی ٧١هـەرێم بدات کە لە هـەرێم وە لە بەرامبەردا بەشەبوجەی حکومەتی نەوت و غاز بکات لەعکەمەتی 
 ..................................................دەستور دەڵێت،مادەی خوێندەوە
هـاتی نەوت هـەيە کە داوی داحکومەتی فيدراڵ.وە حکومەتی فيدراڵمافی ئەوەی هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەبێتبگەڕێتەوە بۆلەبەرئەوە دا
هـاتی نەوت و گاز بە شێوەيەکی داد پەروەرانە دابەشبکاتەوە بە سەر خەڵکی و گاز بکات. وە حکومەتی فيدراڵی دەبێت دا
و بدرێت بەو شێنانەی کەلەلايەن حکومەتی پێشووی هـەرێمەکان و پارێزگاکاندا. وە دەبێت بەشێکی تايبەت بۆ ماوەيەکی دياريکرا
هـەرێمەوە.  حکومەتی فيدراڵ عێراقەوە زەرەرۆماند بوون.  ئەو شوێنانەش زۆربەيدەکەوێتەسنوری حکومەتی 
% بوجەی حکومەتی فيدراڵە، حکموەت فيدراڵ ٧١هـەرێمی بڕيوە کەلەوەکمومارەسەکردنی مافی خۆی بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی 
% نانێڕيت تا ٧١هـەرێن کە لە هـەرێم وە دەڵێت بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی هـاتی نەوت و غاز دەکات لە حکومەتی داوای دا
هـاتەی کە هـەرێم لە حکومەتی فيدراڵ زياترە لەو دا% بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی ٧١هـاتی نەوت و غازی تەسليم نەکرێت. لە دا
  . از دەستی دەکەوێتهـاتی نەوت و غهـەرێم لە داحکومەتی 
 
 . هـەرێمی بە قانونی يان دەستوری نەناساندوەپرسيار: حکومەی فيدراڵی تا ئێستا گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
 
اعترافی پێنەکردون بەڵام بە شێوەيەکی زمنی اعترفی پێکردون. چۆن بە شێوەيەکی زمنی اعترافی کردوە، حکومەتی وەڵام: 
بەرميلنەوت لە ڕێگەی کۆمپانيانی سۆمۆی حکومەتی  ٠٠٠٠٥٤هـەرێم دەکات کە ڕۆژانە ی فيدراڵی ئێستا داوا لە حکومەت
هـەرێم دەنێرێت.  ئەمە اعترافی زمنيە بەگرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی هـەناردە بکات لەبەرامبەردا بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی فيدراڵەوە 
   .هـەرێم
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هـاتودا ناتوانێت بيانوی ئەوە بگريت بڵيت گرێبەستەکانی ا حکومەتی فيدراڵی لە دابەشێوەی زمنی جياوازە لە دانپيانانی ڕەسمی. ئاي
هـاتودا باری هـەرێم نا ياسايين؟ بەری ئەمنی و سياسی عێراق ڕەنگە ئێستا گونجاو نەبێت بۆ ئەمە بەڵام ئەگەر لە داحکومەتی 
هـەرێم ياسای نين، بە تايبەت ڵيت گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی ی سياس ی ئەسايشی عێراق جێگير بوو حکومەتی فيدراڵی لەوانەيە ب
هـەرێم يان بڕياری دادغای عيراقی يان نێو کە اعترافێکی رەسمی نەيە لەلايەن حکومەتی فيدراڵ بە گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
  . هـەرێمدەوڵەتی نيە لەسەر ياسايی بوونی گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
 
دراڵی دەتوانێت يەوە بکات لە ناوخۆی عێراقدا، بەڵام لە دەروەی عێراق و لە ئاستی نێو دەوڵەتيدا د. يوسف: بەڵی حکومەتی في
هـەناردە هـەريم بگرێت نەوت و غاز ئەتوانێت چی بکات. حکومەتی فيدراڵ دەتوانێت چی بکات بۆئەوەی ڕێگە لە حکومەتی 
هـەرێم بتەقێنێتەوە. ئێستا حکومەتی فيدراڵ دەتوانێت چيبکات تا ڕێگە ناکاتە دەرەوە مەگەر بە تەيارە بۆريە نەوتەکانی حکومەتی 
هـەناردەی دەرەوە نەکات. لەوانەيە سکاڵای ياسای لە دژی هـەرێم بگرێت تا نەوتەکای لە ڕێگەی تورکيا وە لە حکومەتی 
هـەرێن يدراڵ بە گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی هـەرێم لە دادگای تورکيا تۆمار بکات. ئەو کاتە اعترافی زمنی حکومەتی فحکومەتی 
هـەرێم دژ بە حکومەتی فيدراڵ بەکارديت. بە ڵێ و بۆچونی ياساناسان و شارەزايانی نێودەوڵەی لەسەر گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی 
کێشەی  هـەرێمی بڕيوە، يان دەتوانيتحکومەتی فيدراڵی دەتوانێت شتێک بکات وەک ئەوەی کە ئێستا بەشە بوجەی حکومەتی 
هـەرشکردنە سەر ئەو ناوچانەو گەڕانەوەی جەيشی عيراق بۆ ئەو هـێنێت بۆهـۆکارێک بەکار بناوچە جێ ناکۆکەکان وەک 
  .ناوچانە.حکومەتی عێراقی ناتوانێت لەوە زيات بکات ئە تا ئێستا کردێتی
 
ەکۆمپانيان بيانيەکان کردوە کە نابيت گرێبەستی نەوت هـەرەشەی لپرسيار: نازانمئەەگر بتوانمئەمرسيارە بکام.حکومەتی فيدراڵی 
هـەرێم بکات ئەوا گرێبەستکەی لەگەڵ هـەر کۆمپانيايەک گريبەست لەگەڵحکومەتی هـەرێم بکەن، وە و گاز لەگەڵ حکومەتی 
حکومەتی فيدراڵ نەدەن و  هـەرەشەکانیحکومەتی فيدراڵ لەدەستدەدات. پێت وايە چی وا لەکۆمپانيا بيانيەکان دەکات کە گوێ بە
هـەيە و وە هـەرێم.وەک دەزانيت کە کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان ڕاوێژکاری  ياساييان بەردەوام بن لە گرێبەستەکانيان لەگەڵحکومەتی 
 .هـەتا دڵنيا نەبن لە ياسايی بوونی گرێبەستێک واژوی ناکەن
 
هـەرێم دەوڵەتی لەسەر ياسايی بوونی گرێبەستەکانی حکومەتی وەڵام: دوو شت وای لێکردون. يەکەم بۆچونی شارەزايانی نێو
هـەرێم ياسايين. دووەم بەخشينی کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان لە لێپێچينەوەی  وەک لە سەرەتاوە باسمکرد کە دەڵێن گرێبەستەکانی حکمومەتی 
 .ياسايی
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Interview 3 with Dr Sherko Jawdat the Chair of the Oil and Gas 
Committee of the Kurdistan Parliament  
 
Q1: Are the KRG’s PSC legal or constitutional? 
A:in the Constitution specify the model contract whether it should be PSC or 
TSC. That is left for the Federal Government and the KRG. However, Article 111 
and 112 of the Federal Constitution allow the KRG to manage oil and gas from 
the fields discovered after the 2005, but oil and gas operation from the fields 
discovered before 2005 must be managed together with the Federal 
Government. Therefore, the model contract such as PSC has not been 
mentioned in the Constitution.  
Q: The question is whether KRG’s oil and gas contract are legal or illegal? 
A: Yes, they are legal  
Q 2: If they are legal on what basis they are legal and under what law? 
A. in accordance to the KRG Oil and Gas Law of 2007. That law allows the KRG 
to sign contract with the IOC to invest in the petroleum sector in Kurdistan and 
if there is dispute between the IOC and the KRG, it should be referred to the 
International Arbitration.  
Q: Referring the dispute between the KRG and IOC over oil and gas contract to 
the International Arbitration, is not against the Federal Constitution as it is 
against the principle of sovereignty?  
A: That is the legal matter, it is a pure legal matter whether it breaches the 
sovereignty of Iraq or not. However, the KRG has a right to manage oil and gas 
operations from the fields discovered after the enforcement of the Constitution 
of 2005. In the event of arising dispute between the KRG and IOCs the dispute 
should be referred to the International Arbitration. this is because IOCs are 
foreign companies and they believe their rights are more protected with the 
International Arbitration.  
Q: The Federal Government argues that the KRG’s oil and gas contract are 
illegal, even the KRG does not have right to manage oil and gas operations.  
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A: The problem is the Federal Government and KRG interpret the Article 111 
and 112 as they want and as they protect their interests. As I said before the 
KRG has a right to the manage oil and gas operations from the fields discovered 
after 2005, but management of the fields discovered before 2005 must be in 
co-operation with the Federal Government such as the Baba Gurgur fields which 
was discovered before 2005 that must be managed together with the Federal 
Government. 
Q: There is any co-operation between the KRG and the Federal Government in 
managing the fields discovered before 2005? 
A: No 
Q; On what basis the Iraqi government interpret the constitution as it wants? 
does the Federal Government has a right to interpret the Constitution? 
A: The Federal Constitutional Court has the right to interpret the Constitution. 
But the Iraqi government attempt to stop the KRG from exporting oil through 
the Federal Constitutional Court, but they lost the case. There is now a new 
case, which Nouri Maliki raised in 2014 against the KRG to exporting its oil and 
gas through Turkey to the Jihna Harbour. In that case Nouri Maliki demands 
$26,000,000,000.00 from the KRG. There is a dispute between the KRG and 
Federal Government over the interpretation of the relevant articles of the 
Constitution. There is a legal gap due to the lack of Federal Oil and Gas Law. 
The Draft of Federal Oil and Gas Law is at the Iraqi Parliament. The Political 
parties tried to pass the Federal Oil and Gas Law twice, in 2007 and 2011, but 
they failed. The Constitution requires oil and gas management to be regulated 
by the national law.  
Q: As you said there is serious dispute between the parties over the 
interpretation of the relevant articles of the Constitution, and the only authority 
in Iraqi to interpret the Constitution is the Federal Constitutional Court. Why the 
disputed parties have not taken up the matter to the Federal Court and ask the 
Federal Court to interpret the relevant articles of the Constitution? 
A: The Iraqi Oil Minister lodged a lawsuit at the Federal Court against the KRG 
and the Natural Resources Minister, but the case has been delayed for political 
settlement. The disputed parties want to reach a political agreement on this 
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matter. there is now negotiation between the Federal Government and the KRG 
on this matter for example in the 2019 budget law the KRG is required to send 
250000 bpd to the Federal Government and in return the Federal Government 
will send the KRG’s share of the Federal budget. That means to politically settle 
the legal dispute  
Q: Does the political settlement response to the KRG’s unilateral management 
of oil and gas? 
Answer: That will be subject to the terms of the settlement and how the disputed 
parties agree on the interpretation of the relevant articles of the Constitution. 
This will be subject for the negotiation in the upcoming days. The Technical 
Committee has been set up for the matter, and before that the KRG prime 
Minister visited Baghdad last week to discuss the same matter. The technical 
committees for KRG and Federal Government will meet next to discuss how to 
resolve the problem.  
Question. The current case at the Federal Supreme Court now for the dispute 
over the management of oil and gas operation or is specifically over the 
interpretation of those two articles 111 and 112.  
Answer: It is for the management of oil and gas by the KRG without co-operation 
with the Federal Government.  
Question: Is there any concern from the KRG over the Federal Court’s partiality, 
like being bias to the Federal Government, or the structure of the Federal Court 
and the selection procedure of the Judges, like the share of Shia and Sunni in 
the Federal Court. 
Answer: Share of Shia, Sunni and Kurds in the selection of the judges is 
organised but concerns from the KRG over the partiality of the federal Court, 
that question should be answered by the KRG.  
Question: Regarding the Federal Oil and Gas Law of 2007 and amended in 2011. 
As you know that Law has not been ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. is there any 
agreement between the disputing parties to make new amendments to the 
Federal Oil and Gas Law to the extent that resolve the legal dispute between 
them over the management of oil and gas? 
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 .چاوپێکەوتنی سێيەم لەگەڵ د. شێرکۆجەودەت ئەندامی ليژنەی نەوت و غاز لە پەرلەمانی کوردستان
 
  هـەرێمياسايين يان دەستورين؟ئايا گرێبەستەکانی نەوت و غازی حکومەتی  پرسيار:
هـێشتووە بۆ وەڵام: دەستوری دياری نەکردوە کە گرێبەستاکن شەراکەت لە قازانج بن يان خزماتگوزاری بن. ئەوەی بەجێ
هـەرێم کە نەوت و غاز حکومەتی  يس دەستور مافی داوە بە ٢١١و  ١١١هـەرێم حکومەتی فيدراڵی. بەڵام ماددەی حکومەتی 
دۆزراونەتەوە بەبێ گەڕانەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵی. بەڵام  ٥٠٠٢هـێنێت و بفرۆشێت لەو کێڵگانەی لەکەدوای ساڵی دەرب
هـەرێم و هـاوبەشی بێت لە نێوان حکومەتی دۆزراونەتەوە دەبێت بە ٥٠٠٢بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غاز لەو کێڵگانەی کە لە پێش 
  . هـاوبەش لە دەستوردا دياری نەکراوەکومەتی فيدراڵی. لەبەرئەوە جۆری گرێبەست وەکگرێبەستی شەراکەتی ح
 
  هـەرێمی کوردستان ياسايين يان ناياسايی؟پرسيار: پرسيارەکە ئەوەيە کە ئايا گرێبەستە کانی ،نەوت و غاز، حکومەتی 
 
 .وەڵام: بەڵێ ياسايين
 
  ەر چ بنەمايەک وە بە پێی چ ياسايەک؟پرسيار: ئەگەر ياسايين لەس
هـەرێمی . ئەو ياسايەک ڕێگەدەدات بە حکومەتی ٧٠٠٢هـەرێمی کوردستان ساڵی وەڵام: بە پێی ياسای نەوت و غازی حکومەتی 
ی هـەرێمهـێنان لە نەوت و غازی حکومەتی کوردستان کە گرێبەستی نەوت و غاز بکات لەگەڵۆمپانيا بيانيەکان بۆ وەبەر
هـەرێم و کۆمپانيا بيانيەکاندا ئەوە ناکۆکيەکە دەبرێتە لای تەحکيمی هـاتەپێش لەنێوان حکومەتی کوردستاندا. وە ئەگەر ناکۆکی 
  .نێودەوڵەتی
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هـەرێم و کۆمپانيا بيانيەکان لەسەر گرێبەستەکان بۆ تەحکيمی نێودەوڵەتی دژ پرسيار: گەڕانەوەی ناکۆکی نێوان حکومەتی 
  . وری فيدراڵنيە، چونکە ناکۆکە لەگەڵ بنەمای سەروەری عيراقبەدەست
 
وەڵام:ئەوە بابەتێکی ياسايی بەحتە کە ئايا دژ بە بنەماکانی سەروەری عێراق بێت يان نا. بەڵام مافی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی 
هـەرێم وکۆمپانيا بيانيەکاندا ان حکومەتی هـەبوونی ناکۆکيدا لەنێودۆزراونەتەوە. لەکاتی  ٥٠٠٢هـەيە لەو کێڵگانەی کە دوای 
يان باشترە کێشەکانيان ببەنە لای Uئەوە ناکۆکيەکە دەبێت ببرێتە لای تەحکيمی نێودەوڵەتی،چونکە کۆمپانيا نێودەوڵەتيەکان پ
  .تەحکيمی نێودەوڵەتی لەبەرئەوەی پێيان وايە مافەکانيان لای تەحکيمی نێودەوڵەتی زياتر پرێزراوترە
 
هـەرێمی کوردستان ناياسايين ، تەنانەت حکومەتی ار: حکومەتی فيدراڵ دەڵێت گرێبەستەکانی نەوت و غازی حکومەتی پرسي
  هـاهـەرێم مافی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی نيە بە تەن
ەفسير دەکەن کە ی دەستور بەو شێوەيە ت ٢١١و  ١١١هـەرێم مادەی وەڵام: کێشەکە ئەوەيە کە حکومەتی فيدراڵی و حکومەتتی 
هـەرێم مافی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی لەو کێڵگانە خۆيان دەيانەوێت و کە لە بەرژەوندی خۆيانە. وەک پێشوتر ووتم حکومەتی 
دۆزراونەتەوە وەک کێڵگەی بابەگوڕگوڕ ٥٠٠٢دۆزراونەتەوە، بەڵام بەرێوەبردنی ئەو کێڵگانەی کە پێش  ٥٠٠٢هـەيە کەلەداوی 
  . ـاوبەشی بێت لەگەڵ حکومەتی فيدراڵداهدەبێت بە 
 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵدا لەبەڕێوەبردنی ئەو کێڵگانەی کە پێش هـەيە لە نێوان حکومەتی هـەنگيەک هـەماهـيچ پرسيار: ئايا 
  دۆزراونەتەوە؟ ٥٠٠٢
 
 .وەڵام: نەخێر
 
ت بەو شێوەيەی کەدەيەوێت. ئايا حکومەتی فيدراڵی دەسەڵاتی پرسيار: لەسەر چ بنەمايەک حکومەتی فيدراڵی دەستور تەفسيردەکا
  هـەيە؟تەفسيرکردنی دەستوری 
 
هـەرێم هـەيە، بەڵام حکومەتی فئدراڵی دەيەوێت ڕێگەلەحکومەتی وەڵام: دادگای فيدراڵی دەسەڵاتی تەفسيرکردنی دەستوری 
هـەرێم وڵيدا لە ڕێگەی دادگای فيدراڵيەوە ڕێگە لە حکومەتی  هـەهـەناردەکردنی نەوت و غاز. حکومەتی فيدراڵی بگرئت لە 
هـەرێم تۆمارکردوە،ککە هـەناردەنەکات بەڵامکەيسەکەی دۆڕاند. ئێستا کەيسێکی تری لەدژی حکومەتی بگرێت کە نەوت و غاز 
هـەرێ کە حکومەتی ی نوری ماليکی سەرۆک وەزيرانی پێشووی عێراق لە دادگای فيدراڵی تۆماری کردوە لەدژی حکومەت
هـان. لەکەيسەکەدا نوری هـەناردەی دەرەوە بکات لە ڕێگەی تورکيا بۆبەندەری جیهـەرێم مافی ئەوەی نيە کە نەوت و غاز 
هـەرێم حکومەتی فيدراڵدا لەسەر هـەيە لە نێوان حکومەتی هـەرێم دەکات. ناکۆکی دۆلار لەحکومەتی  ٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٦٢ماليکی 
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رکردنی دەستور. نەبوونی ياسای نەوت و غازی فيدراڵ بۆشايەکی ياسايی دروست کردوە. ڕەشنوسی ياسای نەوت و غازی تەفسي
هـەوڵدرا  ١١٠٢و  ٧٠٠٢فيدراڵ لە پەرلەمانی عيراقە بەڵام تائێستا لايەنکانی ناوپەرلەمان لەسەری ڕێک نەکەوتون لەساڵی 
ياساکە ئائێستا پەسەند نەکراوە. دەستور چۆنياتی بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازی بەجێ کەياساکە پەسەندبکريت بەڵام ڕێکنەکەوتن و 
  .هـێشتوە بۆئەوەی بە ياسايەکی نيشتمانی ڕێکبخرێت
 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵدا لەسەر تەفسيرکردنی مادە پەيوەندی هـەيە لە نێوان حکومەتی پرسيار: وەک ژەنابت ووتت ناکۆکی 
هـەبێت دادگای فيدراڵە. هـا لايەنێک کەدەسەڵاتی تەفسيرکردنی دەستوری دەستور بە بەڕێوەبردنی نەوتو غاز وە تەندارەکانی 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ کێشەی تەفسيرکردنی مادەپەيوەنديدارەکانی تايبەت بە نەوت و غاز نەبردوەتە بۆچی تائێستا حکومەتی 
  ی؟لای دادگای فيدراڵ بۆ تەفسيرکرند
 
هـەرێم و وەزيری سامانەسروشتيەکانی وەڵام: وەزيری نەوتی عيراقی سکاڵای تۆمارکردوە لە دادگای فيدراڵی لە دژی حکومەتی 
هـەرێم، بەڵام کەيسەکە بەردەوام دوادەخريت بۆ ئەوەی کەڕێکەوتنی سياسی لەسەر کێشەی نەوت و غاز بکرێت. حکومەتی 
هـەيە لە نێوانياندا ێت کە ڕێکەوتنی سياسی بکرێت لەسەر کێشەی نەوت و غاز. ئێستا گفتوگۆ هـەردوو لايەنی کێشەکە دەيانەو
بەرميل  ٠٠٠٠٥٢هـەرێم ڕۆژانە حکومەتی فئدراڵی داوا دەکات کە حکومەتی  ٩١٠٢بۆ نمونە لەياسای بوجەی فيدراڵی بۆ ساڵی 
هـەرێم دەنێرێت ەرامبەردا حکومەتی فئدراڵی بوجەی حکومەتی هـەناردەبکاتە دەرەوە لەبنەوت لە ڕێگەی حکومەتی فيدراڵەوە 
 .بۆ کوردستان. ئەمەش چارەسەری سياسيە بۆ کێشەکە
 
هـا نەوت و غاز هـەيە کە بە تەنهـەرێم مافی ئەوەی پرسيار: ئايا چارەسەری سياسی دەبێتە وەڵامێک بۆ ئەوەی کە حکومەتی 
 بەڕێوەببات؟
 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵی لەسەر تەفسيری مادە سەر ناوەرۆکی ڕێکەوتنەکە و وە ڕێکەوتنی حکومەتی وەڵام: ئەوە دەوەستێتە 
هـاتوون بۆ ئەم مەسەلانە. سەرۆک هـاتودەبێت. ليژنەی تەکنيکی پێکپەيوەنديدارەکانی دەستور. ئەمە بابەتی گفتوگۆکانی دا
هـاتوو هـەفتەی داەفتەی پێشوو بۆ گفتوگۆکردن لەسەر ئەوکێشانە. وە هـهـەرێم سەردانی بەغدای کرد وەزيرانی حکومەتی 
هـەرێمی کوردستان لەگەڵ ليژنەی تەکنيکی حکومەتی فيدراڵی کۆدەبێتەوە بۆ چارەسەرکردنی ليژنەی تەکنيکی حکومەتی 
  .ئەمبابەتانە
 
هـا تايبەتە بە ناکۆکی بردنی نەوت و غازە يان تەنپرسيار: ئايا ئەو کەيسەی کە ئێستا لە دادگی فيدراڵيە لەسەر کێشەی بەڕێو
  يس دەستور؟ ٢١١و  ١١١هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ لەسەر تەفسيرکردنی مادەی حکومەتی 
 
 . هـا و بەبێ گەڕانەوە بۆ حکومەتی فيدراڵهـەرێمەوە بە تەنوەڵام: لەسەر بەڕێوەبردنی نەوت و غازە لەلايەن حکومەتی 
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هـاتەی هـەرێمەو لەسەر بێلايەنی دادگای فيدراڵ يان لەسەر چۆنيەتی پێکهـەيە لەلاينە حکومەتی هـيچ نيگەرانيەک پرسيار: ئايا 
هـەڵبژاردنی دادوەرەکان، وەک بڵێين بەشی شيعە وبەشی سونە و بەشی کورد لە دادگی فيدرڵ تايبەت بە شێوەی دياری کردن و 
  .دادگای فيدراڵدا
هـەبوونی نيگەرانی لەلای حکومەتی عە و سونەو کورد لەبەرچاوگيراوە لە دياريکردنی دادوەرەکاندا. بەڵام وەڵام: بەشی شي
  . هـەرێمی کوردستان بکرێتهـەرێم دەربارەی سەربەخۆی بوونی دادگای فئدراڵی ئەبێت ئەو پرسيارە لە حکومەتی 
 
. وەک ئاگاداريت تائێستا ياساکە ١١٠٢هـەموارکردنی لە ساڵی و  ٧٠٠٢پرسيار: دەربارەی ياسای فيدرالی نەوت و غازی ساڵی 
هـەموارکردنی ياساکە بە شێوەيەک کە سەر لەنێو لە پەرلەمان پەسەند نەکراوە. ئايا گيچ ڕێکەوتنێک لەنێوان لايەنەکاندا بۆ 
  . ێوەبردنی نەوت و غازهـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ بکات لەسەر بەڕچارەسەری ناکۆکيەکەکانی نێوان حکومەتی 
 
هـەرێم و حکومەتی فيدراڵ کۆدەبنەوە بۆ تاوتوێکردنی کێشەکان و چۆنيەتی هـاتوو ليژنەی تەکنيکی حکومەتی هـەفتەی داوەڵام: 
  .چارەسەريان
 
  هـيچ ڕێکەوتنێک نەکراوە لەسەر ئەم کێشە؟هـێشتا پرسيار: کەواتە 
 
  وتنێک نەکراوەهـيچ ڕێکەهـێشتا وەڵام: نەخێر 
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Annex 3 The PSCs KRG has signed with IOCs between 2002 and present:  
(a) Ain Sifni  
a. PSC – Hunt Oil – 08/09/2007 
b. Assignment Novation and First Amendment Agreement – 
26/07/2011 
c. Hunt Oil Guarantee – 26/07/2011 
d. Hunt Oil LOR – 26/07/2011 
(b) Akri Bijeel  
a. PSC – GKP/MOL – 06/11/2007 
b. GKP/MOL Assignment – 22/10/2007 
c. GKP/MOL Assignment and Novation Agreement – 30/10/2007 
d. GKP/MOL Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
(c) Arbat  
a. PSC – Shamaran – 28/08/2009 
b. Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
(d) Atrush  
a. PSC - Atrush - GEP - 10/11/2007 
b. First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
c. Marathon Guarantee - 20/10/2010 
d. Marathon LOR - 20/10/2010 
e. TPI Assignment, Novation and Second Amendment Agreement - 
20/10/2010 
(e) Baranan  
a. PSC – Talisman – 15/06/2009 
b. Assignment Agreement – 26/07/2011 
c. Murphy LOR – 26/07/2011 
d. Talisman LOR – 26/07/2011 
e. Talisman/Murphy Guarantee – 26/07/2011 
f. Murphy TPI Assignment – 26/07/2011 
(f) Barda Rash  
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a. PSC – Komet – 20/06/2008 
b. Afren LOR – 27/07/2011 
c. Komet/Afren First Amendment Agreement – 27/07/2011 
d. Komet LOR – 27/07/2011 
e. Termination Agreement – 27/07/2011 
f. First Amendment Agreement and Completion Certificate – 
07/09/2011 
(g) Bazian  
a. PSC - KNOC - 10/11/2007 
b. Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008 
c. Deed of Assignment and Novation - 12/12/2008 
(h) Ber Bahr  
a. PSC - Genel Enerji - 31/03/2009 
b. GKP Assignment Agreement - 16/07/2009 
c. Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement - 16/07/2009 
d. Third Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(i) Bina Bawi  
a. PSC - Oil Search/A&T - 06/03/2008 
b. PSA - A&T - 29/03/2006 
c. EPSA - A&T - 26/02/2007 
d. Deed of Assignment and Novation - 01/04/2009 
e. OMV/A&T/Hawler Energy Assignment and Second Amendment 
Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(j) Central Dohuk  
a. PSC - Murphy/Petroquest - 14/10/2010 
b. Murphy LOR - 14/10/2010 
(k) Chia Surkh  
a. PSC - Longford/Petoil/Genel Enerji - 11/06/2009 
b. First Amendment Agreement - Longford/Petoil/Genel Enerji - 
01/08/2010 
(l) Dinarta  
a. PSC - Dinarta - HESS - 17/06/2011 
b. Dinarta - Petroceltic LOR - 26/07/2011 
c. Dinarta - Guarantee - 27/07/2011 
d. Dinarta - HESS LOR - 26/07/2011 
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(m) Duhok  
a. PSC – DNO – 13/03/2008 
b. Amendment and Relinquishment Agreement – 10/09/2008 
c. Assignment Agreement – 31/03/2009 
d. Assignment and Amendment Agreement – 31/03/2009 
e. Third Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
(n) Erbil  
a. PSA Annex A – DNO – 25/06/2004 
b. PSA Annex C – DNO – 25/06/2004 
c. PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004 
d. PSC – DNO – 13/03/2008 
(o) Garmian  
a. PSC - Western Zagros - 25/07/2011 
b. Western Zagros Guarantee - 25/07/2011 
c. Western Zagros LOR - 25/07/2011 
(p) Harir  
a. PSC - Marathon - 20/10/2010 
b. Marathon LOR - 20/10/2010 
c. Marathon Guarantee - 20/10/2010 
(q) Hawler  
a. PSC - Norbest - 10/11/2007 
b. KEPCO/KNOC Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008 
c. AOG Guarantee - 09/08/2011 
d. AOG LOR - 09/08/2011 
e. Confidentiality and Release Agreement - 09/08/2011 
f. KNOC LOR - 09/08/2011 
g. Norbest LOR - 09/08/2011 
h. Second Amendment Agreement - 09/08/2011 
i. Certificate of Completion Executed - 10/08/2011 
j. Deed of Assignment and Novation 
(r) Kurdamir  
a. EPSA - Western Zagros - 04/05/2006 
b. EPSA - Western Zagros - 26/02/2007 
c. PSC - Western Zagros - 28/02/2008 
d. Completion Agreement - 19/06/2008 
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e. Talisman Third Party Agreement - 19/06/2008 
f. Talisman Third Party Agreement Annex A - 19/06/2008 
g. Amendment Agreement - 25/07/2011 
h. Completion Certificate - 25/07/2011 
i. Talisman/Western Zagros Guarantee - 25/07/2011 
j. Talisman LOR - 25/07/2011 
k. Western Zagros LOR - 25/07/2011 
l. First Amendment Agreement to TPPA - 25/07/2011 
(s) Mala Omar  
a. PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007 
b. First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
c. Certificate of Completion - 31/08/2010 
(t) Miran  
a. PSC - Heritage - 01/10/2007 
b. Heritage/Genel Enerji Assignment Agreement - 31/03/2009 
c. Heritage/Genel Assignment and Novation Agreement - 31/03/2009 
d. Third Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(u) Piramagrun  
a. PSC - Repsol - 26/07/2011 
b. Repsol Guarantee - 26/07/2011 
c. Repsol LOR - 26/07/2011 
(v) Pulkhana  
a. PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
b. PSC - Shamaran/Petoil - 28/08/2009 
c. Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(w) Qala Dze  
a. PSC – Repsol – 26/07/2011 
b. Repsol LOR – 26/07/2011 
c. Repsol Guarantee – 26/07/2011 
(x) Qara Dagh  
a. PSC - Niko/Vast/Groundstar - 28/04/2008 
b. Niko Assignment Agreement - 28/04/2008 
c. Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement - 28/04/2008 
d. Second Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
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(y) Qush Tapa  
a. PSC - KNOC - 21/06/2008 
(z) Rovi  
a. PSC – Reliance – 22/12/2006 
b. PSC – Reliance – 06/11/2007 
c. First Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
d. OMV/Reliance Second Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
e. Second Amendment Agreement Certificate of Completion – 
31/08/2010 
(aa) Safen  
a. PSC – Marathon – 20/10/2010 
b. Marathon LOR – 20/10/2010 
c. Marathon Guarantee – 20/10/2010 
(bb) Sarsang  
a. PSC – Hillwood – 06/11/2007 
b. First Amendment Agreement – 26/08/2010 
c. Marathon Guarantee – 20/10/2010 
d. Marathon LOR – 20/10/2010 
e. TPI Assignment, Novation and Second Amendment Agreement – 
20/10/2010 
(cc) Shaikan  
a. PSC – GKP/MOL – 06/11/2007 
b. First Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010 
(dd) Shakrok  
a. PSC – Hess/Petroceltic – 26/07/2011 
b. Hess LOR – 26/07/2011 
c. Guarantee – 26/07/2011 
d. Petroceltic LOR – 26/07/2011 
(ee) Sangaw North  
a. PSC - Sterling - 10/11/2007 
b. Sterling/Addax Deed of Assignment and Novation - 15/09/2008 
c. KNOC Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008 
d. Sterling/Addax/KNOC - Deed of Assignment and Novation - 
12/12/2008 
(ff) Sangaw South  
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a. PSC - KNOC - 21/06/2008 
(gg) Sarta  
a. PSC - Reliance - 22/12/2006 
b. PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007 
c. First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
d. Second Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
e. Certificate of Completion - 31/08/2010 
(hh) Shakal  
a. PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International 
Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003 
b. PSA - Shakal/Trilax/Petoil - 25/02/2007 
c. PSC - Shakal/Oil Search/Petoil - 06/03/2008 
d. Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(ii) Sheikh Adi  
a. PSC - GKP - 16/07/2009 
b. First Amendment Agreement 
(jj) Shorish  
a. PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007 
b. Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
c. First Amendment Completion Certificate - 31/08/2010 
(kk) Sindi Amedi  
a. PSC – Perenco – 02/10/2007 
b. Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement – 24/08/2011 
c. First Amendment Completion Certificate – 24/08/2011 
d. First Amendment Guarantee – 24/08/2011 
(ll) Sulevani  
a. PSC - Petroquest - 14/10/2010 
(mm) Taq Taq  
a. PSA - Genel Enerji - 20/01/2004 
b. PSA - Genel Enerji - 21/11/2006 
c. PSA Annexes A, B, C - 21/11/2006 
d. PSC - Genel Enerji/Addax - 26/02/2008 
e. First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
f. Taq Taq: PSA Attachments - Genel Enerji - 2002  
g. Taq Taq: PSA - Genel Enerji - 2002 
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(nn) Tawke  
a. PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004 
b. PSC - DNO - 13/03/2008 
c. Confirmation Agreement - 10/09/2008 
d. Indemnity Agreement - 10/09/2008 
e. Amendment and Relinquishment Agreement - 10/09/2008 
f. Assignment and Amendment Agreement - 31/03/2009 
g. Border Adjustment Amendment - 30/07/2009 
h. Sixth Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010 
(oo) Taza  
a. PSC - Oil Search/Shamaran - 27/07/2011 
b. Guarantee - 27/07/2011 
c. Shamaran LOR - 27/07/2011 
d. Oil Search LOR - 27/07/2011 
e. Amended K42 Option Agreement - 28/08/2009 
f. Oil Search K42 Option Agreement - 16/07/2009 
g. Oil Search K42 Option Agreement PSC Annex - 16/07/2009 
(pp) Topkhana  
a. PSC - Talisman - 19/08/2011 
b. Option Agreement - 19/06/2008389 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
389 The full texts of all the contracts are available at 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=1 . 
239 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 Relevant Articles from Iraqi Constitution of 2005 
 
Article 1:  
 The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state 
in which the system of government is republican, representative, 
parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the 
unity of Iraq. 
Article 13:  
First: This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq and shall be 
binding in all parts of Iraq without exception.  
Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. Any text in 
any regional constitutions or any other legal text that contradicts this 
Constitution shall be considered void.  
 
Article 109:                                                           
The federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, independence, and 
sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system. 
 
Article 110:   
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following 
matters:  
First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, 
signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, 
signing, and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic 
and trade policy.  
240 
 
Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including 
establishing and managing armed forces to secure the protection and 
guarantee the security of Iraq’s borders and to defend Iraq.  
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy; issuing currency; regulating 
commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq; 
drawing up the national budget of the State; formulating monetary policy; and 
establishing and administering a central bank.  
Fourth: Regulating standards, weights, and measures.  
Fifth: Regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, residency, and the right 
to apply for political asylum.  
Sixth: Regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail.  
Seventh: Drawing up the general and investment budget bill.  
Eighth: Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq and 
guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq 
in accordance with international laws and conventions.   
Ninth: General population statistics and census.  
  
Article 111:    
Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and 
governorates.   
Article 112:    
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying 
an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were 
unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were 
damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different 
areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.  
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Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate 
governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to 
develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to 
the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles 
and encouraging investment.  
  
Article 114:  
The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authorities 
and regional authorities:  
First: To manage customs, in coordination with the governments of the regions 
and governorates that are not organized in a region, and this shall be 
regulated by a law.   
Second: To regulate the main sources of electric energy and its distribution.  
Third: To formulate environmental policy to ensure the protection of the 
environment from pollution and to preserve its cleanliness, in cooperation with 
the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.  
Fourth: To formulate development and general planning policies.   
Fifth: To formulate public health policy, in cooperation with the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region.  
Sixth: To formulate the public educational and instructional policy, in 
consultation with the regions and governorates that are not organized in a 
region.  
Seventh: To formulate and regulate the internal water resources policy in a 
way that guarantees their just distribution, and this shall be regulated by a 
law.   
  
Article 115:  
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All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government 
belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region.  With regard to other powers shared between the 
federal government and the regional government, priority shall be given to the 
law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region in case of 
dispute. 
 
Article 117:  
First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of 
Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.  
Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance 
with its provisions.  
 
Article 121:   
First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for 
those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal 
government.  
 Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in 
respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal 
government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the application 
of the national legislation within that region.  
 Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the 
national revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but 
having regard to their resources, needs, and the percentage of their 
population.  
 Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in 
embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and 
developmental affairs.  
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 Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative 
requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of 
the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and 
guards of the region.  
 
Article 140:  
First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete 
the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of 
the Transitional Administrative Law.   
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority 
elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes 
completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by 
a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.  
   
Article 141:  
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, 
and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including 
court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are 
amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the 
competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the 
Constitution.  
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